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Abstract 
Computer programs designed to converse with humans in natural language provide 
a framework against which to test supra-sentential theories of language production 
and interpretation. This thesis seeks to flesh out, in terms of a computer model, 
two basic assumptions concerning prosody-that speakers use intonation to convey 
intention, or attitude, and that prosodic prominence serves to convey conceptual 
prommence. 
A model of an information-providing agent in is proposed, based on an analysis 
of a corpus of spontaneous dialogues. This uses an architecture of communicating 
processes, which perform interpretation, application-specific planning, repair, and 
the production of output. Dialogue acts are then defined as feature bundles corre-
sponding to significant events. A corpus of read dialogues is analysed in terms of 
these features, and using conventional intonational labelling. Correlations between 
the two are examined. 
Prosodic prominence is examined at three levels. At the level of surface encoding, 
re-use of substrings and structural parallelism can reduce processing for the speaker, 
and the listener. At the level of conceptual planning, similar benefits exist, given that 
speakers and listeners assume a common discourse model wherever possible. At these 
levels use is made of a short-term buffer of recent forms. A speaker may additionally 
use contrastive prominence to draw the listener's attention to disparities. Finally, 
at the level of intentions, a speaker wish to highlight certain information, regardless 
of accessibility. 
Prosodic focus is represented relationally, rather than via a simple binary-valued 
feature. This has the advantage of facilitating the mapping between levels; it also 
renders straightforward the notion of focus as the product of a number of potentially 
conflicting influences. 
Those parts of the theory concerned with discourse representation, language gen-
eration, and prosodic focus have been implemented as part of the Sundial dialogue 
system. In this system, discoursal and pragmatic decisions affecting prosody are 
converted to annotations on a text string, for realisation by a rule-based synthe-
SIzer. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Information dialogues 
Dialogue is a basic social skill; human infants engage in dialogues of a rudimentary 
nature before they learn to use language. A competent language user can participate 
in dialogues, and follow passively the conversations of others. 
In the case of human-computer interaction, the purpose of the interaction may be 
to get the computer to perform an action or series of actions. Of particular interest 
are information dialogues, defined by Bunt (1989) as "dialogue with the sole purpose 
of transferring (obtaining, providing) certain factual information." Language-based 
interaction, in particular that where the medium of communication is voice, pro-
vides an efficient means of information transfer. Information services may become 
available to relatively unsophisticated users, provided that commonly used linguistic 
and dialogic conventions are observed. 
1.2 Prosody in dialogue 
The distinction between voice and written conversations is not simply a matter of 
modality. The linguistic register is often different. Writing seems to encourage more 
formality, more structure, less redundancy. On the other hand discourse markers 
such as oh and well belong to the spoken mode. Because dialogue tends to be spoken, 
and the spoken message is subject to errors and noise in processing, voice dialogues 
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are more likely to give rise to communication failure and the resulting repair needs. 
A final difference concerns the prosodic component of a voice message, missing in the 
written. The role of prosody in information dialogues is the subject of this thesis. 
In current 'text-to-speech' systems prosodic decisions are made on the basis of 
textual information alone. Since a complete linguistic analysis is unavailable, the 
result is often bland, or inappropriate. The case is different for voice output gener-
ators forming part of computational systems that embody linguistic and contextual 
knowledge. McDonald (1989) points out that a language generation program allows 
an application to distance itself from language: 
This distance makes it possible to increase dramatically the quality of 
the texts that are produced by allowing independent influences to enter 
into the process and their constraints and contributions combined ... A 
grammatically sophisticated generator will annotate ... conceptual units 
according to the different ways they could be combined and realized, 
and will establish a set of decision criteria-rhetorical, semantic and 
pragmatic-which govern what actually happens. 
If we assume that prosodic choices are to a greater or lesser extent affected by 
internal states, then a computational representation of such states, as they evolve 
during the course of a dialogue, ought to be capable of informing prosodic choices. 
1.3 Aims and scope of this thesis 
This thesis sets out to produce a computational account of a speaker in dialogue, 
with primary attention to how decisions of prosodic import are made, given the 
speaker's internal representations. The representations may be broadly divided into 
those which concern the dynamic state of both agents' knowledge about the domain, 
and those concerning the relationship between the speakers and their expectations of 
one another. In the domain of prosody, I adopt the commonly-held position whereby 
information status if indicated is done so by accentual means, whereas pragmatic 
relations are conveyed using melody. From this vantage point, I shall be concerned 
with these questions: 
1. how salience is conveyed prosodically in dialogue; 
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2. how dialogue is structured, and what implications this has for the choice of 
intonation contours; 
3. how prosody generation can be integrated into a computational account of 
language production. 
The representations that I use have arisen out of the dual need of answering these 
questions, and building a working computer model of a language-using agent who 
performs many other functions which are not necessarily manifested prosodically. 
Wherever appropriate, I shall attempt to show that decisi0ns with prosodic import 
are emergent, in the sense that the mechanisms which underlie them must exist on 
independent grounds. 
Language behaviour is an extremely wide field of study; in this work I am primar-
ily concerned with modelling the human agent as producer of language. Although 
the processes used in production and understanding may be different, it may be 
that they share, at some stage, common representations-a common (language-
dependent) grammar and lexicon-to take the most obvious example. Being con-
cerned with the dynamic behaviour of speakers therefore, I shall have occasion to 
refer to their activity as listeners. Studies in the field of prosody are also numerous 
and varied. Prosodic phonology, and its phonetic exponents, have occupied much 
attention. My work is largely concerned with those pragmatic decisions that are 
manifested prosodically; representations at a phonological level are therefore only 
of passing importance. Because however as yet the 'metalanguage of prosody' is 
a relatively impoverished one about which there continues to be controversy, it is 
necessary on occasions to argue at a level of phonological explicitness: either in 
revIewmg the evidence, or when discussing the outcomes of choices which affect 
prosody. 
A final restriction on this thesis is that the domain, and thus the sublanguage 
from which most examples are drawn, is restricted to the application of flight en-
quiries. This is in part necessitated by the origins of this work within the Sundial 
project. It has the advantage however of considerably simplifying the technical de-
tails of surface-linguistic and semantic representation. Examples cited in the litera-
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ture often draw on linguistic material which is in itself problematic for computational 
linguistics technology. The restriction to information dialogues in a simple domain 
may prove sufficiently constraining to enable generalisations to be drawn, where the 
sheer variety of material in less limited domains would diminish this possibility. 
1.4 Methodology and notation 
1.4.1 Computational modelling 
As demonstrated in Chapter 5, the ideas central to this thesis have been elaborated 
in sufficient detail to form part of a working system for handling human-computer 
dialogues. This thesis attempts to provide cognitive explanations for observed lin-
guistic phenomena. A computational model can support such an explanation in at 
least two ways. Firstly, the theory that is being stated can be formulated in precise 
terms: should any observable consequences arise, these may be tested and used to 
refute or support the theory. Secondly, a computational model which is implemented 
constitutes an existence proof that the theory is supported by an effective procedure 
(eg. Johnson-Laird 1983). In describing such a computational model, however, a 
trade-off needs to be maintained between achieving sufficient explanatory power, 
and over-shooting into excessive detail. 
Notations and implementation 
Woods (1986) points out: 
... one can axiomatise any rule-governed behaviour that one can rigor-
ously specify, whether its nature is deductively valid or not, logic-like or 
not. But the difficult issues mostly stem from determining what the be-
haviour should be and how to bring it about. This work remains whether 
the medium is predicate calculus or some other representational formal-
Ism. 
This thesis is an exploration of behaviour, some of which would appear to be rule-
governed. I have been eclectic in my choice of notations, and not sought to provide 
rigorous axiomatisations or proofs. Where some degree of formal precision is re-
quired, I use a combination of logic, set theory and the algorithmic notations familiar 
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in computer science. In Chapter 4 I make use of unification grammar formalisms, as 
a technique for describing linguistic constraints and their combination, as these oper-
ate across levels. A similar notation, based on the notion of typed feature structures, 
is used for describing conceptual material. In common with other feat ural notations, 
these constraint languages allow underspecification. Structures can then be built up 
incrementally. In Chapter 3 the notation of Communicating Sequential Processes 
(CSP) is introduced, for describing and reasoning about concurrent processes. 
The programs embodying the computational theories described here have been 
implemented in Quintus Prolog. However despite the apparent declarative nature of 
Horn-Clause logic, on which Prolog is based, the programming language is far from 
declarative in its every day use. Prolog execution may be described procedurally, as 
a process of search through an AND/OR goal tree (Eisenstadt and Brayshaw 1987). 
Viewed in this way, Prolog is not a particularly appropriate language for describing 
algorithms, since the state of the search at any stage is not explicitly represented, 
but hidden for example in the previous choice points for which alternatives remain. 
I therefore make little use of Prolog in describing algorithms or datastructures. 
1.4.2 A notation for describing intonation 
The term prosody is generally used by linguists to refer to those linguistic features of 
an utterance which are not segmental (eg. Couper-Kuhlen 1986:3). In the acoustic 
domain, its parameters are generally taken to be those of fundamental frequency, 
amplitude, and duration. At an intuitive level, where perceived structure is taken 
into account, these correspond to melody, stress, and rhythm. However, as Bolinger 
(1958) pointed out, pitch obtrusion is a more important correlate of stress than 
increased amplitude. Accepting this view, it follows that the field of intonation, in 
its narrow sense pertaining to the melody of speech, subsumes within it the study 
of accent. In this thesis I am concerned with intonation; I ignore that equally 
important aspect of prosody-metrical structure. The latter is generally taken to 
be realised in the time domain, and therefore separable from intonation, though of 
course dependent on it. 
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English is privileged in the considerable effort that has been devoted over the 
years to the transcription and classification of intonation. A number of systems have 
been used, from interlinear notation, in which the relative pitch of each syllable 
is indicated (Palmer 1924), to tonetic (eg. Crystal 1969) and autosegmental (eg. 
Liberman 1978, Pierrehumbert 1980), in which contours are described as minimal 
sequences of tonal events, the latter specifying some aspect of local pitch movement. 
Although emerging out of different traditions, the British (contour-based) and the 
American (level-based) approaches have tended to converge on descriptions which 
are substantially similar. Ladd (1980: ch.l) compares a number of systems from both 
sides of the Atlantic, and observes a general consensus in approaches, for example 
in the description of nuclear tones. 
In describing and transcribing intonation, I shall follow the practice associated 
with the tone sequence model, and describe only relevant tonal events. Bolinger 
(1958) distinguishes between lexical stress, the potential of words to have accents 
on certain syllables, and pitch accent, the intonational realisation of accent in an 
utterance. The tonal events, or tonal segments of the autosegmental model corre-
spond in the main to pitch accents; these are supplemented however with segments 
known as phrase accents and boundary tones, which are used to define behaviour at 
the periphery of contours. Tonal segments may be interpreted as targets, possibly 
associated with local pitch movements. It is possible to derive a pitch contour from 
these, using a variety of interpolation and smoothing techniques (eg. Pierrehumbert 
1980, Silverman 1987). The phonological claim for autosegmental representations 
is that they define distinctive abstract patterns; the phonetic claim is that these 
patterns are directly realisable in the acoustic domain. 
The advantages of an autosegmental-style representation are not only phono-
logical however. A case can be made for the ultimate equivalence of many if not 
all tonal sequence notations. However, autosegmental representations are becom-
ing commonly used by a wide variety of linguists, both intonologists (Ladd 1983; 
Gussenhoven 1984; Hirst 1983) and others whose interest is with the interaction of 
intonation and other components (Steedman 1990; Bird 1991). 
Pierrehumbert's (1980) representations make use of two tonal symbols, H (high) 
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Symbol Type Gloss 
H Pitch accent 'high' accent 
HL Pitch accent (nuclear) fall 
H Pitch accent high with monotone 
HH Pitch accent high rise 
LH Pitch accent low rise 
HLH Pitch accent fall rise 
iHLl.H Pitch accent deep fall rise 
1 Diacritic downstep 
Diacritic up step 
[ ] Boundary boundary symbols (default) 
T] Boundary end boundary: top of speaker's range 
1] Boundary end boundary: bottom of speaker's range 
[T Boundary initial boundary: high key 
[1 Boundary initial boundary: low key 
Table 1.1: Inventory of tonal symbols 
and L (low), together with diacritical marks indicating pitch accent, phrase accent, 
and boundary tone. Certain combinations of tones trigger upstep and downstep. 
according to rules specific to these phenomena. Ladd (1983) proposes a modification 
whereby the dichotomous HjL distinction is maintained, but phenomena such as 
downstep and delay are specified as features on accents. I follow the spirit of this 
proposal, using the symbols 'T" 41' to indicate upstep and downstep, and 'X', where 
X is a tonal accent, to indicate monotone. A complete inventory of the symbols used 
is given in Table 1.1. The symbols are typed as pitch accent, diacritic, or boundary 
tone. I follow Ladd in introducing compound symbols such as HL for 'fall', where 
Pierrehumbert would decompose these into pitch accent/phrase accent. Boundary 
tones are by default not indicated; where an intermediate boundary position needs 
to be shown, it is generally enough to indicate this using the single symbol '1' (rather 
than 'H'). Marked final boundary tones ('Tl' and '1]') are shown when pitch rises 
to falsetto, or falls to creak. Otherwise boundaries are taken to follow the contour 
of the nuclear tonal segment. When unmarked, phrase-initial boundaries default to 
the middle of the speaker's range. Otherwise '[1' and '[Tl indicate high and low key 
respectively. The notation also has some similarities to INTSINT and SAMSINT 
(Wells et al. 1992). 
In Examples 1.1-1.3 the (a) versions show stylised copies of contours, marked 
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using Pierrehumbert's notation (Pierrehumbert 1980: 257,277,291); the (b) versions 
give the same sentences annotated with the notation described in Table 1.1. 
another 
(1.1) a. 
orange 
b. AnH other HL orange 
another orange 
(1.2) a. 
b. AnH other LH orange 1] 
H-
HY. 
L- / 
'-
the cardamon bread was good 
(1.3) a. 
b. The LHLH cardamon bread was good 
I follow Pierrehumbert in marking a 'hat pattern' as H HL (cf. Example 1.1). 
Where the prenuclear accent is at some distance from the nucleus, the intervening 
syllables 'sag' for H HL; I use H HL to maintain the level head. l Delayed or 
'scooped' accents (cf. 1.3) have not appeared in my data; they could possibly be 
notated more efficiently using a diacritical feature indicating delay (eg. Ladd 1983). 
lGussenhoven (1984) introduces a tone-linking rule, whereby a chain of HL accents lose their 
fall, and become high accents with sags in between. 
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The notation I use for transcription is broad rather than narrow; as a result there 
may be details which other notations such as that of Crystal (1969) describe better. 
On one issue at least my usage agrees with that of Crystal and the 'British school': 
the symbol annotating the nuclear syllable has scope up to the next pitch accent or 
phrase boundary. This is exemplified in (1.3), where LHLH applies not just to Cal' 
but to the remainder of the utterance. In contrast, some autosegmentalists such as 
Pierrehumbert notate the phrase accent (L -) and the boundary tone (H'70) also at 
the syllable level. My choice is mainly one of convenience; where I depart from it 
this is because the final boundary tone is at an extreme in the speaker's range. 
To facilitate comparison, where several contours are available for a single text, 
separately, indexed to positions in the string. Position '0' is always the beginning of 
the string, and '$' the final boundary position. Boundary symbols, unless specifically 
indicated, follow immediately the word last indexed. So for example, the indexed 
string: 
I'd tlike to reserve a 2fiight to 3pans on 4monday sevenmg 
together with the contour description: 
is equivalent to the utterance: 
(1.4 ) [l I'd H like to reserve a fiigh t to l HL paris 1 on H monday 1 HL evening 
I shall wherever possible use this version of autosegmental notation, even when 
citing examples which have appeared otherwise notated. Such a straightjacket ap-
proach is justified because the phonology of intonation is not one of the main con-
cerns of this thesis. 
1.4.3 A notation for describing prosodic focus 
It is well known (eg. Brown et al. 1980, Thompson 1980) that prosodic labelling 
of spoken corpora is difficult, and difficult to get even experienced judges to agree 
upon. Among other aspects, this applies to the presence and absence of sentence 
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accents, which are generally taken to indicate prosodic focus. Because of this, when 
discussing focus I use a notation intended to leave unanswered the question of pres-
ence or absence of accents, but which indicates simply that certain phrases are more 
or less prosodically prominent than others. Thus I use the symbols < ... > round 
a phrase to indicate relative prominence, and > ... < to indicate relative lack of 
prominence, with respect to the surroundings. For example: 
(1.5) it <seems> to be <ahead of schedule> 
(1.6) it <<is»ahead of schedule now 
(1. 7) ... leaves at seven twenty in the evening our time 
which is eight twenty >in the evening< their time 
The double bracketing in (1.6) is used for especially prominent phrases, which 
normally would receive some kind of emphatic pitch marking. 
The amount of marking used will depend on the degree of detail at which dis-
tinctions are needed to be made. Examples 1.5-1.7 are relatively under-marked. A 
more comprehensive marking might be the following: 
(1.5') 
(1.6') 
(1. 7') 
>it< <seems> >to be< <ahead of schedule> 
>it< <<is» >ahead of schedule< <now> 
... leaves at seven twenty in the evening our time 
>which is< «eight»<twenty> >in the evening< <<their»>time< 
Whereas this seems a reasonable extension of the previous versions, it will be 
observed that any attempt to define a language of text delimiters upon which such a 
system of marking can be based is likely to fall prey to problems of redundancy and 
ambiguity. The obvious solution is to impose these bracketings on phrasal structures 
rather than fiat ones. This would have the advantage too of being capable of rep-
resenting relative prominence at a global as well as at a local level. This approach 
is the one taken in metrical phonology; I shall resist it, since my principal concern 
is with not with surface structures, but with the mechanisms underlying focus. The 
notation as presented, especially when used at a lesser level of detail than in Ex-
amples 1 .. 5 '-1. 7', is sufficient for illustrating phenomena, when default conventions 
10 
such as the routine defocussing of closed class words is taken into account. In Sec-
tions 4.2.5 and 4.3.3.1 I introduce underlying representations of focal prominence, 
according to which the output of the focus assignment mechanisms discussed in this 
chapter may be formatted. 
The two notations introduced, pitch-accent-based autosegmental, and bracketed 
for focus, are complementary. In general I will use the first when contours are being 
discussed, and the second where issues of focus assignment are at stake. 
1.4.4 Corpora 
The prosodic data discussed in the literature is largely of the anecdotal kind. Some 
intonologists maintain their own corpora of examples (eg. Bolinger 1989: 394-39;; 
Couper-Kuhlen 1986). However much of the argument over the interpretation of 
intonation draws on hypothetically constructed examples and scenarios. There is no 
doubt some validity in this approach: consider what advances have been made in 
the study of syntax since Chomsky led the way by advocating the respectability of 
linguists' intuitions. And as Bolinger warns, unless they are carefully constructed, 
statistically-based studies may miss those occasions where intonation is being put 
to special use. 
In this work I shall refer where relevant to examples from the literature, anecdotal 
or otherwise. I shall also on occasions construct my own examples. However, a large 
part of the data I present is taken from two corpora, which I describe here. 
The first, the Flight Enquiries corpus, consists of a set of recordings of spon-
taneous telephone conversations between professional information providers in the 
employ of an airline, and individual callers. As one conversation (not transcribed) 
reveals, the employees were aware they were being recorded. The conversations typ-
ically are concerned with queries about specific flights; occasionally the queries are 
less specific requests for information, or requests which fall outside the competence 
of the information provider, such as enquiries about flight reservations. Selected 
conversations from these recordings were transcribed by a collegue, Robin vVoof-
fitt, using the notation of Conversational Analysis; indications in the notation of 
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gaps in the conversation and overlaps are left in where appropriate, but no use is 
made of them. Where relevant I have transcribed portions of the corpus, using the 
autosegmental or focus notations described above. 
The second corpus-known as the Swedish Airlines corpus-arose out of a need 
to study in more detail the dialogue phenomena as they applied to the even more 
limited case of information dialogues which could be produced by the computer 
information service under construction within the Sundial project. The dialogues 
were designed to provide a variety of linguistic and dialogue-structural forms that 
appeared to lie within the projected linguistic competence. Phrases and phenomena 
were based closely on those found in the enquiries dialogues, but in some of the 
dialogues the task of making reservations was included. An attempt was made to 
cover the range of dialogue acts that should be within the capability of the agent. 
Particular attention was paid to repetitions, and the difference between strong and 
weak confirmations. The texts of the dialogues is given in Appc::ndix A. 
Two sets of recordings were made, with two speakers in each taking in turn the 
part of Caller and Agent.2 The speakers: MG, JM, JQ and MC were one female 
and three males. Since the purposes of the recordings were to provide material for 
the theories described here, rather than to establish empirical results, no effort was 
made to normalise the conditions of recording or the resulting recordings. 
The nine dialogues were transcribed, using the annotated autosegmental notation 
(see Appendix B). Not all turns were transcribed for every speaker, but an attempt 
was made to do this in the case of potentially interesting phenomena. Because this 
work is concerned with formulating a theory of production specifically in the case 
of the information-provider, somewhat more attention was paid to the utterances of 
Agent than to those of Caller. 
The two corpora are complementary: the first is natural and spontaneous, but 
contains limited examples if any of a given phenomenon. The second is constrained 
to be closer to the competence of the linguistic and conceptual mechanisms that I 
present. It also contains more than one example of phenomena such as repetition, 
2} thank Jill House and Anne Cutler for organising the two recording sessions. 
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with the contextual conditions and the speakers varied. Against this must be set 
the unnaturalness of the task of reading from a script, which several of the readers 
commented on. Extracts from the corpora which appear in the text are identifiable, 
in the case of the Flight Enquiries corpus, by a reference identifier from the \\Tooffitt 
transcriptions, and in the case of the Swedish Corpus, by cross-identification of 
dialogue number and move number, using the prefix 'SA'. 
1.5 The place of this work in the Sundial project 
The work presented for examination in this thesis represents my original contribution 
to the study of pragmatic and discoursal influences on the production of prosody. 
Although this work is self-contained, as demonstrated in Chapters 3 and 4, the 
computer implementation needs to be set within the wider context of the Sundial 
system, of which it forms part. Sundial is a five-year ESPRIT project, having the aim 
of providing a spoken conversational interface to information services. The system, 
in particular the dialogue manager and voice output components, is discussed in 
Chapter 5. The architecture, notably that of the Dialogue Manager, is the result 
of joint work. The software modules dealing with dialogue and output generation 
were implemented by a number of individuals. The Belief Module (Section 5.2) 
was designed and implemented by me, using Nigel Gilbert's NOOP object oriented 
package. Included in the Belief Module are those microplanning, or description 
routines, covered in Section 5.3. I was also responsible for the Linguistic Generator 
(Section 5.4), and the pragmatic components of prosodic generation (Section 5.5). 
Together these components cover the principal ideas presented in Chapters 4 and 
5. Other components of the dialogue manager, described briefly in Sections 5.1.1-
5.1.2, were built by the following individuals: Eric Bilange, Wieland Eckert, Norman 
Fraser, Nigel Gilbert, Klaus Heussler, Jean-Yves Magadur, Scott McGlashan and 
Jutta Unglaub. Prosodic realisation has been the work of Jill House. 
Discussion of those components for which I am not primarily responsible has 
been kept to a minimum. The computational model outlined in Chapter 3 presents 
my reconstruction, in part inspired by the Sundial Dialogue Manager. 
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The semantic knowledge representation language, SIL (see Section 5.2.1), has 
been jointly developed with a number of individuals, notably Scott McGlashan, 
Fran~ois Andry, and Gerhard Niedermair. Likewise, the lexicon description lan-
guage, a version of Unification Categorial Grammar (see Section 4.2.2), was devel-
oped with the aid of Norman Fraser, Scott McGlashan, Franc;ois Andry and Simon 
Thornton. Both of these knowledge representation languages replaced earlier pro-
totypes which I built, the essential difference being one of scale and generality. I 
have played a consultative role in the development of the new languages, having the 
principal responsibility for implementing the knowledge bases which use them. The 
interface language between the Linguistic Generator and the rule-based synthesis 
component (Section 5.5.3) was the joint work of Jill House and myself. 
During work on this thesis, some of my ideas have appeared in joint publications, 
and in Sundial technical reports. Those publications which directly relate to the 
work of this thesis are Youd and House (1991) and Youd and McGlashan (1992). The 
first of these presents in more embryonic form some of the ideas on focus elaborated 
in Chapter 3. The second paper includes details of the Belief Module description 
routines and the Linguistic Generator. Those components of both papers which 
represent my own work, and which are re-presented here, have been extensively 
revised and elaborated. In addition, my contributions to the following technical 
reports: Bilange et al. (1990), Bilange et al. (1991), Youd et al. (1990), Youd et al. 
(1991) reference material which is re-presented in this thesis. 
1.6 Overview of this thesis 
In Chapter 2 I review past research in the fields of dialogue modelling, discourse 
modelling, language production and intonational meaning. While a wealth of analy-
ses of prosodic phenomena are available, little work has been done so far to tie them 
into a computational model of production. 
Chapter 3 examines the Flight Enquiries corpus, with a view to determining 
the kinds of phenomena that a computational model of dialogue should account 
for. Such a model is then elaborated, in terms of an architecture of communicating 
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agents. This leads to an abstract feat ural characterisation of moves in a dialogue, as 
'dialogue acts'. Prosodic transcriptions from the Swedish Corpus are then examined, 
with a view to establishing whether intonational contour can be said to depend on 
dialogue act features. It proves difficult to account for the variability in intonation 
contours in terms of the model; this suggests that factors not modelled, such as 
attitude, may be involved. 
In Chapter 4 I present a computational account of semantic focus, as it underlies 
prosodic accent. I do this at three levels: surface-structural, conceptual, and inten-
tional. There is some evidence that speakers re-use a certain amount of previous 
material, including lexis and surface structure. I propose an account of how this 
is done, and show that it can be of benefit to both speaker and listener. At the 
conceptual level, reuse of accessible material is often accompanied by relative loss of 
prosodic prominence. I elaborate a model of accessibility to account for prominence 
patterns. This is extended to cover cases of contrastive prominence, corresponding 
to disparate belief states. Finally, I investigate how a speaker's intention to mark 
certain parts of the utterance may be associated with prosodic prominence and local 
contours. 
Chapter 5 describes and illustrates the implementation of the focus assignment 
components, as part of the description and generation routines of the Sundial system. 
I show first how the architecture of the Sundial dialogue manager corresponds to 
that specified in Chapter 3. I then describe in detail the implementation of the 
discourse-modelling component, and of the message output components, and the 
working of prominence assignment. This is illustrated with a detailed example. 
Finally in Chapter 6 I discuss some of the implications and extensions arising 
out of this work. 
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Chapter 2 
Review of previous work 
2.1 Introduction 
Four areas are relevant to this work. Firstly, theoretical and computational mod-
els of human dialogue place the utterances produced by speakers within a frame-
work of interaction, in which common conventions allow speakers and listeners to 
communicate goals or mental states. Secondly, theories of internal representation 
of information, and their accessibility to speakers during discourse are required in 
order to account for the context-dependence of language. Thirdly, cognitive and 
computational accounts of language production itself examine the constraints on 
the speaker, and how these can be modelled. Lastly, it is necessary to examine how 
these contexts: dialogic, discoursal and linguistic, affect prosodic decisions. 
2.2 The nature of dialogue 
2.2.1 Theoretical and empirical approaches to dialogue 
Dialogue is a structured social event in which individuals interact, and as a result of 
interaction, may change their internal representations. In pursuing the pragmatic 
functions of prosody, two questions must be asked: 
1. What is the nature of dialogue structure, and how is it apparent, either to the 
speakers during the course of the dialogue, or to the analyst? 
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2. What factors influence a speaker's behaviour in dialogue, from one moment to 
the next? 
The questions are clearly interrelated: a conversational agent needs to maintain 
some internal representation of the current context, so that he can deal in a ra-
tional, coherent manner with conversational events produced by himself or by the 
interlocutor. Conversely, any structure that can be shown to exist, it may be ar-
gued, exists on functional grounds, namely those of enabling speakers to so orient 
themselves. In this section I investigate theoretical and empirical approaches to 
these questions. Approaches based on speech-act theory have to a large degree 
been theoretical. They have attempted to characterise the relation between speech 
events, and change in speakers' internal representation. Approaches in the tradition 
of conversational analysis, on the other hand, have tended to remain pretheoretical 
in their choice of units of analysis. They have put the emphasis on observation, 
followed by functional accounts closely tied to the data. 
Speech act theory is founded on the assumption that we 'do things with words' 
(Austin 1962). In its most explicit formulation (eg. Searle 1969) the effect utter-
ances are intended to achieve on their hearer (their illocutionary force) is linked to 
necessary and sufficient conditions for their performance. For example, a question 
has the preparatory conditions that the speaker does not already know the answer, 
and that the hearer is not expected to provide the answer without being asked, and 
the sincerity condition that the speaker should want to know the information. A 
final essential condition defines what a speech act counts as-in this case an attempt 
to elicit the relevant information from the interlocutor. Speech acts are therefore 
intimately bound up with goals and beliefs, assuming as they do goals and beliefs 
on the part of the speaker, and having at least one effect on the beliefs of the hearer, 
namely that those goals and beliefs conventionally associated with the use of that 
speech act are held by the speaker. Searle, and a number of others (eg. Bach and 
Harnish 1979) have attempted to classify speech acts, using categories such as: 
(2.1) directive: an attempt by the speaker to get the addressee to do something 
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Speech Act theory has commanded considerable attention among linguists and com-
putationallinguists. However, some t.heoretical difficulties exist (eg. Levinson 1983: 
241ft'). Particularly pertinent to the application of the theory in computational di-
alogue systems, is the question of how it accounts for the relation between surface 
structures and illocutionary force. According to the literal force hypothesis (Gazdar 
1981) every speech act has an illocutionary force which is directly dependent on 
surface syntactic features such as mood, or on the presence of some 'performative' 
component. Such a version of the theory would have it that an utterance such as 
can you open the door is literally marked as a question, and only via some process 
of pragmatic inference is the intended force, or indirect speech act-in this case a 
request-derived. This lays a considerable burden on the interpretative process, es-
pecially since it is apparent that only a minority of speech acts that occur in natural 
conversation are direct according to the definition. 
In its precision, at least so far as the conditions for successful performance of an 
act are concerned, Speech Act theory lends itself well to attempts at formalisation. 
Cohen (1978) applied AI planning formalisms to the description and implemen-
tation of speech acts in computer programs. He proposed that conversation be 
viewed as a sequence of actions, in which the participants affect each others' beliefs 
and goals, via speech. Such a sequence could be extended to include nonlinguis-
tic actions aimed at fulfilling an agent's intentions, such as getting a door opened. 
Within the planning paradigm (eg Fikes and Nilsson 1971) plans had been modelled 
as sequences of operators generated by a problem solver in order to achieve some 
specified change in the state of the world. Cohen observed that speech acts could 
be considered among such operators, since they may be used to affect the beliefs 
and intentions of agents in cooperative planning. For example, a request is defined 
as an operator with preconditions: 
(2.2) AGENT believe (RECIPIENT can do ACT) 
AGENT believe (RECIPIENT believe (RECIPIENT can do ACT)) 
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-ie, the speaker believes the hearer can perform the request, and is aware of this 
ability; and effects: 
(2.3) RECIPIENT believe (AGENT believe (AGENT want ACT)) 
-which embodies the condition of hearer uptake of the speaker's intentions in per-
forming the act. Cohen remarks that non-obviousness (ie, that the hearer would 
not be expected to perform the act as a matter of course) and sincerity (that the 
speaker intends the hearer to perform the act) are both integrated into the planning 
process. Important features of the approach pioneered by Cohen are the formalism 
which makes use of embeddable attitude operators such as believe and want, and 
the requirement that the effects of speech acts depend on their successful uptake. 
In fact for their intended (or perlocutionary) effect on the interlocutor to take place, 
further conditions on his willingness and ability to act are needed. 
Bunt (1989) extends Cohen's approach. Bunt observes that the illocutionary 
and perlocutionary effects of communicative acts, which he terms dialogue acts, are 
derivable from their appropriateness conditions. For example 
S wants to know whether some proposition p is true 
S suspects that H knows whether p is true 
are basic prerequisites of asking a question. The notion of appropriateness condition 
is used to define a hierarchy of dialogue acts; these fall into three basic types: 
questions, answers and informs. Figure 2.1 shows part of the hierarchy for questions. 
Dialogue act types are shown in capitals; sets of appropriateness conditions are 
represented by sentences. Appropriateness conditions are inherited down the tree. 
Bunt handles lack of certainty about the interlocutor's beliefs, using the operator 
suspect in the place of know. In the case where, for example, an agent wishes to 
obtain confirmation for something he believes to be true for the interlocutor, he may 
use the POSI-CHECK dialogue act. In Section 2.2.2 I consider in more detail some of 
the work of the 'planning school' of dialogue modelling. 
The conversational analysis (CA) tradition has been concerned with the detailed 
analysis of naturally-occurring conversations, in recorded or transcribed form. In 
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S wants to know 
which elements in 
set X satisfy p 
S suspects that 
H knows 
t 
WH-QUESTION 
S 
CHECK 
POSI-CHECK 
S wants to know 
whether p 
S suspects that 
H knows whether p 
t 
p 
NEGA-CHECK 
p 
CONTRA-CHECK 
Figure 2.1: Dialogue acts characterised by appropriateness conditions 
isolating items for scrutiny, attention has been placed on those phenomena which 
the conversational participants themselves orient to, as well as to those which can 
be shown to directly relate to those issues faced by agents engaged in online con-
versation. One major result concerns the organisation of turn-taking. What are the 
mechanisms (or rules) whereby agents collaborate to ensure that speaker transition 
takes place smoothly? Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson (1974 ) suggest that these 
depend on speakers organising their utterances into turn-constructional units and 
listeners being capable of deciding when a unit is complete. The rules then deter-
mine who will hold the floor after the current unit: an interlocutor, if he is somehow 
selected by the speaker, or if he self-selects; failing that, the speaker himself may 
continue. The rules predict for example that overlaps between speakers may occur 
if several compete for self-selection, or if the location of the end of the speaker's 
turn-constructional unit is ambiguous. 
Turn-taking is an example of the local organisation of conversation. Equally 
important for our purposes is the phenomenon of the adjacency pair. These are 
two-person exchanges in which the second part in some way relates to the first 
part, as for example questions/answers, summons/responses, requests/compliances. 
However like other rules in CA, the rules defining what count as adjacency pairs 
are normative rather than prescriptive. That is, failure to produce a second part of 
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the appropriate type is not an error, though it may lead to pragmatic inference, as 
is the case when an interlocutor fails to answer a question. It is in fact possible to 
associate with many patterns of organisation a dispreferred as well as a preferred 
outcome. Thus a dispreferred outcome in the case of a question would be a 'don't 
know' answer; in the case of a request, inability or refusal to comply. Levinson 
(1983) suggests that the indirect nature of many requests such as do you have hot 
chocolate may have arisen because lack of compliance with a direct request is socially 
dispreferred. 
While speech-act based approaches have dealt with utterances in isolation, at 
the level of agents' beliefs and intentions, conversation analysis has placed much 
emphasis on observable, structural phenomena. A number of hybrid approaches 
have attempted to integrate speech acts as units within larger structures. Sinclair 
and Coulthard (1976), and Moeschler (1986,1989), have the exchange as a unit. 
Moeschler also introduces rhetorical relations between constituents, which can be 
marked as dominating or subordinate. Consider the following example (translated 
from Moeschler 1986): 
Al Have you got the time? 
Bl Haven't you a watch? 
(2.4) A2 It's stopped. 
B2 It's eight o'clock. 
A3 Thanks. 
The units of structure are the exchange, the intervention, and the speech act. Ex-
changes consist of interventions, which may recursively contain exchanges. Moeschler 
provides the following analysis of (2.4): 
11 Ai 
,J- 11' Bi 
12-f E"l 12' A2 
LADB2 
'----- 13 A3 
The outer exchange, E, is partitioned into an initiating question (11), a response (12) 
and an evaluation (13). 12 in turn is complex, comprising a subordinate exchange 
(ES) and a dominating act (AD). Embedded exchanges are thus handled in the 
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grammar. A similar approach is taken by Wachtel 1986; units and rewrite rules 
governing them are shown in (2.5): 
(2.5) CONVERSATION -+ DIALOGUE [DIALOGUE]* 
DIALOGUE -+ EXCHANGE [EXCHANGE]* 
EXCHANGE -+ ACT [DIALOGUE] ACT [DIALOGUE] 
Wachtel also makes use of features on nodes; these percolate and trickle through 
the dialogue tree according to various inheritance principles: for example, the (dis-
course) topic is defined at the dialogue level, and inherited by exchanges and their 
immediately descendant acts, but not by embedded dialogues. 
Houghton (Houghton 1986) combines an intentional model comparable to Co-
hen's with a syntactic treatment which allows sequences to be treated as structural 
units. He does this by defining preconditions and effects, not on individual acts, but 
on sequences of utterances known as interaction frames. To accomplish some change 
in goals and beliefs interactively, an agent must initiate such a frame. While the 
frame is still active, the agent and his interlocutor take up the initiatory and reactive 
roles, as defined for that type of sequence. Perlocutionary effects are modelled by 
the successful culmination of the interaction frame. For example, the interaction 
frame for M A K E-K NOW N is defined to have preconditions as in (2.6) and effects as 
in (2.7). 
(2.6) 
(2.7) 
know( initiator, not( know( addressee, proposition))) 
know( addressee, know (initiator, proposition)) 
Once this has been chosen, on the basis of the initiator's intentions and beliefs, the 
addressee will if cooperative become the respondent, and both will act and update 
their representations according to the instructions laid down for their respective 
roles. 
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2.2.2 Plan-based accounts of dialogue 
Cohen's OSCAR (Cohen 1978) provided a computational model of his formalisation 
of speech acts, as plan operators. Where its plan for action required assistance from 
an interlocutor, OSCAR produced utterances corresponding to the required speech 
acts. In a complementary approach to that of Cohen, Allen (Allen and Perrault 
1980, Allen 1983) produced a computer program in which the system was concerned 
with modelling the user's underlying plans and goals, using the evidence of speech 
acts recognised. Allen used a plan inference system to provide a rational account of 
some phenomena in cooperative dialogue, as in the following exchange: 
(2.8) patron: when does the Windsor train leave? 
clerk: 3:15, at gate 7. 
Here the clerk provides, gratuitously, unsought-for information. Allen suggested this 
was because s/he is able to infer that the patron has the plan of catching the train. 
Reconstructing the plan, the clerk may detect that the patron needs to leave from 
a certain gate, and may not know which. The additional information is designed to 
circumvent this potential obstacle. 
Litman (Litman and Allen 1985) considered the case of clarification subdialogues 
as a special case of obstacle detection. If an agent is trying to reconstruct his inter-
locutor's plan, and finds some information missing, he may plan for a clarification 
question. In order for her system to reason about plans, Litman included the latter 
as objects in her ontology, and allowed for metaplans, such as SEEK-ID-PARAMETER, 
which came into action when a parameter of some plan was not known. Instances 
of plans were kept on a stack, so that when the purposes of a plan were achieved, 
it could be popped from the stack. The input speech act could be used to continue 
the current plan inference, in one of three ways, either by continuing the top (sus-
pended) plan on the stack, or introducing a clarification metaplan for some plan on 
the stack, or by constructing a new plan. Like Allen, Litman used domain-specific 
expectations of speakers' goals. 
A further application of plan recognition has been in the interpretation of sen-
tence fragments. Carberry (1985, 1988) remarked that a range of pragmatic infer-
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ences may be associated with these; compare: 
A: The Korean jet shot down by the Soviets was a spy plane 
(2.9) B: With 269 people on board? 
B': With infrared cameras on board? 
While utterance B' is concerned with obtaining (or confirming) additional infor-
mation, B expresses doubt about the underlying proposition. Carberry poses the 
question: what knowledge does an information provider need, to cope with such 
fragmentary utterances? She identifies four major components: (i) a task-related 
plan, sufficiently explicit to account for the information seeker's goals as revealed 
in the previous discourse; (ii) a representation of shared beliefs; (iii) a set of antici-
pated discourse goals, based on general conversational principles; and (iv) processing 
knowledge, including plan-recognition strategies and focussing mechanisms. Pro-
cessing fragments takes place as follows. A discourse component suggests discourse 
goals that the information seeker IS might be pursuing. These are stacked, and serve 
to schedule responses to IS's utterances in such a way that conversational principles 
are conformed with. For example, having asked a question, the information provider 
may push onto the stack the discourse expectation ANSWER-QUESTION. Carberry 
provides rules relating each discourse expectation to a family of possible discourse 
goals, which IS might use to satisfy that expectation. Plan recognition techniques, 
similar in essence to those of Allen, are used to propose possible attachment points 
for IS's incoming utterances, to a context model representing that portion of IS's 
plan derived so far. Conflicts between alternative choices are resolved using the pos-
sible discourse goals, together with a focussing mechanism that attempts to enforce 
local coherence by preferring associations in or close to the area identified in the 
preceding discourse as the current focus of attention. 
In the plan-based models cited so far, a single agent was modelled. Interac-
tion was presumed to be with a human user. By contrast the implementation de-
scribed by Power (1979) is symmetrical; both agents in a dialogue are represented 
by independent communicating computational processes. Two 'robots' are initially 
equipped with possibly disparate sets of belief and goals, in a 'world' consisting of 
the two robots themselves, a door and a bolt, and simple 'laws of nature' governing 
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action in that world. The robots, two identical programs set up with different initial 
conditions, have as resources the ability to plan privately, and the ability to initiate 
and participate in conversational procedures. These are used as a basis for conversa-
tional structure, and may themselves call embedded conversational procedures. An 
example: 
(2.10) CONVERSATIONAL PROCEDURE ASK(sl, s2, Q) 
1: S1 composes a sentence U which expresses Q as a question, and utters 
it. 
2: S2 reads U and obtains a value for Q. He records that S1 cannot see 
the object mentioned in Q, and then inspects his world model to see if 
Q is true. If he finds no information there he says I DON'T KNO\V, 
otherwise YES or NO as appropriate. 
3: S1 reads S2's reply. If it is YES or NO he updates his world model 
appropriately. If it is I DON'T KNOW he records that S2 cannot see 
the object mentioned in Q. 
Both speakers share the same inventory of conversational procedures, and each of 
these is intended to achieve a given purpose for the initiator. For example the 
conversational procedure ASK is initiated by a speaker whose purpose is to obtain 
information. Then in order to get the addressee to know which conversational 
procedure he is expected to take a role in, the initiator has to announce it, as 
for example, for ASK: 
(2.11) May I ask you a question? 
In the initial stage of a conversation, the robots, being cooperative, agree to 
pursue a common goal, such as that of robot1 being on the same side of the door 
as robot2. The robots develop in parallel identical plans, planning in private, but 
identifying where necessary those parts of the planning tree which can only be 
accomplished cooperatively. For these, conversational procedures are used, both to 
delegate responsibility and to announce its results. For example, to achieve the goal 
of having the door open, one agent may be assigned the responsibility of pushing 
it, and later inform the other agent of the new state of affairs. Allowing planning 
and the execution of plans to interact, as well as the modelling of two agents, marks 
Power's work as different from the plan-recognition work considered so far. 
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The implementation of Houghton and Isard (Houghton and Isard 1986, Houghton 
1986) is close to that of Power, with interaction frames (discussed in the previous 
section) replacing conversational procedures. As with Power's program, both agents 
are modelled and there is therefore no interaction with a human user. The system of 
Smith et al. (1992) also takes the approach that dialogue emerges out of the problem-
solving process: interaction takes place when an agent's knowledge is insufficient. 
The system, which includes speech input and output, is capable of allowing both 
system and user initiatives. 
How suitable is the planning approach as a model of dialogue? In terms of ex-
planatory power, it might be preferred over more syntactic approaches such as that 
of Moeschler. The model concentrates on the goals of agents and their relations in 
plans; structure such as embeddedness comes out as an emergent property, rather 
than needing to be defined in some grammar. Grosz and Sidner (1986) propose an 
architectural account which brings together surface linguistic structure and underly-
ing intentional structure, and treats the former as a derivative of the latter. However 
Suchman (1987) takes issue with the view that plans form a suitable model under-
lying action in dialogue. She focusses on the relation of plans to their execution, 
and proposes that the performance of actions is better explained in terms of local 
interactions between an actor and his environment; actions so described she refers 
to as 'situated actions'. According to this view, plans are powerful rationalisations 
of courses of action, which may be used as a resource before action, in much the 
way that we look at a map before starting a journey. 
2.2.3 Summary 
Conversing is the archetypal form of speaking (Levelt 1989: 64). To account for this 
behaviour requires more than any attempted enumeration of possible conversational 
sequences can provide. In common with the analysis of utterance tokens, analysis of 
conversation needs to be based on underlying structure. From a logician's viewpoint, 
and also computationally, a sensible approach to this problem is to characterise the 
internal states of agents, then to describe how these states become modified as 
26 
the result of events during the course of conversation. Searle's characterisation of 
speech acts in terms of felicity conditions for their successful performance, and the 
formalisation of this by C<;>hen and followers have led to a number of computationa.l 
models. These take as their starting point the beliefs and goals of agents, and define 
speech acts as operators on these beliefs and goals. Planning-the derivation of 
sequences of actions to achieve desired effects-is seen as the motivating force both 
in the production of speech acts, and in their interpretation. In the latter case, it is 
the interlocutor's plan that needs to be inferred. A number of dialogue phenomena, 
from the embedding of clarification sequences, to the interpretation of elliptical or 
phrasal expressions, fall out well from these accounts. 
The range of dialogue phenomena is however somewhat limited; actions per-
taining to repair, or acknowledgement of responses, are not handled easily within 
the speech-act-as-operator model, though Bunt has succeeded in extending it to a 
range of dialogue phenomena, such as confirmations and corrections. However the 
dynamic nature of dialogue, as an unfolding of sequences of particular kinds, is not 
explicitly represented. By contrast, approaches which make use of the structural na-
ture of dialogue are capable of accounting for moves such as backchannel utterances 
for which it is less easy to formulate an intentional basis. They also offer explicitness 
about dialogue structure, and may entertain the idea of structure above the level of 
the exchange. As Wachtel suggests: 
"By taking into account configurations of features at nodes, one can iso-
late ... such elements as 'the last but one topic discussed by the previ-
ous user' or 'the first point in this conversation that needed clarification' 
(Wachtel 1986:39) 
It should be pointed out however that meta-references of this kind are extremely 
rare in spontaneous conversation. 
A third approach, that of Conversational Analysis, has sought to emphasise the 
creativity of an agent dealing with on-line communicative situations. Analysis at 
a considerable level of detail has provided insights into phenomena neglected by 
other accounts, such as openings and closings. Conversational Analysis is wary of 
rules, and at pains to emphasise their normative nature. Nevertheless rules a.nd 
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terminology have found their way into computational accounts. Cawsey (1991) de-
scribes a system in which discrepancies of belief between agents are handled by a 
reason maintenance system, while 'repair' messages concerning such discrepancies 
are scheduled according to the normative sequencing properties proposed by Sche-
gloff et al. 1974. Hirst (1991) in fact suggests that so long as rules formulated by 
Conversational Analysts are declarative, and thus capable of being manipulated by 
agents at a meta-level, computational treatments are possible. The case for this 
however is far from proven. 
Many existing dialogue systems inspired by Cohen's formalisation of Speech Act 
theory have been successful in providing coherent theories of agents as both language 
understanders and producers. There has however been a bias towards understand-
ing, and towards issues of pragmatic inference which are of theoretical interest. The 
TENDUM system (Bunt et al. 1985), which focusses on information dialogues, nego-
tiation and repair, and is partially empirically based, possesses many of the features 
of the dialogue system that I explore in Chapter 3. 
All systems that I have discussed, including those in which dialogue structure 
IS explicitly represented, have in common a division between the representation 
of information, and the operations or messages which result in the manipulation 
of that information. Those accounts that are prepared to define units agree on 
the speech act/speech event/communicative act/dialogue act as the basic unit of 
representation. Where they differ is in the functional load that they put on this 
unit. Dialogue grammars, or the interaction frames of Houghton, may represent 
dialogue events which are insignificant in terms of their effects on goals and beliefs, 
but which serve as slot fillers in a given sequence. 
However, little has been achieved in the elucidation of the relation between sur-
face sentences and phrases, and these acts. The problem is partly one of interpreta-
tion; as we have seen, the communicative function of many sentences is conventional, 
or needs to be arrived at via pragmatic inference. This need not be a problem for 
accounts of the relationship between dialogue acts and intonational contours, since 
it might be argued (and has been) that the latter are more directly indicative of il-
locutionary force. Mismatch of units, however, remains a problem both for accounts 
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of sentential content, and accounts of intonation. This is because turns, linguistic 
units and dialogue acts need not be in one-to-one correspondence. 
One other factor that has received relatively little attention is the perception by 
a speaker of his relationship to the interlocutor. Levelt (1989) cites experiments by 
Herrmann (1983) in which subjects requested objects of one another. It was found 
that the amount of deference (linguistically) in a request was directly related to 
the speaker's view of his own legitimacy in making that request. Similarly, in the 
classroom dialogues investigated by Sinclair and Coulthard (1975) it was found, not 
surprisingly, that a basic asymmetry existed in the structural positions occupied by 
utterances of teachers and pupils. 
2.3 Discourse coherence 
Communicating agents need to keep their own internal record of the discourse thus 
far; otherwise every utterance must introduce everything anew. So much is implicit 
in the accounts of dialogue structure reviewed: for example, an utterance counts as 
a response in so far as the speaker can be shown to be reacting to some previous 
initiative. But the contextual representations that agents hold in common must also 
contain a record of what has been said. This might be at the surface-linguistic level: 
a simple log of every utterance. Or it could be at a deeper level, in which information 
is stored as tokens in some internal model of the world, as affected by the discourse. 
There is evidence from studies of human memory, and behaviour in discourse, that 
the deeper form of representation is the one which persists, and which agents use as 
a resource during conversation. In Section 2.3.1 I review the evidence for discourse 
models and discourse model accessibility, and discuss theories of how the discourse 
model is represented. In addition to their use of long-term discourse memory, it has 
been shown that over a relatively short span, speakers and listeners make use of 
surface linguistic information. The evidence for this is reviewed Section 2.3.2. 
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2.3.1 Discourse model accessibility 
Language processing agents build internal models which go beyond what was actu-
ally said. We are at pains to make sense of the world as presented to us through lan-
guage; we will, for example, readily accept the description "the waiter" if the current 
discourse context concerns a restaurant, even if that individual is being mentioned 
for the first time. These model-building abilities were dramatically illustrated in an 
experiment by Bransford, Barclay and Franks (1972). Subjects presented with the 
sentence: 
(2.12) Three turtles rested on a floating log and a fish swam beneath them. 
readily make the spatial inference that the fish swam beneath the log. In a similar 
vein, it has been shown that memory for gist outlives memory for the exact verbal 
expressions used. Discourse models "are either part of or else intimately linked to 
broader models of the world" (Hankamer and Sag 1984). We may therefore conceive 
of them as populated by tokens, or discourse entities, which correspond in some way 
to the entities, real or psychological, that they represent. Additional evidence that 
humans model the world of discourse in this way comes from the use of pronomial 
anaphora and referring expressions (eg. Halliday and Hasan 1975; Hankamer and 
Sag op.cit.). These can often be interpreted as referring to previously mentioned 
discourse entities; moreover, the antecedents are not necessarily noun-phrases, but 
may be complete sentences denoting events: 
(2.13) The children asked to be squirted with the hose, so we did it. (Hankamer 
and Sag 1984:327) 
As further evidence that our discourse models correspond to internal representa-
tions of the world, Hankamer and Sag point out the interchangeability of anaphoric 
expressions, between discourse and deictic contexts. 
Investigations of the make-up of discourse memory have been motivated largely 
by the need to provide a unified account of patterns of coherence over stretches of 
discourse, such as pronominalisation of recent entities, and deaccenting of 'given' 
entities. The terms 'given' and 'new' were introduced by Halliday (1967), in order 
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to account for the distribution of intonational prominence within utterances. New 
information is that "not ... recoverable from the preceding discourse". Halliday 
and Hasan (1976) extend the notion of given to include situationally recoverable 
material. Chafe (1974) combines Halliday's idea of recoverability, with the notion 
of assumed presence in the listener's consciousness, which he takes to be of limited 
capacity, so that discourse entities lose their 'given' status if not mentioned for some 
time, or if the scene or situation changes. Experiments suggest that this is indeed 
the case. Clark and Sengul (1979) found that readers interpreted an ana.phoric 
expression more rapidly if the antecedent was in the previous clause, as opposed to 
two or three clauses away.1 
Further empirical work on discourse accessibility concerns the status of discourse 
entities which are referred to anaphorically, although not previously mentioned. 
Clark and Haviland (1977) considered the case of bridging inferences; these are sup-
posed to occur when a definite referring expression is used with no clear antecedent 
in the preceding discourse, as in (2.14): 
(2.14) a. Mary unpacked the picnic things 
b. The beer was warm 
The phrase the beer is not mentioned in (a), but can be felicitously referred to in 
(b). It is an example of an inferrable discourse entity, according to the taxonomy 
of Prince (1981). Clark and Haviland conjectured that readers would take longer to 
process cases such as (2.14), where inference was required, than those such as (2.15) 
where an antecedent had been explicitly introduced into the discourse: 
(2.15) a. Mary unpacked the beer 
b. The beer was warm 
Experiments, in which subjects were timed reading the second sentences of pairs 
such as (2.14) and (2.15) showed conclusively that this was the case. 
Sanford and Garrod (1981) conjecture that such inferences may be confined to the 
discourse topic, or scenario, under consideration. Scenarios have typical discourse 
lThey made the additional finding that there was a marked discontinuity in retrieval times 
between the recent and non-recent cases. This provides further evidence for the case put in Sec-
tion 2.3.2, that (short-term) surface memory and (longer-term) discourse memory are organised 
differen tly. 
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entities associated with them, such as the waiter in a restaurant, or the conjurer 
at a birthday party. Experiments (again, reading) show that once the limits of a 
scenario (in time, or in space) have been passed, subjects show greater difficulty in 
referring to scenario-dependent entities. 
Researchers building computational models of memory, especially those con-
cerned with natural language, have used database and knowledge representation 
techniques to implement discourse models. This was done for example by Winograd 
(1972), who built a program which conversed about a world inhabited by three di-
mensional geometrical shapes. The current state of the world was displayed visually; 
the discourse model at any stage consisted simply of its internal representation. A 
more flexible approach to representing Natural Language semantics, has been the 
use of semantic networks. Bobrow and Webber (1980) for example use the KL-
ONE language (Brachman and Schmolze 1989) for modelling natural language in 
dialogue. This representation, like many in AI, is semantic-network based, uses 
inheritance, and is capable of distinguishing objects and classes at various levels 
of specificity. Linguistic events are then interpreted as operators which affect this 
structured model. 
Such computational models of memory, together with the script-based represen-
tations of Schank and Abelson (1977) are capable of making bridging inferences. 
Less straightforward is the modelling of accessibility. Grosz (1977, 1981) analysed 
task-oriented expert-apprentice dialogues, and found that the set of possible an-
tecedents to a referring expression such as "the screw" depended on the current 
subtask focussed on in the dialogue. This meant that if a task was returned to 
after an embedded subtask had been dealt with, a referring expression could refer 
back to an earlier, not recently-mentioned antecedent. Grosz's (semantic-network-
based) model partitioned the discourse model into focus spaces, according to the 
accessibility of discourse entities during different phases of the task. The current 
focus space was termed 'active'; those above it in the task hierarchy, 'open' focus 
spaces. Interpretation of a referring expression was handled by directing search for 
an antecedent firstly in the active and open spaces. 
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Figure 2.2: Prince's taxonomy of given and new discourse entities 
A number of attempts have been made to present unified theories of discourse 
model accessibility. Prince (1981) attempts to clarify the notion of 'Givenness'. This 
is treated by Halliday in terms of assumed recoverability by the listener; Chafe uses 
the more limited notion of 'in the listener's consciousness'; if we add the sense of 
'shared knowledge', used for example by Clark and Marshall (1981), this amounts to 
a very imprecise use of the term 'given'. Prince seeks to remedy this by classifying 
referring expressions according to the way in which they purport to address or update 
entities in the (assumed) hearer's model. Her classification is shown, in simplified 
form, in Figure 2.2. A discourse entity may be entirely new to the addressee, or it 
may be dormant, not having been addressed during the current discourse. An entity 
which has been evoked, on the other hand, may have been explicitly referenced in 
the discourse; on the other hand, it may form a part of the discourse situation in 
which speaker and hearer find themselves. Between new and evoked entities, are 
those inferrable (or scenario-dependent) entities whose introduction can almost be 
taken for granted, given the current discourse model. 
A slightly different perspective is taken by Levelt (1989), who classifies an agent's 
model into (possibly intersecting) subsets, according to the source of information: 
common ground contains the information which a speaker can assume his inter-
locutor to know about as a matter of course, for example because of a shared social 
situation; the speaker's contribution and the interlocutor's contribution contain that 
information which the speaker and interlocutor have introduced, respectively. Fi-
nally, there is information which the speaker may potentially introduce at some time 
in the future. Levelt defines the discourse model proper to consist of the sum of the 
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speaker's and interlocutor's contributions. 
Ariel (1989) proposes that linguistic resources are systematically used to mark 
discourse entitie~ for accessibility. This is in line with Hankamer and Sag's (1984) 
work on deep and surface anaphora. According to Ariel, the linguistic encoding of 
accessibility ranges from high-accessibility markers, examples of which in English 
are unstressed pronouns, and zero anaphors, through medium-accessibility markers, 
such as stressed pronouns, and demonstratives, to low-accessibility markers: typi-
cally proper names and definite descriptions. Accessibility may depend on a number 
of factors; among these, Ariel cites: (i) the distance between antecedent and refer-
ring expression; (ii) competition-the number of competitors having the same role 
as the antecedent; (iii) the saliency of the antecedent; for example, whether or not 
it is the current topic; (iv) unity-whether the antecedent belongs to the current 
world/frame of reference, or in textual terms, to the same paragraph or discourse 
segment. Drawing on cross-linguistic evidence, Ariel surmises that this accessibil-
ity scale is universal, but in part conventionalised with respect to the language in 
question. As evidence of a universal tendency, it can be shown that whereas high 
accessibility is marked by using attenuated forms low on informativity, less accessi-
ble entities are expressed using more informative forms. Similar ideas are explored 
by Givan (1992), who argues that such linguistic devices are used in language pro-
duction to convey not only referential accessibility, but also thematic importance, in 
terms of the activation of material with cataphoric potential. Expressions such as 
nominals may be interpreted as instructions for cognitive operations on discourse 
referents, topical or otherwise. Zero-anaphors or pronouns mark continuation of the 
currently active "file", or topic, according to the iconicity principle: 
Information that is already activated requires the smallest amount of 
code. (Givan 1992: 25) 
2.3.2 Accessing and reusing surface forms 
A number of researchers have found that, whereas listeners/readers may have a good 
recall for gist, memory for surface forms is short-lived. Levelt and Kelter (1983), for 
example, recorded conversations with shopkeepers, who were systematically asked 
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one of: 
(2.16) a. What time do you close? 
b. At what time do you close? 
Although there is no difference semantically between the two sentences, the form of 
the answers was found to correlate significantly with the question forms. However, 
if other material such as an explanation was interposed between the question and 
response, the correlation dropped to chance level. Levelt and Kelter concluded that 
while surface recall had an effect on speakers' productions, its effect was limited to 
adjacent clauses. 
One hypothesis concerning the value of recent utterances, to speakers or listen-
ers, is that there may be a reduction in processing load, if the results of previous 
processing continue to be available. Frazier et al. (1984) studied how parallelism 
affected readers' performance. Subjects were presented with sentences formed out 
of conjoined clauses, for example: 
(2.17) John telephoned the library and his friend telephoned the doctor 
There was strong evidence that subjects processed second clauses which exhibited 
a high degree of parallelism with their first parts, faster than comparable material, 
and with improved comprehension. The effect in fact carried over to cases where 
the parallelism was semantic: Example 2.17 would take longer to process than a 
similar sentence in which both direct objects were of the same animacy. Frazier et 
al suggested that these results could be partly accounted for by the assumption that 
intermediate representations were primed; to the extent that processing a subsequent 
segment could take advantage of existing representations, the cognitive load would 
be diminished. 
In a similar vein, Bock (1986) studied the tendency of speakers to produce forms 
that were congruent with just-uttered sentences. Subjects were primed by being 
asked to repeat sentences, and this was immediately followed by a picture description 
task. It was found that descriptions tended to follow the primes in their structural 
features, so that a passive sentence would follow a passive prime, etc. 
Levelt (1983,1989) analysed speakers' self-interrupting self-repairs, as in: 
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(2.18) From white 1 go straight to-er-right to blue. 
Under normal circumstances such repairs-known as reformulations-have been 
found to conform to a well-formedness-condition: a repair is well-formed if a hy-
pothetical continuation of the original is capable of standing in a well-formed dis-
junction along with the repair; for example: 
(2.19) From white 1 go [straight to (green) or right to blue] 
Reformulations often involve considerable retracing-additional evidence that sur-
face forms are being referred to. 
Complementary evidence for the short-term persistence of surface forms, and 
their use as a cohesive resource by language producers, comes from the study of 
anaphora and ellipsis. Sag and Hankamer (1984) studied the phenomenon of deep 
and surface anaphora. While the former category may be distinguished by the 
possibility of deictic interpretation, as in: "1 wonder who she was" , examples of the 
latter depend on surface-structural parallelism, and assume a surface antecedent for 
their completion, as in VP ellipsis: 
(2.20) c: is flight 504 on time A: it should be 
Whereas deep anaphora may be explicated in terms of reference to entities in a 
discourse model, surface anaphors require an analysis in terms of surface structure. 
This distinction is supported by the observation that surface anaphora are charac-
teristically limited in their textual scope. 
Short term persistence may be more or less guaranteed, but there is evidence 
that longer term persistence may depend on the functional load placed on partic-
ular occurrences of surface forms. Bates et al. (1978) analysed conversations from 
television drama, and found better recall of expressions which explicitly introduced 
referents, compared with anaphoric or elliptical expressions. Johnson-Laird (1983) 
describes an experiment where subjects are required to recall descriptions of spatial 
configurations. Those descriptions which were indeterminate (capable of more than 
one interpretation) gave rise to better verbatim recall than determinate descrip-
tions. Johnson-Laird accounts for this in terms of model building: in the case of 
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determinate descriptions, mental models are built or extended, so memory for gist 
is uppermost; in the case of indeterminate descriptions, subjects need to recall a 
propositional form-and the verbatim description is one way of doing this. 
Evidence that speakers make use of repeated surface features in order to maintain 
conversational coherence comes from the analysis of Schenkein (1980), who applied 
the techniques of Conversation Analysis to transcripts of natural conversation. A 
major finding of this work was the number of conversations which exhibit repeating 
patterns of sequential organisation. The parallelism is reinforced by the re-use of 
both structural and thematic material: 
(2.21 ) 
2nd Voice: ... My eyes are like organ stops, mate ... 
1st Voice: ... Cor, the noise downstairs, you've got to hear and 
witness it to realise how bad it is. 
2nd Voice: You've got to experience exactly the same position as me 
mate, to understand how I feel. My eyes are so bad they 
are blurred and I've been using (binoculars) all night. 
Not only do the speakers playoff similar complaints against one another, but they 
employ parallel surface resources which reinforce this patterning. Nevertheless, de-
spite the evidence for repeated action sequences-repeated sequences of argumenta-
tion extending over a number of turns (Schenkein gives an example of a repeated six-
position sequence )-the most striking instances of structural parallelism, Schenkein 
concedes, occur within a single turn or a pair of adjacent utterances. 
The use of surface descriptions as a resource in conversation has been studied 
experimentally by Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs (1986), whose subjects communicated 
about a set of geometrical figures, which required some inventiveness to describe. It 
was found that once a description was settled upon, subjects tended to stick to it. 
Garrod and Anderson (1987) frame the issue in terms of the resources available to 
communicating agents in achieving coordination of action; they may build common 
linguistic representations, and they may rely on shared internal models. In a series 
of experiments in which dialogue partners talked one another through a computer 
"maze game", Garrod and Anderson found that pairs of players evolved their own 
protocols for describing spatial configurations. These protocols were interesting not 
only for their surface regularity, but for regularity according to the type of model 
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they presupposed. Garrod and Anderson found the stability of these 'description 
schemes' to be achieved not so much by explicit negotiation, as by an iterative pro-
cess which they. call input-output coordination: a speaker formulates descriptions 
with respect to a model which he assumes to be held in common with the interlocu-
tor; in interpreting the other's utterances, such assumptions may be incrementally 
revised until stability is reached. They call such a strategy "falsification definite", 
since it proceeds on the assumption that convergence exists, until evidence suggests 
otherwise. Similarly, Clark and Brennan (1991) describe how speakers attempt to 
establish common ground with a minimum of collaborative effort. This process of 
grounding takes place via protocols which may include the use of verbatim repeat 
in backchannel signals. 
2.3.3 Summary 
There is a considerable convergence between researchers from different fields about 
the existence of an internal discourse model, which a conversing agent accesses and 
updates during language processing, and which provides a resource for continued 
conversation. In psycholinguistics, it has been posited to account for retention and 
accessibility of information. It has also been proposed that various forms of linguis-
tic marking conventionally indicate to the interlocutor the degree of accessibility of 
a discourse referent. AI models of language behaviour make use of databases (or 
knowledge bases) as a necessary component to keep track of an agent's knowledge. 
Partitioning techniques have been used to represent focus and topic, and may be used 
to account for certain cases of anaphoric reference. The notion of the discourse model 
is also consistent with model-theoretic approaches to language meaning, though the 
latter often fail to distinguish clearly between mental models and the world that is 
being modelled. The representations used vary from sets of propositions (logical and 
some psycholinguistic models), via models which make relations explicit in an ana-
logical manner, to semantic networks, favoured in computational implementations. 
It may be that such representations are weakly equivalent, in that one can be used 
to model any other. In any case, the notion of a knowledge base used as a resource 
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by an agent underlies them all. 
However there is linguistic evidence that recent surface forms are treated anaphor-
ically in a different manner to longer-term discourse referents; this is backed up by 
psycholinguistic accounts, which demonstrate that an agent does keep a short-term 
record of linguistic structures. According to the Input/Output model of Garrod and 
Anderson, the use of both short term and longer term records by agents serves prag-
matically to reinforce the assumption of convergence. As I discuss in Section 2.5.2, 
the prosodic accentual properties of utterances also provide evidence for discourse 
models. It is possible that the distinction between deep and surface anaphora may 
also apply here. 
2.4 A model of the speaker 
2.4.1 Cognitive models of language production 
The 'speech error' model of language production (eg. Garrett 1980) possesses, apart 
from the message level containing pre-linguistic representations, two levels: the func-
tional and the positional. The former consists of meaning-based representations of 
lexical items, assigned to functional syntactic roles; their function is to control the 
elaboration of syntactic structure. At the positional level, phonologically explicit 
representations of lexical items are assigned linear positions, their function being to 
control the elaboration of phonetic form. Levelt (1989) discusses the architectural 
characteristics that a plausible cognitive model of production should possess. The 
principle of information encapsulation states that components should be relatively 
autonomous-that is, require a minimum of interaction with other components in 
order to obtain information, and operate on a characteristic input. Processes are 
thus specialists with regard to their input and their mode of operation. Levelt's 
architecture is shown in Figure 2.3. The model is based on the evidence of errors 
committed by speakers, notably word and sound exchanges. Levelt divides utter-
ance production into three stages: conceptualising, formulating and articulating. 
The Conceptualizer is concerned with elaborating a preverbal message; the Formu-
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Figure 2.3: Levelt's 'blueprint for the speaker' (modified version) 
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lator takes this message as input and produces a phonetic plan which is used to drive 
articulatory processes. The specialist nature of the ConceptualizeI' and the Formula-
tor is clear from the figure. The former makes use of data from the discourse model, 
while the latter uses the lexicon as its knowledge source. 
The Conceptualizer may be split into two components: a macro planner and a 
microplanner. The macroplanner elaborates communicative intentions into speech 
act intentions, where the latter are specified for content and syntactic mood. In the 
second stage, microplanning, issues such as thematic roles and accessibility marking 
are decided. The preverbal message produced 
" ... is a semantic representation that is cast in the propositional language 
of thought but that, at the same time, meets conditions that make it 
expressible in natural language." (Levelt 1989:75) 
The Formulator consists of a grammatical encoder, and a phonological encoder, the 
distinction between these being based on the same considerations as that between 
Garrett's functional and positional levels. Grammatical encoding takes as input the 
preverbal message, and produces a syntactic surface structure in which the terminals 
are abstract lexical entries, or lemmas, together with sufficient morphosyntactic 
feat ural information to specify any inflections and provide for detailed phonological 
encoding. 
The architecture also provides for monitoring components (not shown in Fig-
ure 2.3). Levelt envisages a feedback loop whereby the phonetic plan is processed 
by the Speaker's comprehension system; a monitor within the conceptualiser then as-
sesses the appropriateness of the output, and takes remedial action where necessary, 
giving cause to self-interruption and self-repairs. Such feedback is possible because 
the system is incremental. Autonomous processes work concurrently, and operate 
in an 'eager' fashion, as soon as some minimum amount of their characteristic input 
becomes available. These processing characteristics, it is generally accepted, must 
be required for human utterance production to operate efficiently from left-to-right, 
with the speaking of an utterance beginning before its planning is complete. 
The issue of how much information of a contextual nature goes into an utterance 
however is not clear. Consider the case of phrasal utterances such as noun-phrase 
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answers, which are incomplete without reference to the question. Are these simply 
conceptualised as fillers for gaps, and passed to the formulator without any accom-
panying contextual evidence? It would appear not, if evidence from languages such 
as German, where an answer may exhibit case agreement with the environment of 
the question, is to be taken into account. 
2.4.2 Natural language generation: computational models 
The work of natural language generation programs is often divided between a concep-
tual planning, and a linguistic realisation stage. While these correspond reasonably 
well with the conceptualisation and formulation stages of the levels architecture, 
they are principally motivated by a need to separate out conceptual and linguistic 
knowledge bases, and the processors special to each. 
2.4.2.1 Planning utterances 
Conceptual planning-sometimes referred to as strategic generation-was investi-
gated by McKeown (1985), whose generation system TEXT is able to describe infor-
mation and meta-information from a military database. At the top level, paragraphs 
are planned on the basis of rhetorical schemas such as "definition", "compare-and-
contrast". These schemas are then instantiated by information from the database, 
selected according to principles of topic coherence, and continuity of local focus. 
A different approach was taken by Appelt (1985), whose utterance-planning 
component is based on Cohen's account of Speech Acts as plan operators (d. Sec-
tion 2.2.1). Given a high-level intention, such as to get an apprentice to do something 
with a screwdriver, the planner is capable of reasoning about knowledge and inten-
tions of discourse agents, in order to derive the most appropriate utterance. The 
possibility of plan optimisation means that Speech Act operators may be combined 
into a single utterance. For example an agent may combine the goal of getting the 
interlocutor to pick up an object with that of informing the interlocutor where the 
object is, to produce: 
(2.22) Get the screwdriver from the floor behind the table 
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Appelt incorporates the conceptualisation of referring expressions into plans, us-
ing the notion of a referring action, whose perlocutionary effect is achieved if the 
hearer becomes aware of the relationship between the intended referent and the noun 
phrase description used. Because noun phrases normally do not appear in isolation, 
referring acts will normally be combined with other acts-as in (2.22), where the 
act referring to the position of the screwdriver is combined with the instruction to 
get it. 
A great deal of the work on planning for natural language generation has been 
concerned with planning the presentation of information, as in the case of Appelt's 
and McKeown's work. Hovy (1990) describes a program which, he claims, is sensitive 
to the interpersonal relationship, actual or desired, between speaker and interlocutor. 
The program is capable of describing information from the same knowledge base 
according to different sets of criteria, such as the speaker's intention to influence 
the hearer, or the hearer's perceived emotional state. On the basis of a given set 
of criteria, rhetorical goals defined in terms of desired stylistic properties of the 
text are set up. Thus the rhetorical goal formality is given the value colloquial 
if the depth of acquaintance is that between friends, but it then receives a more 
formal value if in addition the effect of distance is required. Rhetorical goals act 
as global parameter settings which guide choices such as depth of expansion during 
planning or selection of appropriate vocabulary. Conflict between rhetorical goals 
is handled not explicitly, but by averaging their respective performances in terms 
of the number of choices they have influenced. Another aspect of planning, that of 
referential expressions in discourse, has received attention in Dale (1990). In Dale's 
generator, descriptions vary in detail according to the amount of information needed 
to effect discrimination of referents; decisions to use pronouns or zero-anaphora are 
based on recency considerations. 
2.4.2.2 Linguistic realisation 
This stage, sometimes known as the tactical stage in language generation, takes place 
once a suitably tailored conceptual representation has been produced. Constraints 
defined in a grammar and/or lexicon are then applied to produce natural language 
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output. It is possible to identify two major strands of work which have been active in 
recent years. Computational linguists concerned with elegance and economy of rep-
resentation have built models which make use of constraints defined in a bidirectional 
grammar/lexicon-ie, one in which knowledge is declarative and thus indifferent to 
how it is to be applied, whether in parsing or generation. Both generation and pars-
ing with such linguistic representations may be viewed as the process of deriving 
an analysis tree, which is equivalent to a proof of the well-formedness of the input, 
be it conceptual or textual (Shieber 1988). The nodes the analysis tree are typi-
cally labelled with feature structures that combine lexical, syntactic and semantic 
properties. Constraints are combined by unification. There are of course a number 
of search regimes that will lead to the same result, some more efficient or complete 
than others. Of particular interest is the head-driven bottom-up algorithm (Shieber 
et ai. 1990, van Noord 1990). In this approach, search is lexically based: lexical 
items are selected according to their ability to match with the incoming semantic 
structure; if a lexical item carries with it constraints on its linguistic environment, 
these are used to provoke further search. 
The other continuing major strand of research concerns attempts to provide com-
putational models of theories of incremental production. Kempen and Hoenkamp 
(1987) describe a model of production where the generation of syntactic forms is 
supervised by concurrent grammatical 'specialists', corresponding to the major con-
stituents of surface structure. 
POPEL-HOW (Reithinger 1989, Finkler and Neumann 1989) represents a com-
ing together of several strands of generation research. Firstly, it is an incremental 
generator. Output is available at the phonetic (word string) level before the concep-
tualisation component has finished. Reithinger et ai. demonstrate that this results 
in word order variations reflecting different orderings of conceptual input; given a 
destination (Detroit), a travelling action, and a traveller (Peter), in that order, the 
formulator produces (2.23); If the vehicle (airplane) is then given, the continuation 
(2.24) is produced. On the other hand, specifying the vehicle, the person, the action 
and the destination in that order, produces (2.25): 
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(2.23) Nach Detroit fahrt Peter 
(To Detroit travels Peter) 
(2.24) mit dem Flugzeug 
(by plane) 
(2.25) Peter fliegt nach Detroit 
(Peter flies to Detroit) 
It is thus possible to account for word-order variations in terms of the order in 
which the message is put together, which in turn may reflect topicality. 
Secondly, feedback channels between levels are permitted. If the Formulator 
cannot continue because the linguistic structure it is elaborating requires more con-
ceptual structure, this can be sought at the conceptual level. Finally, POPEL-
HOW employs a declarative, lexicon-based unification grammar, with the virtues 
of modularity and maintainability that this entails. Incrementality with feedback 
is achieved by the procedural means of communicating concurrent objects; however 
the linguistic constraints which these objects are forced to obey are compiled from 
the grammar. 
2.4.3 Summary 
There is general agreement between cognitive modelling accounts of language pro-
duction and computational implementations, concerning the separation between the 
conceptualising and formulating stages. Many of these are based on the notion of 
hierarchical planning, whereby structures conceived at a higher level are refined 
and elaborated at the lower levels, with the aid of context-independent knowledge 
bases. Hovy (1990) however raises the issue of restrictive planning, which he claims 
is needed to account for the phenomena of his model, such as the balance of possi-
bly competing stylistic goals. For such a model to work, it is necessary that local 
execution choices at a number of levels are monitored with respect to their effects 
in satisfying persistent rhetorical goals, and their outcome is adjusted so as to con-
tribute towards global satisfaction of these goals. Such a processing model may be 
particularly suited to describing how prosodic choices are made during production. 
45 
2.5 The relevance of prosody 
The study of intonation, as Hirst (1987) points out, cuts across traditional subject 
boundaries, "from phonetics to pragmatics and far beyond". In this review, I shall be 
concerned with two aspects of prosody: accent and melody, and with what pragmatic 
factors affect them. 
2.5.1 Prosodic focus and accent 
The phenomenon of sentence accent is one that has long absorbed analysts. Unlike 
lexical stress, which is more or less stable, in a language like English more than one 
accentual pattern may apply to a single sentence: 
(2.26) a. The average American expects too much of people. 
b. The average American expects too much of people. 
c. The average American expects too much of people. 
d. The average American expects too much Of people. 
e. The average American expects too much of people. 
(Bolinger 1989: 363) 
A number of explanations of sentence accent have been attempted, from relatively 
syntactic to relatively semantic/discoursal. They have in common an appeal to 
organisation at a level beyond that of the word. 
The notion of Figure and Background may have found its way into linguistics 
from Gestalt Psychology via the Prague School (Danes 1960), where it was consid-
ered to be a major factor underlying the organisation of material within the sentence. 
This was particularly appropriate to a relatively free-word-order language like Czech, 
and in the guise of the theme-rheme opposition it has been applied with some limited 
success to English. The terms focus and presupposition were applied by Chomsky 
(1971) as part of an attempt to incorporate phenomena of accent placement into the 
then prevailing methodologies of Generative Phonology and Transformational Syn-
tax. Chomsky, and following him Jackendoff (1972), were able to provide a meaning 
representation for focus and presupposition, in terms of a variable extracted from 
logical form. Chomsky proposed that a single accent could give rise to a number 
of interpretations, in terms of the domains it brought into focus. For example, the 
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sentence (2.27) with accent on the final word may be construed as an answer to any 
one of (2.28-2.30). 
(2.27) Papa has given Tommy a GUN 
(2.28) What's happened? 
(2.29) What has Papa done? 
(2.30) What's Papa given to Tommy? (Gussenhoven 1987: 12) 
Similarly, Wilson and Sperber (1979) point out that final accent on a sentence 
such as You've eaten all my apples is ambiguous as to which of presupposition is 
intended, for example among: you've eaten all of something, you've eaten something, 
you've done something, something's happened. Sperber and Wilson refer to these as 
a sequence of ordered entailments, because earlier items logically entail later ones. 
They suggest that the ambiguity as to which entailment is intended can be utilised 
by listeners, who make successively more detailed hypotheses, during left-to-right 
processing, corresponding (in reverse order) to the set of ordered entailments. 
Focus thus has been seen by many analysts as a binary distinction, albeit one 
whose scope with respect to an observable pattern of sentence accents is ill-defined. 
Many prosodic phonologists have taken the basic notion for granted, concentrating 
instead on the factors which govern accent placement, given that focus is somehow 
independently assigned. The original Generative Phonology position (Chomsky and 
Halle 1968) was that according to the Nuclear Stress Rule the major accent was 
placed on the final accentable syllable of the sentence. But there were exceptions. 
Schmerling (1976) examined a body of data and found that in many cases 'news 
sentences' which seemed not to depend on given material, did not obey this pat-
tern. 
(2.31) J.Q.hnson died 
These examples Schmerling accounted for with the principle that semantic predicates 
(and hence verbs) were semantically subordinate to their arguments (typically noun 
phrases). The SVO configuration typical of English, Schmerling claimed, had tended 
to obscure this fact, which became apparent when intransitive and phrasal verb 
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examples, or examples from languages such as German with different basic word 
order patterns, were considered. 
Selkirk (1984) and Gussenhoven (1983) both endorsed Schmerling's approach. 
Gussenhoven, starting with the assumption that the binary-valued feature focus 
~~exists as a formal category available in speakers' grammars" (Gussenhoven et al. 
1987: 4), is concerned with predicting where accents will fall, given a distribution 
of the feature over a sentence. Making use of the notion of focus domain, defined as 
one or more constituents whose [+ focus] status can be signalled by a 
single accent (ibid: 15) 
Gussenhoven proposes a system of rules which effectively merge and redistribute 
focus into domains from which accent placement is easily accounted for. An example 
of these Sentence Accent Assignment Rules (SAAR) is given in (2.32). 
(2.32) Domain assignment: P(X)A -+ [P(X)A] (Gussenhoven 1987: 16) 
The rule states that a focussed predicate, followed by some non-specific unfocussed 
constituent, followed by an argument, may be combined into a single focus domain. 
Schmerling's rule, that arguments rather than predicates were accented, then ap-
plies. Gussenhoven's rules are fairly elaborate, designed to minimise the number 
of exceptions. They have been applied to a sizable body of data for both English 
and Dutch. Experimental studies (Gussenhoven 1984b ) have added support. For 
example, when the condition of (2.32) is not met, for example when X is focussed, 
Gussenhoven found that a significant proportion of listeners were able to detect more 
than one accent; this corresponds (according to Gussenhoven) to the case in which 
~focus domain merging' is blocked. 
Against all the work on focus domains must be set the position of Bolinger, who 
has consistently opposed attempts to give structural accounts of accent placement 
(Bolinger 1972, Bolinger 1985, Bolinger 1986, Bolinger 1989). According to Bolinger, 
Accents are prima facie iconic, responding to the speaker's sensation of 
the INTEREST in what he is saying ... At a first remove from interest we 
have IMPORTANCE-what is most important is what is apt to be most 
interesting; and at a second remove we have INFORMATION-what is 
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most informative is apt to be what is most important. Information struc-
ture is served by accentual structure, but mediated through sensation. 
(Gussenhoven et al. 1987: 95) 
Bolinger points out, for example, that the often-observed de-focussing of verbs in 
news sentences can be accounted for in terms of sacrifice of accent to a nearby focal 
meaning, and because the average noun is more interesting than the average verb. 
When a verb is interesting, it is quite normal to accent it: 
(2.33) 
What happened?- Tommy saw a bear! 
Tommy spotted a bear! 
Tommy caught a bear! 
Tommy captured a bear! 
(Bolinger 1986:125) 
The verbs see and catch are relatively commonplace and uninteresting; spot and 
capture are less frequent, and semantically more specific; they are more likely to be 
accented. By the same token, nouns which are relatively semantically empty, such 
as people may lose their accent to the verb---compare (a) and (b) below: 
(2.34) a. Soldiers were standing guard 
b. People were standing guard (Bolinger 1989: 235) 
As a complement to the principle of interest in determining accent placement, 
Bolinger proposes the additional principle of power. He suggests that ceteris paribus 
a pattern in which "a sort of annuciatory or attention-getting accent comes towards 
the beginning and a 'punch' accent comes towards the end"-ie, an early onset and 
a late nucleus, to use Crystal's terminology-is inherently more powerful in its effect 
than one in which the the nucleus is early; compare: 
(2.35) a. We'll see about that. 
b. We'll see about that. (Bolinger 1986:82) 
In fact the shifting of accents as far to the right as possible (causing at times dis-
tortions in the default position of lexical stress) allows for the possibility of more 
prenuclear accents, and thus a greater effect of power: 
(2.36) a. I don't WATCH television! 
b. I don't watch TELevision! 
c. I don't watch teleVISion! 
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d. I DON'T WATCH TELeVIsion! 
(Bolinger 1989: 377) 
The sequence in (2.36) corresponds to increasing emotive pressure on the speaker's 
behalf, occurring perhaps because of misunderstanding or communication failure. 
2.5.2 Prosodic marking of accessibility 
We have seen (Section 2.3.1) that a number of linguistic devices such as anaphora can 
be used to indicate accessibility in the assumed shared discourse model. The notion 
of 'Given' and 'New' was initially used by Halliday to account for patterns of prosodic 
accent. Subsequent investigations of the use of accent, and its correlation with 
accessibility, have added to our understanding of the Given-New distinction. Brown 
(1983) applied the classification of Prince (1981) to the analysis of the results of an 
experiment in which speakers described figures containing simple shapes. She found, 
as would be expected, that evoked items tended to be deaccented, and new items to 
receive accent. Interestingly, material not directly mentioned, but inferrable from 
the preceding discourse, also tended to be accented, though slightly less frequently. 
Terken (1985) carried out a series of experiments in which speakers described the 
relative positions of letters on a simple VDU display, using sentences such as: 
(2.37) The P is below the K 
Because the sequence of configurations was so arranged that there was continuity 
over time, he was able to analyse both cumulative mention, and probability of men-
tion of an item, as well as the 'pragmatic status' of an item (whether it was currently 
considered to be movable or stationary). His results showed that items tended to 
be treated as given-ie, to be unaccented-relative to previously mentioned items, 
when these were either: (i) coreferential, (ii) had the same pragmatic function (in 
the sense that it belonged to the same class, of either movable, or stationary items; 
(iii) had the same sentential position. Nevertheless, even strongly predictable items 
lost their propensity to being defocussed if in the subject or predicate position where 
that position in the previous utterance was filled by another referent. In a further ex-
periment, in which speakers gave oral instructions concerning a visual task, Terken 
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found that the boundaries between instructions inhibited carry-over of what was 
accessible, apart from instruction topics and topical items. This result is strongly 
reminiscent of those of Sanford and Garrod (1981) on scenario-dependent entities 
(cf. discussion on page 31). 
The accentual pattern of an utterance may act as a positive aid to the listener. 
Non-accented syllables tend to be phonetically reduced; for accented syllables the 
converse holds. Cutler and Fodor (1979) suggest that the comprehension of ac-
cented words is faster; this allows listeners to give priority to the processing of new 
information in an utterance. Fowler and Housum (1987) presented listeners with 
materials obtained by using various spliced combinations involving first and subse-
quent mentions of words, from spontaneously spoken monologues. They found that 
the subsequent mentions were perceptually degraded, but that listeners were able to 
compensate because they had heard the words before, and because by the time of 
the second mention there was usually added contextual support. They also found 
that listeners use their knowledge that a word has been repeated to facilitate recall 
of its prior context. Terken and Nooteboom (1988) present results with similar im-
plications. Subjects followed successive configurations of letters on a visual display, 
similar to that of (Terken 1985), and were given the task of verifying recorded utter-
ances. Reaction times were measured, with the clear result that not only was new 
information verified faster when the information-carrying words were accented than 
when they were not, but given information was verified faster for unaccented words, 
than for accented. These results suggest, as Terken and Nooteboom hypothesize, 
that both accentuation and de-accentuation are exploited by listeners: accentuation 
directing the attention of the listener to acoustic/phonetic decoding (ie, bottom-up 
processing); de-accentuation leading him to search among the limited set of discourse 
entity candidates that are currently active, thus allowing top-down processing. 
Further evidence for the usefulness of prosodic focus to listeners comes from an 
experimental study by Blutner and Sommer (1988). When subjects were presented 
with contextualised ambiguous words, initially both readings were present, if the 
words were part of the semantic focus of the sentences. For words not belonging to 
the semantic focus (ie, material which could be considered 'given' or presupposed), 
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there was not found to be such a stage of activation preceding disambiguation. 
These findings complement Ariel's (1989) and Givan's (1992) conjectures about 
the use of explicit high-accessibility markers such as pronouns, in indicating to the 
listener how to retrieve a previous referent. In the case of unaccented forms, these 
were not attenuated at a lexical or semantic level; however, as Fowler and Housum 
verified, they tended to be prosodically attenuated. Givenness marked by prosodic 
attenuation appears therefore to facilitate search for listeners. 
2.5.3 Intonation and contrast 
The idea that contrast can be marked by accent must be uppermost among folk-
notions of prosodic function among English speakers. Contrastive accent has even 
found its way into written texts, via the typographical device of italics. Nevertheless 
a precise linguistic characterisation of contrast has proved difficult. Objecting to 
the classification of some pitch contours as contrastive or emphatic, Bolinger (1961) 
retorts: 
As far as we can tell from the behaviour of pitch, nothing is uniquely 
contrastive. 
As support for this view Bolinger gives the examples: 
(2.38) [lHe didn't buy a LH Ford] he bought a 1HL Plymouth. 
(2.39) [1 Just leave him LH alone] and he won't 1HL bother you. 
Whereas some kind of contrast is undoubtedly being made in (2.38), the same 
contour is used in (2.39) without any such intended effect. So far as semantic 
contrast is concerned, Bolinger (1961) points out that at one extreme, any item that 
receives pitch prominence may said to be in contrast, even if the class of potentially 
contrasting items is hopelessly broad-as is the case in Let '8 have a picnic, where 
"picnic" may be taken to be in opposition with any of the innumerable other things 
we might do. 
Chafe (1976) on the other hand, asserts that "contrastive sentences are qualita-
tively different from those that simply supply new information from an unlimited 
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set of possibilities". What distinguishes the truly contrastive case, he claims, is an 
awareness on the speaker's part that some item is being selected from a limited set 
of candidates, and it is this that is the correct one. Chafe further suggests that some 
contours may be intonationally distinguished as contrastive: 
(2.40) a. They elected H Alice HL president 
b. They elected HLH Alice HL president 
In (b) for example, the speaker is consciously contraposing Alice with other names 
on the committee; this is not the case in (a). 
For Ladd (1980) what appears phonetically contrastive may be accounted for in 
terms of narrow focus. De-focussing of 'given' material leads to its being deaccented, 
with the result that unlikely elements may appear to achieve contrastive prominence. 
Thus in (2.41:B) the nucleus is on read, because books is deaccented: 
(2.41 ) A: Has John read Slaughterhouse-five? B: No, John doesn't READ books 
An interpretation where the second read is contrastive is clearly not tenable. 
Ladd also drew attention to a class of cases where a fall-rise nucleus is used to 
indicate focus within a given set: 
(2.42) A: Did you feed the animals B: I fed the HLHCAT 
Ward and Hirschberg (1985) follow up this analysis, pointing out that in many cases 
a set-theoretic explanation is too limited. They propose instead that the fall-rise in 
these cases introduces the pragmatic implicature of uncertainty; the speaker being 
uncertain whether his/her offering will meet the expectations of the interlocutor. 
Couper-Kuhlen (1984) proposes two basic semantic types of contrast. Like Ladd, 
she does this in truth-conditional terms. In semantic type 1, associated with a 
lHLcontour, 
"the speaker asserts that a proposition (or an item in a proposition) 
is true and simultaneously asserts that a contrasting proposition (or a 
contrastive item) is false. 
Thus We're going to lHL PORTland denies the possibility of some other activity or 
destination. Couper-Kuhlen's semantic type 2 corresponds essentially to the use of 
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the fall-rise studied by Ladd and Ward and Hirschberg. Here the speaker is being 
concessive rather than assertive. Cutler and Isard (1980) likewise maintain that 
contrastiveness is signalled intonationally. On the basis of the example: 
(2.4:3) a) London's the capital of Scotland isn't it? 
b) No HL Edinburgh's the capital of HLH Scotland] 
HLH London's the capital of HL England 
Cutler and Isard claim that intonation can distinguish items which are contrasted 
from those focussed items which are not. 
What none of the above analysts have paid particular attention to is the frequent 
co-occurrence of contrastive prosody with situations of interactive repair. Levelt 
and Cutler (1983) analysed repair exchanges from a corpus in which speakers de-
scribed visual patterns. They found that in the case of marked repairs-ones where 
the prosody differed from that of the original-the difference between the reparan-
dum and the repair was predominantly semantic. Moreover, there was a significant 
correlation between the markedness and the size of the semantic field from which 
contrastive items were taken. Thus repairs involving direction (only four directions 
possible) were more likely to be marked than those involving colour (twelve possi-
bilities ). 
The evidence points against the existence of intonational forms employed uniquely 
to express contrast. Nevertheless, with more sensitive definitions of semantic con-
trast, it may be possible to formulate general rules for contrastive intonation. It 
may be noted that many examples illustrating contrastive intonation refer to dis-
parate states of affairs. In Section 4.3.4 I examine the contrastive utterances that 
get produced when such conditions hold, and the intonational forms that may be 
associated with them. 
2.5.4 Intonational contour and meaning 
Ladd (1980) likens the task of attempting to assign meaning to intonational units 
to that of the extra-terrestial linguist confronted with the phrases sitting in a chair 
and sitting on a chair. To arrive at the (correct) insight that the two expressions 
have different semantic implications requires first the knowledge of phonetic detail 
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and phonological structure which will enable them to be told apart. In the case 
of intonation, although broad agreement exists with regard to the phenomenon of 
pitch accent (see Introduction: 1.4.2), there is considerably less agreement about 
structural phenomena than that existing for segmental phonology. One relatively 
uncontroversial notion is that the phenomenon of contour as melody, and the phe-
nomenon of accent are to some degree separable, at least where function is concerned. 
We have seen in the previous sections that an interpretation of accent as applying 
to information status is perfectly maintainable. In fact the results of Cutler and 
Swinney (1987) demonstrating that young children are unable to make use of ac-
centual cues to focus, when set against their known competence in using melody 
pragmatically, suggests that these functions are also distinct developmentally. This 
section is devoted to the melodic aspect of intonation, and its possible pragmatic 
interpretations. 
Within linguistic approaches to intonational meaning, there has been a strong 
tendency to take as units of functional analysis those defined on independent formal 
grounds as phonological units. In the 'British tradition' (eg. O'Connor and Arnold 
1961) the intonation phrase, or tone group, is organised as follows: 
PREHEAD HEAD NUCLEUS TAIL 
where the nucleus is the location of the final-and usually perceptually most prominent-
pitch movement; the head is that portion from the first pitch accent to the nucleus, 
and the prehead and tail consist of unaccented syllables, though in the case of the tail 
these follow the contour established by the choice of nuclear tone. This terminology 
has undeniable descriptive advantages. Analyses based on it however tend to equate 
a homogeneous set of form options with an equally homogeneous set of functions. 
Thus Gussenhoven (1983) considers the options of fall, fallrise, rise to be equivalent 
to various manipulations of the 'background' with respect to the 'variable' (where 
these terms correspond roughly to the Chomskyan 'presupposition' and 'focus'): 
Adding the variable to the background 
selecting the variable from the background 
testing the validity of the variable with respect to the background 
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fall 
fallrise 
r1se 
Gussenhoven claims that the use of the nuclear tone paradigm can be accounted for 
in terms of these manipulations. 
In those analyses which isolate the nucleus as the most meaningful unit, there 
is a tendency to apply circular reasoning in determining what choices of nuclear 
unit there should be. Thus Ladd (1980) distinguishes between the high and low 
rise-making no such distinction for falls-largely on functional grounds, and Brazil 
et al. (1980) are able to collapse all nuclear options into two, the 'proclaiming tone' 
(typified by a falling nucleus) and the 'referring tone' (typified by the fall-rise). In 
this class of models, there is also a tendency to consider the prenuclear part as 
subsidiary. Thus Levelt (1989): 
"The intonational meaning of the phrase is essentially carried by the 
nuclear tone. The prenuclear tune can modify that meaning-can soften 
it or sharpen it-but cannot essentially change it. 
In contrast, the autosegmental approach of Pierrehumbert (1980) lends itself to 
a treatment in which the tonal units, and even their components, are assigned 
meaning. Pierrehumbert's phonology has been reviewed in Section 1.4.2. In Pier-
rehumbert and Hirschberg's (1990) account of intonational meaning, the phonology 
is mildly hierarchical, consisting of pitch accents, intermediate phrases, and into-
national phrases. Phrase accents and boundary tones are taken to mark the end 
boundaries of the latter two categories. The model of intonational meaning then 
proposes that pitch accents convey information about individual discourse objects. 
Thus H* indicates that the salient object should be treated as 'new', whereas L * is 
taken to mean that the salient object should be excluded from the predication of 
the utterance, so that in: 
(2.44) L*H-H% I should apologize 
the speaker is declining to commit himself to apologize, though it might be inferred 
that the addressee believes it should be the case. Pierrehumbert and Hirschberg's 
account extends to the meaning of phrase accents and boundary tones, which are 
seen as relational markers to the surrounding discourse. They claim that their fine-
grained approach allows more generalisations than a nuclear-tone based one such as 
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Gussenhoven's. The Pierrehumbert-Hirschberg theory of intonational meaning has 
been further endorsed by Hobbs (1990). 
Opposed to such compositional approaches to intonational meaning have been 
attempts to analyse intonation in terms of holistic units with their own specific func-
tions. Liberman and Sag (1974) claim a correlation between such 'holistic contours', 
and illocutionary forces, and posit the existence of an intonational lexicon where 
such correspondences are defined. Sag and Liberman (1975) make the narrower 
claim that certain contours are capable of freezing the illocutionary interpretation 
of an utterance, so that only the direct speech act reading became available. Thus 
m: 
(2.45) 1 Why don't you move to Cali 2fornia 
a o[l 2HL reading was capable of being interpreted as a suggestion, whereas the 
'tilde contour': IHL 2LH, they claim, can only have the direct reading of a 
question. Cutler (1977) however points out that the contours proposed by Liberman 
and Sag were far from being restricted to the illocutionary meanings intended for 
them. Liberman and Sag's 'contradiction contour', for example, could be used in a 
situation where no contradiction, only disapproval, was present: 
(2.46) HL Go and see what the fellow LH wants 
Cutler's conclusion, that intonational meaning cannot be decontextualised in this 
way, is in line with Bolinger's scepticism (cf. page 52) towards claims for contrastive 
contours. 
Faced with the analytic difficulties exemplified above, a functional approach 
could be considered more appropriate to this study, especially if it is the case that 
within a limited domain, those functions may be enumerated. In the remainder of 
this section therefore I review a number of those functions which are relevant to this 
work, and which have been thought to be influenced by intonation. The case of the 
use of contour in contrastive intonation has been reviewed in Section 2.5.3. 
Prosodic signalling of turn-taking One aspect of turn-taking that continues 
to puzzle researchers is how synchronisation of turn-change happens so efficiently. 
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Sacks et al.(1974) propose that linguistically-definable transition relevance places 
exist in a speaker's utterance, and that listeners planning to take the floor project 
the position of these so as to know when to intervene. One obvious cue to such 
potential turn boundaries is sentential completeness; however a speaker may choose 
to draw out a sentence, adding postmodifiers after minimal completeness has been 
reached. Prosodic cues seem a likely possibility, especially taking into account the 
results of experiments such as that of Cutler (1976) which suggest that listeners 
monitor the progression of the intonation contour and are able to predict prosodic 
events later in the utterance. They are also attractive to phonological accounts of 
intonation which isolate the final boundary tone as a unit of analysis, if this can be 
shown to function as such a cue. 
Duncan (1974) first advanced the view that intonation acted as one among a 
number of turn-giving cues.2 According to Duncan's analysis of videoed conversa-
tions, most final pitch movements acted thus as 'turn-taking signals'. Beattie, Cutler 
and Pearson (1982) investigated television interviews with the British politician Mrs 
Thatcher. They found that interruptions by the interviewer could be consistently 
attributed to lack of consistency in turn-giving signals. Cutler and Pearson (1986) 
got subjects to read dialogues where the same target sentence was used either turn-
medially or turn-finally. They failed to find a significant correlation between position 
in the turn, and the intonation used. Likewise, listeners did not prove to be com-
petent judges of whether the sentences presented in isolation were turn-medial or 
turn-final. However there was some consistency between the actual contours used 
by speakers, and listener's judgements: upstepped contours tended to be judged 
turn-medial, while downstepped contours were pronounced turn-final. 
Somewhat less conclusive are the results of Schaffer (1983). Listeners were asked 
to judge whether excerpts from recorded dialogues were turn-initial, final or medial. 
\Vhere lexical/syntactic cues were present, listeners appeared to pay more attention 
to these than to prosodic cues. Despite listeners' lack of consistency and correctness 
in interpreting these, Schaffer found that rises were more successful cues to turn-
20ther cues included for example when the speaker turned his gaze to the interlocutor. 
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finality than falls. Schaffer speculates that local cues such as contours may be of less 
importance to speakers and listeners than their common grasp of the conversational 
organisation. 
There is some evidence that heightened register and amplitude are used in cases 
of successful (as opposed to unsuccessful) turn-grabbing (see French and Local 
1986). 
Intonation and questions Correctly interpreting questions is clearly important 
for conversational participants, especially in information dialogues. It is well-known 
that syntactic markers such as sentential mood or the presence of tags are not in 
themselves sufficient to indicate whether or not an utterance is a question (eg. Quirk 
et al. 1985: 803-853). Can intonation help in this respect, especially when syntactic 
evidence is not present? Minimal pairs might suggest that this is the case: 
(2.47) Yes-no question vs. exclamation 
a. isn't he LH sure of himself 
b. isn't he HL sure of himself (Couper-Kuhlen 1986: 148) 
(2.48) Statement vs. question 
a. HLJohn has 
b. LH John has (Halliday 1967: 41) 
But linguists have on the whole been wary about the existence of such a phe-
nomenon as question intonation. Bolinger (1989) considers in turn a number of 
question types, asking what the correlation might be between those types and into-
nation contours. He concludes: 
One can calculate probabilities, but there are no defining connections 
between intonation and question type. (Bolinger 1989: 143) 
He nevertheless is able to isolate cases where certain contours are typical or atypical 
of a particular question type. Thus a 'B + B' contour (in our terminology, iHH) 
predisposes an utterance to be a yes-no question; the contour' ... (B +) B + A' 
(ie, [HH P HL) is most typical of an alternative question; while reprise questions 
59 
(those that involve a more or less verbatim repetition of what has been said) 'strongly 
favour profile B'. 
Brown, Currie and Kenworthy (1980) report work in which listeners were pre-
sented with question and answer utterances extracted from recorded natural conver-
sations, either isolated or with context. The material was selected so that textual 
clues were not present. For the isolated utterances they found a good consensus 
among judges that a terminal high-rise indicated a question. Otherwise, listeners 
tended to agree but wrongly, judging the majority of questions to be not-questions. 
For contextualised utterances, the number of correct judgements was higher, as 
would be expected. Brown et al also examined the recorded corpus for correlations 
between question-type and contour. They found that polar questions associated 
with fall-to-low (HL 1]) were overwhelmingly conducive-ie, indicating to the ad-
dressee that a certain answer was expected. However the relevance of these findings 
to the work of this thesis may be limited by the fact that the data used is confined 
to the Edinburgh dialect of English. 
Geluykens (1987) presented listeners with synthesized utterances, where the nu-
clear contours were varied according to the patterns laid down in Halliday (1970). 
The task was to grade the utterances, which carried no syntactic clues, on a scale 
from "definitely a question" to "definitely a statement". There was no reliable cor-
relation found between question judgements and contours, though Halliday's tone 2 
(high rise or fall-rise) did better than the others. The factor that did have a signifi-
cant effect on listener's judgements was a pragmatic one. The grammatical subjects 
of Geluyken's sentences were varied, taking as values the pronouns /, you and he. 
An average of 53% of the 'you' utterances were taken to be questions, as compared 
with 12% and 19% respectively for the'!' and 'he' ones. Thus you feel ill was more 
likely to be judged a question than / feel ill, irrespective of intonation. Geluykens 
suggests a Searlian interpretation (cf. Section 2.2.1): the 'you' utterances are more 
likely to fulfill the felicity condition, namely thi~.t the addressee can be expected to 
know the answer. 
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The affective use of intonation Bolinger (1986) points out that intonation 
in conversation typically forms part of a 'gestural complex' of signals which may 
include eyebrow-raising or the shrugging of shoulders. These gestural displays, it 
has been argued, have their origin in the emotional state of the speaker. But, 
Bolinger concedes, they are nevertheless susceptible to ritualization: 
"A ritual is arbitrary to the extent that the performer does not sincerely 
'feel' the message he conveys. And yet the ritual is still close enough to 
the erstwhile reality it enacts so that it cannot be understood without 
reference to that reality. That appears to be the stage at which the 
supposedly arbitrary uses of intonation and its gestural counterparts 
have arrived. (Bolinger 1986:198) 
Similarly, other accounts emphasise the universal symbolism of pitch. Ohala (1983) 
relates high pitches to displays of nonagressiveness or defensiveness. Conversely, low 
pitches tend to be associated with dominance and power. Bolinger (1986: 219) sug-
gests that the use of falsetto register may have its origin in the display of submission; 
a falsetto terminal can be "unaggressively appealing". 
Couper-Kuhlen (1986:185-7) makes the distinction between emotion and atti-
tude. The former term, which covers descriptions such as amused, angry, anxious, 
bored, frightened, has to do with physiological arousal; whereas the latter is more de-
scriptive of the speaker's overt behaviour: affectionate, arrogant, coquettish, critical, 
deferential. Bolinger's notion of 'accent of power' may be related to this attitudinal 
use of language. (d. discussion on page 49). 
Scherer et al. (1984) set out to investigate the varying assumptions of what 
they call the configurational and the covariance models. According to the former, 
linguistically-oriented hypothesis, both verbal and nonverbal features are category-
valued; the choice of configuration of these produces different affective meanings. 
According to the covariance model, there is a directly observable covariance be-
tween the strength of speaker arousal and various acoustic parameters, such as 
pitch and loudness. Listeners were presented with recordings of utterances which 
were known to produce judgements of speaker affect. When the verbal component 
of the utterances was filtered out, it was found that affective judgements remained, 
thus confirming in part the covariance model. In a related experiment {Ladd et al. 
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1985) it was found that attributions of arousal appeared to vary continuously with 
the pitch range at which utterances were synthesized. However the 1984 results 
also provided some evidence for the configurational model, in that the interaction 
of contour type and verbal content was found to have an affect on judgements of 
affect. 
2.5.5 Summary 
Information focus and prosodic accent are related, albeit indirectly. Several re-
searches have attempted to mediate this relation, using for example the notion 
of semantic predicate-argument structure, and broad/narrow focus. According to 
Bolinger however, sentence accents are primarily iconic, enabling a speaker to high-
light those portions of an utterance which he deems interesting. Accenting is also 
exploited by listeners, as complementary psycholinguistic studies have shown, en-
abling them to direct processing resources to where they are most needed. 
There has been a certain amount of confusion regarding contrastive intonation. 
There is for example little clear evidence that a single class of 'contrastive accents' 
exists; instead, examples from the literature have referred to a number of distinct 
phenomena. What these seem to share is a certain markedness, when compared for 
example with neutral accents. 
A number of functions have been proposed the melodic component of intonation; 
these relate principally to the interpersonal aspect of communication. While the 
evidence concerning the use of intonation to signal question status and turn-taking 
is mixed, other studies point to the affective, attitudinal origin of prosodic contours. 
2.6 Conclusions 
This review began with an examination of theories of dialogue, both computational 
and non-computational. A number of theorists have chosen to emphasize the static 
effects of dialogue, as opposed to its dynamic behaviour. Speech Act based accounts, 
for example, are largely concerned with accounting for the effect of an utterance on 
the beliefs and goals of speaker and addressee. Computational accounts, especially 
62 
those pioneered by Cohen, Allen and Power, have contributed to a better definition 
and understanding of Speech Act theory. Other researchers (Sinclair and Coulthard, 
Houghton, Moeschler) who have appreciated the need for a structural account with 
wider scope than that of the isolated speech events have focussed primarily on the 
well-formedness properties of that structure. By contrast, Conversation Analysts 
have provided detailed studies of how speakers faced with online communication 
problems resolve these, or project their solutions further into the dialogue. However, 
their 'theoretical asceticism' (Levinson 1983), although healthy as a motivating force 
in empirical work, has on the whole prevented absorption of their ideas into cognitive 
and computational accounts. 
A number of conclusions may be drawn from research which has concentrated 
on the internal representations which speakers and listeners may make use of. Lin-
guistic and psycholinguistic studies both point to there being an essential difference 
between those surface representations built up during parsing and those residing 
in discourse memory. The latter are more permanent than the former; however 
the evidence is that within a limited time-frame language processing is capable of 
making use of recently generated surface representations. Many studies of discourse 
representation have been concerned with the resolution of anaphoric reference (eg. 
Sanford and Garrod 1981). Out of this concern have arisen computational models 
in which discourse memory is partitioned according to some criterion of focus or 
accessibility. Other studies have focussed on how mutual acceptability of discourse 
information is negotiated and how speakers use linguistic resources to explicitly in-
dicate accessibility A great portion of this work however has focussed on the agent 
as understander rather than producer of language. 
A 'levels-of-processing' model of language production with at least the stages: 
conceptualisation, formulation and phonological encoding, has long been accepted 
in cognitive psychology. Computational treatments have concentrated on the con-
ceptualisation (or planning) and formulation (or surface generation) stages, with a 
bias towards the latter. With the rise of constraint-based representations of gram-
mars and lexica in the 1980s, computational treatments of surface generation have 
looked towards bidirectional models, in which both parser and generator share the 
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same linguistic knowledge bases. With a few exceptions however, exemplars have 
not been built to work within a dialogue context, and little attempt has been made 
to deal with the reuse of surface structures, or account for incremental production 
across a number of turns. 
A large body of descriptive work now exists for English prosody. Although 
studies are to some extent diffuse, being hampered by the lack of an appropriate 
metalanguage for describing both prosodic form and its (largely pragmatic) func-
tions, progress in the experimental field, especially that concerning the prosodic 
marking of accessibility and turn-taking, serves to constrain possible theories. But 
whereas a considerable amount of representational work has been achieved at the 
phonetic level and to a lesser extent the level of syntax and surface prosodic struc-
ture, cognitive models of language production are still relatively silent about how 
pragmatic assignment of prosodic features comes about. The computational treat-
ment of prosody has been largely restricted to assignment of prosodic features to 
pre-existing texts, as in the systems of Silverman (1987) and Hirschberg (1990). The 
elaboration of prosody within a model of production is still virtually unexplored. 
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Chapter 3 
Dialogue behaviour and prosody 
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I construct a model of the Agent as engaged in an information di-
alogue, and demonstrate coverage of a variety of dialogue phenomena. The model 
favours levels of analysis which are particularly appropriate to the study of intona-
tion, as it affects the dynamics of conversation. 
A study of the meaning of contours needs to be set within a framework with 
respect to which they can be meaningful. The framework is a model of the Agent 
as information provider, engaged in a dialogue with a Caller. Both need to convey 
intentions and expectations via the linguistic actions which they produce and receive. 
In terms of the model, such actions can be thought of as moves which advance its 
state towards the desired outcome of successful information transfer. These moves, 
or dialogue acts (d. Section 2.2.1) are represented internally as events containing 
sufficient contextual information to determine unique transitions between states. At 
the linguistic level, on the other hand, a speaker uses the resources of language to 
enable an interlocutor to infer the nature of the intended event, and advance his 
model accordingly. Thus the prosodic attributes of an utterance may be on a par 
with the textual attributes, subject to similar Gricean tensions between brevity and 
informativeness. Prosodic and textual attributes may even be complementary: for 
example, if a speaker signals an utterance to be a question using inverted sYlltax, 
then intonational signals are less crucial; conversely, if the textual extent of the 
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utterance does not extend sufficiently for this to be done, then intonation becomes 
an important cue to this function. 
The model descri bed here is a rational reconstruction of the Sundial dialogue 
manager, whose implementation is described in Chapter 5. It is based on an agent's 
own attempts to impose order on external linguistic events, and respond appropri-
ately. 
This chapter begins with an overview of dialogue phenomena, particularly the 
dynamic and structural aspects, and how they affect speakers' utterances. The study 
is largely based on analyses of the Flight Enquiries corpus; where appropriate, gen-
eralisations about intonational contour are attempted. I then turn to the definition 
of a computational model of the speaker. Using a symbolic notation to define and 
describe the behaviour of synchronising concurrent processes, I show how the infor-
mation provider's behaviour in a variety of dialogue situations may be economically 
described in terms of the behaviour of a number of computational processes mod-
elling communicating experts or 'agents'. This leads to the definition of dialogue 
acts, which I take to be the inner characterisation of externally observable linguistic 
events. 
Finally, I present an analysis of contours in the Swedish corpus, and discuss how 
these relate to a labelling in terms of dialogue acts. The correlations found are of a 
probabilistic kind; it is therefore concluded that a fully explanatory account would 
need to consider factors not explored in this thesis. 
3.2 Dialogue phenomena 
3.2.1 Synchronisa,tion and adjacency 
Cooperative conversation needs to be orderly. Turns should succeed one another 
smoothly, with a minimum of overlap (cf. Section 2.2.1). In addition, coopera-
tive conversation is structured; as we have seen in Section 2.2.1, such structure may 
extend both to exchange-relatedness, and embedding. Evidence for long-term verba-
tim recall is scant (cf. Section 2.3.2). This might indicate that memory for dialogue 
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structure is short-lived. Nevertheless, speakers are aware of the unfinished nature of 
exchanges, of which there may be more than one, over longish stretches of conver-
sation. Example 3.1 illustrates that a response may be delayed for a period of time 
(2-4: initiative; 13-14 response). 
[6] Tl:SA:1986 (T) 
1 A: flight information may I help you 
2 C: yes urn two eight two bee please 
3 urn can you tell me if you've got a 
4 confirmed arrival time for that 
5 (.7) 
6 A: sorry two eight 
(3.1) 7 two -was it 
8 C: -( ( two eight t-wo )) 
9 A: -right can you hold on 
10 (14) 
11 A: sorry to keep you waiting 
12 (.7) 
13 two eight two (.3) will be landing now 
14 (.) at eleven (.) thirty five 
But such long-distance dependency between utterances is unlikely to be purely struc-
tural. Consider an example where A declines to respond immediately, but offers to 
ring back, maybe some hours later. A may ring up and produce an utterance such 
as (13-14); it is hard to see however how an argument based on structural coherence 
can be extended to such a case. Instead, it is sufficient to say that A has retained a 
commitment to respond over a period of time. I refer to any pair of moves in which 
the second discharges a commitment set up by the first, as initiative-response (IR-) 
related. IR-related moves need not even belong to the same dialogue, as we have 
seen. On the other hand, in Section 3.2.3 I present evidence that responses which 
are close to their initiatives are more likely to be structurally related to them. 
3.2.2 Handling information transactions 
From the viewpoint of Caller-Agent interaction, a successful information dialogue 
is one in which the Caller's goals are satisfied. Assuming that the Agent has privi-
leged access to a special body of information, or database, goals may be treated as 
equivalent to database tasks. An information dialogue consists of one or more cycles 
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during which a Caller specifies a task, or a task is interaetionally specified, and the 
Agent provides a resolution for that task. 
A task may be a query or an update. I concentrate on the former case. Consider 
for example: 
SA4:C1: when is the next flight to rome please 
( 3.2) 
SA4:A 7: there's a flight this evening at nine 
Here the response [SA 4:A7] directly satisfies the query [SA 4:C1]. In other words. 
the information provided by the response serves to instantiate the open proposi-
tion which constitutes the query, in such a way that the resulting proposition is 
true of the database. More complex cases of the query-response relation, than di-
reet (minimal) satisfaction, are satisfaction of indirect queries, near-satisfaction and 
over-satisfaction. An indirect query is one for which the Agent may need to infer 
what exactly the Caller needs, for example: 
[48] Tl:SB:344 
8 C: ... the bee ay five 
(3.3) 9 eight four from tu! HL rin love 
24 A: it'll be landing hopefully at ten twenty 
25 five 
To deal with the query of Example 3.3 successfully, the Agent needs to apply the 
default inference that the Caller is interested in the arrival time of the flight. 
Responses that over-satisfy requests are common. These provide more informa-
tion than explicitly requested. 
[10] Tl:SB:454 (T) 
6 C ... I'd like to check on the 
7 arrival time of bee ay zero eight four 
8 (.) uhm: vancouver seattle (.) to heathrow 
( 3.4) 16 A: yes the flight's on route it's expected now 
17 at fifteen fifteen 
20 terminal four (.3) 
21 heathrow airport 
A Response may nearly satisfy the conditions of the request. Compare (3.3) with 
the fuller version: 
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[48] Tl:SB:344 
8 C: ... the bee ay five 
9 eight four from turin love 
(3.5) 17 A: we've got a five seven 
18 THLH nine from turin] which was scheduled 
20 A: for H ten HLH thirty 
Example 3.5 is a case where the query as originally specified is unsatisfiable, hut a 
related query (with some of the original constraints relaxed) may be satisfied. In that 
case a 'cooperative' response (Kaplan 1983, Guyomard and Siroux 1989) is possible. 
The slightly dispreferred nature of such a response is marked intonationally with 
HLH. The HLH accent appears both on the changed element: jive seven nme 
and on the part of the utterance which answers the original question: ten thil'ty. 
This is evidence that the marking is not narrowly associated with the need to modify 
a constraint, as set-theoretic accounts such as those of Ladd (1980) and \Vard and 
Hirschberg (1985) would suggest (d. Section 2.5.3); rather the usage seems to be 
associated with an attitude of deference. 
Delayed responses, even if direct, .... re often marked by some reformulation of 
the original query. Example 3.1 demonstrates delay occasioned by a confirmation 
subsequence, and a request to hold the line. Delay may happen for reasons of 
clarification, confirmation or repair, or simply because of the time taken to look up 
information in the database. A number of so-called insertion sequences (Schegloff 
1972) are themselves IR-related, and arise because the task is under-specified: 
[10] Tl:SB:454 (T) 
7 arrival time of bee ay zero eight four 
8 (.) uhm: vancouver seattle (.) to heathrow 
(3.6) 9 (.) 
10 A: HH today sir T] 
11 (.) 
12 C: today 
This kind of query (line 10) is unlike the open query, in that a default value (today) 
is given. I call this a default query. Such defaults are easily overturned. It does not 
seem that a response other than the default is dispreferred, any more than a similar 
response to an open question would be. 
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Insertion sequences can be seen to conform to the same pattern as IR-pairs 
associated with the major task. That is, the notion of satisfaction is central to what 
constitutes a successful clarification. They are however more likely to form close 
adjacency pairs. 
3.2.3 Interpreting input from the Caller 
According to cognitive accounts of discourse coherence (cf. Section 2.3.1) interpre-
tation of utterances takes place against the background of an assumed shared model, 
which is progressively refined and extended. In Chapter 4 I pursue this further. In 
addition to discourse-model-related interpretation, cues may be extracted from ut-
terances relating to their function in dialogue. They may contain semantic material 
of a propositional-attitude nature, as in (3.7-3.8): 
(3.7) 
(3.8) 
[7] T1:SA:2013 (T) 
3 C: can you tell me 
4 the flight arrival time of bee ay two 
5 eight six from (.5) er california (.5) 
[28] T1:SB:2082 (T) 
22 A: H three five 1 HL seven you said 
23 C: three five seven yes 
Initiatives would appear to be more marked, both semantically and syntactically. 
Can you tell me in (3.7) and you said in (3.8) both provide explicit indication of 
their dialogic function, an open question and a confirmation initiative, respectively. 
Other cues to initiative status are well-known; these include tags, subject-auxiliary 
inversion, and the use of interrogative pronouns. There are nonetheless cases where 
initiatives are not accompanied by explicit cues, and contextual reasoning is needed. 
In Example 3.9 the major contextual clue that line 7 is an initiative seems to be a 
negative one: the utterance is not an appropriate response to the only outstanding 
initiative, a request for information about a flight. Moreover the name of the carrier 
is something the Caller might be expected to know: 
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[28] Tl:SB:2082 (T) 
3 C: ... I wuh- just want to check flights 
4 from lyons -coming to 
(3.9) 5 A: -yes 
6 C: terminal one 
7 A: i(k) [i with british HH airways i] 
8 C: with british airways 
In (3.10) the fact that information already given by the Caller is repeated means 
that A's utterance is probably the initiation of a confirmation sequence: 
[34] T2:SA:I045 (T) 
(3.10) 7 A: to paris 
8 C: yeah 
There may however be difficulty in telling whether an elliptical initiative with re-
duced syntactic features is a default query or a confirmation. The former seem to 
be marked more consistently with high final boundary tones: d. (3.6, 3.9), where 
default queries are all marked with final HH, and (3.8), where a confirmation is 
marked with! HL. In Section 3.4 I examine more data which points to this clistinc-
tion. 
In the case of responses, surface cues are even rarer. The clearest are discourse 
markers indicating acceptance or rejection, such as yes, no, that's right. These are 
regularly used to accompany responses to default (or polar) questions, d. (3.10: 1.8; 
3.8: 1.23). In addition, the discourse marker yes is regularly used to mark the accom-
panying utterance as a response, regardless of the nature of that response: 
[37] T2:SA:1235 (T) 
(3.11) 16 A: yes I haven't got a flight nine six 
17 nine from hamburg ... 
In (3.11) the Agent is announcing failure to find a response matching the Caller's 
constraints. Here and in many other cases, yes marks a return to a delayed task, 
after intervening sub-sequences and holds. See also Example 3.4. 
The response no is invariably hedged according to some convention of a Gricean 
nature, whereby if the Caller knows a better response, it would be uncooperatiye 
not to give it: 
[28] Tl:SB:2082 (T) 
(3.12) 9 A: ... is it today 
10 C: no it's next monday evening ... 
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Responses which are not explicitly marked as such depend often on adjacency. 
A further contextual cue may be given by reuse of surface forms: 
( 3.13) 
[.j] Tl:SA:1356 (T) 
44 C: which terminal will I come back 
45 A: you'll come 
46 to north 
Responses are generally intonationally neutral, with falling nuclei. Exceptions are 
dispreferred responses (cf. 3.5), and responses which are broken across turns, to be 
discllssed in the following section. 
3.2.4 Delaying and chunking messages 
Dialogue acts, viewed as operators which advance the state of the interaction, are 
not necessarily co-extensive with turns, nor even sentences. 
Firstly, it is possible to have turns consisting of more than one dialogue act: 
[13] Tl:SB:9588 (T) 
61 C: er::m how would I find out will there be 
62 any other numbers I can ring 
63 A: well that's right I'll just have (3.14) 
64 to give you a general gat wick number 
65 just hold on a moment 
A's turn (lines 63-65) consists of multiple sentences with related but distinct dialogue 
functions. 
Secondly, a dialogue act may be developed over a number of turns. This tends to 
happen if a considerable amount of information needs to be transmitted, for example 
in the case of multiple solutions: 
A: there are Bjghts at seven thirty 
C: seven thirty 
(3.1.5) A: eight fifteen 
C: eight fifteen 
A: and ten twenty 
Likewise, information about sayan arrival may be too detailed to give 111 one 
turn: 
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[7] T1:SA:2013 (T) 
8 A: two eight six from 
9 san francisco -is on its way expected 
(3.16) 10 C: (-that's th-) 11 A: at H thirteen THLH ten 
12 (.) 
13 C: Hthirteen IHLten 
14 A: H terminal HLH four (1) H heathrow 1 HL airport 
It seems that information which the Caller may not be presumed to know is brokf'n 
down into manageable chunks, the granularity varying with the amount of detail in 
the information. Thus telephone numbers are typically broken down: 
[13] T1:SB:9588 (T) 
69 A: ... ring gatwick on H oh two nine LH three 
70 (.) 
71 C: oh two nine three 
(3.17) 72 A: H two HLH double eight 
73 ( .3) 
74 C: two double eight 
75 (.) 
76 A: [ldouble HLtwo 
This chunking of information for telephone transmission is part of what Clark and 
Brennan (1991) call verbatim grounding. 
The data shown here bears out the common observation that when an act is 
spread over a number of turns, the non-final turns have 'continuation marker' nuclei. 
These may may be low or high rises or fall rises; a single speaker would seem free to 
choose which, on a per-turn basis. In (3.17) the Agent uses both LH and HLH as 
continuation markers. The end of a broken sentence is frequently marked by a fall 
to low: cf. Examples 3.16 and 3.17. 
3.2.5 Confirmation and repair 
Repair moves and repair sequences are occasioned by failure in information transfer. 
I class with these confirmation sequences, as these presuppose sub-optimal com-
munication. I concentrate on other-initiated repair. Here the party initiating the 
repair does so as the result of detecting something wrong; otherwise. there is no 
repair. Assuming that some error occurred in processing the input, there is a scale 
of possibilities: 
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1. nothing was understood: the interlocutor needs to request repetition of the 
entire utterance; 
2. part of the input was not understood, but the missing part can be contextu-
alised: this occasions a request for repetition of the missing part; 
3. certain elements of the input were doubtful: these need to be confirmed; 
-t. certain elements of the input correspond to modifications, with respect to the 
earlier discourse model state: these need to be confirmed; 
5. the interpretation of the utterance qua dialogue act needs to be confirmed. 
I refer to these cases, respectively, as repetition initiatives, open confirmations, value 
confirmations, modification confirmations and dialogue act confirmations. 
Repetition initiatives frequently use apologetic markers: 
(3.18) 
(3.19) 
[7] T1:SA:2013 (T) 
45 A: [THwhat IHsaturday is it THHforT] 
46 C: HH pardon 
47 A: [TH what 1 HL saturday sir 
[26] T1:SB:1772 (T) (P) 
6 A: is it H heath THLH row 
7 (.3) 
8 C: HH sorry T] 
9 A: from H heathHLH row 
Responses to repetition initiatives may reformulate rather than simply echo the 
previous utterance, as in Examples 3.18 and 3.19. In both cases the textual refor-
mulation is slight. But if the Agent is having difficulty with communication, a more 
drastic reformulation may be needed. 
(3.20) 
[42a] T3:SA 
4 A: ... is that toHLH day madam 
5 C: pardon 
6 A: toHLH day's flight 
7 C: it's er yes 
8 A: the H fligh t 's 1 H leaving 1 HL today] LH yes 
The Caller in (3.20) is not a native speaker of English, and communication is on 
the point of breaking down. The Agent tries a minor reformulation (line 6) which 
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appears to fail, followed by a major reformulation (line 8), which involves a major 
change in contour, from fall-rise nucleus, to downstepping to fall. Contour change, 
or shifting the register up or down, is common in repetitions. In (3.19) there is a 
nucleus shift on the repeat. and a falling rather than a rising contour. In (:3.21) the 
repeat involves only a nucleus shift. This time though the effect is to emphasize we 
and so permit the implication: but somebody else may know . ... 
[39] T2:SA:1931 (T) 
17 A: H not that we HLH know of 
(3.21) 18 (.3) 
19 C: LH sorry 
20 A: H not that HLH we know of ... 
The Agent appears to take the repetition request as arising out of a failure of un-
derstanding. 
Open confirmation initiatives can take a variety of forms, for example: 
can you repeat the departure time 
(3.22) 
flight number what 
These share the property of providing enough context for the interlocutor to make 
out where the gap in knowledge is. Value confirmation initiatives may be echoes 
with no textual indication of the dialogue act. If however the act is some distance 
from the earlier utterance which it refers to, explicit marking is more likely: 
[2] Tl:SA:349 (T) 89 (M) 
25 A: ... that's the ell oh two eight 
(3.23) 26 one 
39 C: - what did you say Hell oh H tee 
(cf. 3.7). Of the unmarked cases of confirmations, not all are responded to. This 
may be because the speaker forecloses on this possibility by continuing: 
[2] Tl:SA:349 (T) 89 (M) 
43 A: but the flight number is ell oh two 
(3.24) 44 eight one 45 (.) 
46 C: sotto voce two eight (right) 
47 aloud H thanks TH ver-y ! H much in! HL deed 
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Confirmation initiatives between chunks of information (cf. 3.17) are also typically 
not responded to. Otherwise, hearers do tend to respond to confirmation initiatives, 
even those for which no explicit marking is available. This suggests that response to 
confirmation initiatives may be the default; however well marked they are, if they 
appear in a turn-final position, they get responded to. From the speaker's point 
of view, failure to use an explicit form such as did you say ... ? or intonational 
marking such as HLH may mean that he is indifferent to \\'hether or not he re-
ceives a response. If the contextual information which would support an unmarked 
formulation is not available, then explicit marking will be necessary. 
Corrections, and acts requiring that agents update their discourse models non-
monotonically, are discussed in Section 4.4. 
3.3 A computational model of the speaker in di-
alogue 
In this section I present a reconstruction which reflects the functionality and the 
architectural principles underlying the Sundial dialogue manager, while differing in 
details. It also incorporates many of the phenomena observed in Section 3.2. The 
model is presented as a formal specification; it is not implemented. Its purpose is 
to bring into a coherent framework a number of the dialogue phenomena observed, 
and to clarify the notion of 'dialogue act'. 
3.3.1 Modelling an information-processing agent 
Before considering in more detail internal information processing, I develop a sym-
bolic characterisation of an agent, as it produces and receives messages. The no-
tation of Communicating Sequential Processes (CSP: Hoare 1985) is particularly 
appropriate for this. An agent can be represented as an autonomous process, whose 
behaviour is descri bed in terms of the external, observable events which it partici-
pates in. An agent which reacts appropriately to the events hello and goodbye can 
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be defined algebraically as follows: 
AGENT == (?hello -!hello - AGENT 1 ?goodbye -!goodbye - S!;!P) 
This definition states that the process AGENT reacts to the input hello by out-
putting his own hello, or to goodbye by outputting goodbye. The operator "1" repre-
sents deterministic choice between events over which A GENT has no control. The 
definition is recursive, which means that AGENT can react indefinitely to inputs 
of hello. On hearing goodbye, however, the process AGENT becomes the dummy 
process Sf( IP, representing successful termination. 
Two agents modelled in this way will inevitably deadlock, since both will require 
an utterance from the other in order to do anything at all. This situation can be 
remedied in the following definition of DECISIVE_AGENT, who takes the first 
initiati ve. 
DECISIVE_AGENT ~ (!hello - DECISIVE_AGENTd 
DECISIVE_AGENT2 .:: (!goodbye - SKIP) 
Here the process DECISIVE_A GENT is described according to the states it 
passes through: DECISIVE_AGENT, DECISIVE_AGENTl and DECISIVE_AGENT2• 
The conversation between AGENT and DECISIVE_AGENT can now be modelled 
in its entirety by the parallel combination of the two processes: 
CONVERSATION .:: (AGENT II DECISIVE_AGENT) 
Although concurrent, the processes synchronise on their common events-an output 
for one agent being an input for the other-so that the following sequence of events 
can be shown to take place: 
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DA DAl 'Ts~ /:KIP DECISIVEAGENT: • ~ . 
Ih fh 
AGENT: • ~ . ~.-. ~ A A/?h A A/?g SKIP 
Figure 3.1: State transitions for the .AGENT jDECISIVE-AGENT dialogue 
(3.2-5) 
Events 
!hello 
? hello, !hello 
?hello 
!goodbye 
?goodbye,!goodbye 
Process State changes 
DECISIVE_A GENT -+ DECISIVE_A GENT} 
AGENT -+ AGENT 
DECISIVE_AGENT} -+ DECISIVE_AGENT2 
DECISIVE_AGENT2 -+ S[(IP 
A GENT -+ S[(IP 
The derivation in (3.25) represents an account of the conversational sequence: 
DA: hello, A:hello, DA:goodbye, A:goodbye. Events are represented twice, according 
to whether they are being treated as the output of one process or as the input of 
the other. A pictorial representation is shown in Figure 3.1. The process AGENT is 
represented as A. The notation P / event is used to represent the state of process P 
after it has engaged in event. DECISIVE_AGENT has three states DA, DA} and 
DA2 • Thick arrows represent state transitions; time unfolds along the x-axis. Thin 
vertical arrows are used to represent messages between processes, assumed to pass 
instantaneously, so that the processes do in fact synchronise on common events. The 
figure makes clear one property of DECISIVE-A GENT that may not be apparent 
from the definitions: after it has said goodbye, it hangs up, and doesn't wait for 
AGENT to respond. 
I use the notation of Communicating Processes not to characterise a conversa-
tion as a system of communicating individuals, as I have done above, but to describe 
a single agent-the information provider or Agent in an information dialogue-as 
a system of internal processes or 'homunculi'. Nevertheless the approach exempli-
fied in (3.25) can be applied in order to achieve internal modelling of the dynamic 
behaviour of the partner (see Section 3.3.7). 
The architecture that I propose is the product of a number of communicating 
processes each of which are expert in some aspect of conversation or linguistic be-
haviour. These are the following: 
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MET~ 
ca-INPUT PJN~I I .IN;ef!--OUTPf!+-aC 
~_I~ ~sJt;? 
Figure 3.2: Architecture for the Agent as a system of communicating processes 
The information component: This is responsible for handling of queries or 
other tasks of the Caller. It may also initiate its OWll queries. 
The output component: This plans and generates the Agent's messages. 
The discourse interpretation component: This interprets the semantic part 
of the interlocutor's message in the context of the current discourse model. 
The pragmatic interpretation component: This uses a combination of cues 
to assign a dialogue act label-and hence a destination component-to the 
output of discourse interpretation. 
The metacommunication component: This produces repair and confirmation 
messages as the result of monitoring other messages internal to the Agent; it 
also handles repair and confirmation messages of the interlocutor. 
The complete architecture is shown in Figure 3.2. The acoustic/telephonic channel 
from Caller to Agent is labelled ca; the reverse channel is ac. Messages on channels 
are symbolically described as events annotated by the channel labels; thus aC.e 
represents the event e on channel ac. The notation also allows us to distinguish 
between ac!e -representing that event from the viewpoint of the outputting process, 
and ac? e -the same event from the perspective of the receiving process. It is 
normal to constrain the definition of a process by enumerating the finite set of e\'ent 
symbols, or alphabet that it can participate in. I do not attempt to enumerate 
events for any process except schematically; since they can be characterised as finite 
feature structures such enumeration can in principle be done. A channel, like a 
process, has an alphabet: the set of events which appear on it in the definition of 
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the processes that use it. The alphabets of channels may be assumed to be typed-
for example, input to the discourse interpretation component will ahvays take the 
form of a linguistic sign. For information to be sent along a channel, the message 
must appear in the alphabet of both receiving and sending processes. This constraint 
will be exploited in Section 3.3.5, where a process can be inhibited from receiving a 
message which is flagged as unreliable. Because messages between processes rapidly 
become complex, these are generally referred to schematically in process definitions, 
using upper-case variables, hiatuses ( ... ) and indexing. Similar conventions apply 
in the examples. 
The idea of a process communicating along channels can be exemplified by con-
sideration of the STATE component. This process is responsible for managing 
the gross changes of state of the Agent which affect his ability to participate in 
dialogue, namely: opening and closing the dialogue, and suspending conversation 
while information is being looked up. STATE gets messages from the Caller, af-
ter pragmatic interpretation, along the channel ps, and sends its messages to the 
Caller via the channel o. A simple definition of STATE can be based on that 
of DECISIVE-AGENT above, with ?hello replaced by ps?hello and !goodbye by 
o!goodbye, and so forth. For this to have any effect on the remaining components, 
it must be supposed that as the result of a successful greetings sequence, STATE 
sends out a global message !begin to the other components, and that these are all 
in a quiescent state until having received such a message. Likewise, as the result 
of the closing sequence, STATE sends out the message lend, which is included in 
the definition of every process with the effect that it causes that process to become 
SJ(IP: ie, terminate. Suspension can be dealt with as follows: when about to do 
a database access, the component INFO sends the message is!hold; on receIvmg 
this, STATE negotiates suspension with the Caller, by sending out the message 
o!(init; hold) and awaiting the reply ps?(resp; hold). Components of the Agent, 
with the exception of STATE and INFO, can then be temporarily put into suspen-
sion by STATE issuing the global message !hold. Likewise, once INFO is ready to 
continue, it sends the message is!resume to STATE, which re-awakens suspended 
processes with the global message !resume, and then negotiates resumption with 
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the Caller. The events ?hold and ?resume must of course be in the alphabets of all 
relevant processes, with appropriate behaviour defined. Example 3.26 shows typical 
negotiation sequences: 
A hold the line please o : (init; hold) 
C thanks ps : (resp; hold) 
(3.26) 
A hello o : (init; resume) 
C hello ps : (resp; resume) 
This also illustrates how a surface form like hello can have two related but distinct 
dialogue functions: beginning a conversation, and resumption after a break. 
3.3.2 The Information component 
This component (INFO) is responsible for communication with the database. It 
also has the functionalities discussed in Section 3.2.2: 
1. Establishing the current task. This may be done on the basis of an initial task 
formulation by the Caller, or by an explicit request such as (how) can I help 
you or what information do you require. 
2. Once the task has been adequately specified, retrieving a response, or per-
forming an update. 
3. Assessing what constitutes a well-formed query. This means that meta-knowledge 
about the capabilities of the database needs to be consulted, in order to ensure 
both efficient look-up and compact response. 
4. Sending the well-specified task to the database, and reading back the response. 
I do not discuss the mechanisms whereby responses other than minimal direct 
ones are returned, but assume these results are flagged by appropriate features. 
5. Accepting further specification, if the initial task formulation is not adequate, 
or initiating sub-sequences to obtain it. 
I discuss first how task information is represented notationally, and hence, what 
messages (or events) the information component participates in. I then define a 
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number of relations on task information, before defining the dynamic behaviour of 
the information component. A query can be notated as follows: 
(3.27) (query; Selector, Constraints) 
,,,,here Selector is used to define the response options, and Constraints are used 
to constrain the query. For example, consider the query corresponding to 'What time 
does sa308 from Rome arrive. Using at to refer to the slot arrivaLtime, dp to 
departure_place, fn for flighLnumber, this can be represented: 
(3.28) (query; {at: A}, {fn : sa308; dp : rome}) 
Here A represents a named variable whose value is sought; this may be replaced 
by a value representing a default. Similarly for alternatives queries, the options are 
specified in the Selector field; for example, if asking whether the arrival time was 
seven fifteen or eight fifteen, the query can be represented: 
(3.29) (query; {at: {715,815}}, {fn : ba292})) 
The selector therefore both contributes to the constraints, and defines what 
information is to be extracted as the result of a successful query. One further kind 
of query is a polar query; for this the selector is empty, and the query succeeds or 
fails depending on whether the information in the Constraints field is true or false. 
For the two place relation 
(3.30) SatisfiesDB( (query; {Sel}, {Constraints}), Result) 
to be true, the propositions SelU Constraints must be derivable from the database. 
I do not discuss the presuppositional constraints imposed by the selector. Result 
is a value; for open queries, it represents the value of the unknown variable; for 
default queries, the value at the path specified by the default selector; for alterna-
tives queries, one of the alternative values proposed. An overloaded response has 
additionally context-value pairs corresponding to further information which is si-
multaneously true of the database, together possibly with values for variables which 
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were left underspecified in Constraints, but were not part of the selector. In the 
case of a polar query, the response (if not overloaded) is empty. 
A result to a query can then be divided into three parts, representing the ,"alue 
(if any) for the selector, additional constraints and bindings in the case of overloaded 
responses, and modifications to the original constraints in the case of approximate 
responses: 
(3.31 ) Result == (Value, Overload, App1'Oximation) 
Approximate responses may be assumed to contain additional instructions for 
modifying the original query. In cases where Overload and Approximation are not 
present, I show only the result value. 
In defining the Information Component, the messages used correspond to events 
on the channels pi (input from Pragmatics Interpretation) and 0 (output to Output 
Component). Communication with the database is left implicit in the definition of 
SatisfiesDB. Possible messages are: 
(3.32) 
(3.33) 
(3.34) 
(3.35) 
message 
pi?(init; (query; {Sell, {Cnsts})) 
pi? (respj (queryj {Sel}, { Cnsts }), (result; { Val})) 
o!(init; (query; {Sel},{Cnsts})) 
o!(respj (query; {Sel}, {Cnsts}), (result; {Val})) 
shorthand 
pi? (initl j Query) 
pi? (respl; Result) 
o!(init1j Query) 
o! (respl; Result) 
where (3.32) and (3.33) correspond to queries and responses from the Caller, 
while (3.34) and (3.35) messages initiated by the Agent. Responses thus contain 
mention of their queries; in the case of responses from Agent, these are needed for 
proper response formulation; for response from Caller, this is not strictly necessary, 
so long as queries and responses are indexed as belonging together. One further 
type of input is simply a set of constraints, without any other information about 
what can be done with it. INFO will try to attach this information to the current 
task. 
83 
I now give a CSP definition of INFO. Its states are notated by the current task, 
Ie: INFO(Ta.k) where Task schematically represents a task specification. If there is 
no task, the notation INFO() is used. I distinguish between states where input is 
expected, and where output needs to be sent, thus: INFO( ... ):7 for input; INFO( ... ):! 
for output. The initial state could either be INFO( ):7, which waits for the Caller 
to specify a task, or INFO( ):h which prompts for one. The rules for INFO can be 
stated as follows: 
(3.36 ) INFO( ):! - o!(preinit; Task) -+ INFO( ):7 
(3.37) INFO( ):? - pi?(init; Task) -+ INFO(Ta.k):! 
INFO(Ta.k):! - if db_adequate( Task) then 
if Satisfies_DB( Task, Response) then 
(3.38) o!( resp; Task; Response) -+ INFO():! 
(3.39) else o!( respj Task; failed) -+ INFO( ):! 
endif 
else if nexLsubquery( Task, Subq) then 
(3.40) o!(init; query; Subq) -+ INFO(Ta6k):? 
endif 
(3.41) INFO(Tad):? ~ pi? (resp; Constraints) -+ INFO( T4.k~Co1l.tr4i1lt.):? 
I define a pre-initiative ((preinit; ... )) to be a message which expects an initiative 
for its response. The unary predicate db_adequate( Task) is true if Task is sufficiently 
specified for a database access. If this is not the case, the form of an interactive query 
for further specification is given by the relation nexLsubquery. Task~Constraints 
represents the further specification of Task which results from adding Constraints. 
As an example of the operation of INFO, consider the following dialogue: 
Al how can I help you 
Cl what time does SA 308 from Rome arrive 
(3.42) A2 is that to Heathrow 
C2 no Gatwick 
A3 seven fifteen 
The events and state changes for INFO are as follows: 
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Event 
Al o!(preinit; TASK) 
CI pi? (init; (queryl; {at: A}, {In : sa308; dp : rome})) 
A2 o!(init; (query2; {ap: hrow}, { ... })) 
C2 pi?(resp; (query2; .. . ),(result; {gwck})) 
A3 o!(resp; (queryl; ... ), (result; {715})) 
(3.43) 
State changes 
IN FO( ):! --. IN FO( ):? 
INFO( ):? --. INFO«queryl)):! 
INFO«queryl)):! --. 
nVFO«query' )):? 
INFO«queryl )):? --. 
INFO«query IO)):? 
INFO«queryJo)):? --. liYFO( ):! 
-where INFO«querylo}):? represents the state of INFO when it still needs to 
answer the Caller's query, but when the task has been refined (by C2). The definition 
of INFO is simple and limited. It assumes that there is only one task at a time. 
This is not the case, for example, if the Caller asks for some clarification, whilst 
his main task is still being processed. This situation can be dealt with if INFO 
keeps a stack of tasks, so that with its state represented: INFO( Ta3k1, Ta3i.:2"") ' Tas~:1 
is the current task; once finished it is removed from the stack and Task2 becomes 
the current task, etc. Also not included are explicit messages for concluding tasks: 
the Caller might wish to stay with the current task, and ask for more details. after 
the major response (3.38) has been generated. A more detailed definition would 
also include the ability to freely mix unsolicited input (including sub-tasks) from 
the Caller, with requested input. 
3.3.3 The Output component 
The Output component (OUTPUT) is responsible for planning and generating the 
systems utterances. I have demonstrated (Section 3.2.4) that turns produced by 
speakers need not be co-extensive with dialogue acts. Since the latter are the main 
unit of information transfer within the system, this imposes a dual requirement. 
OUTPUT should be able to buffer up several messages before saying any; it should 
also be capable of breaking up into smaller chunks a single message which contains 
too much information to be delivered at once. Moreover, if feedback from the 
interlocutor is to be dealt with in between chunks, OUTPUT will be required to 
suspend its current operation, and make itself available for any repair subsequences 
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that may occur, for example: 
(:3.44 ) 
AI: there's a flight this evening at nine 
CI: five oclock 
A')' no nine oclock 
C2: nine oclock 
A3: arrive rome eleven thirty 
C3: eleven thirty 
In (3...14) the Agent's information-providing dialogue act takes place O\'er Al and 
A3; CI-C2 is a subsequence involving a repair. 
In order to define a mechanism for buffering messages input from elsewhere in 
the system, I assume a pre-defined limit on the buffer size, max, after which the 
system needs to speak its stored messages. The constraint that speaking is allowed 
after a fixed number of messages may seem inflexible; compare: 
(3.45) A: which airport are you travelling from 
what day do you want to leave 
(3.46) A: what day do you want to leave 
you're travelling from London 
(3.47) A: you're travelling from London 
what day do you want to leave 
Only (3.47) seems acceptable, and that only if the first dialogue act is read as a 
confirmation not requiring a response. This suggests that speaking should happen 
as soon as an initiative requiring a response is processed. I shall let OUTPUTn :! 
be the process after n messages have been stored, and speaking is enabled. The 
function generate_messages takes the buffer contents indexed by its arguments, 
and produces the corresponding (extended) utterance. The unary predicate is_init 
determines whether or not its argument is a true initiative, ie. reqUIres a response. 
OUTPUT is defined as follows: 
(3.48) OUTPUTn:! - o?messagen+l ...... 
if is_init( messagen+d then 
ac!generate_messages( (1 ... n + 1)) 
...... OUTPUTo:? 
else OUTPUTn+1:! 
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PROCESSES 
OUTPUT: 
CALLER 
Figure 3.3: OUTPUT when the maximum buffer length is 3 
endif 
(n < max - 1) 
(3.49) OUTPUTmax _ 1:! - o?messagemax --+ 
ac!generate_messages( (1 ... max) ) 
--+ OUTPUTo:? 
Buffering is illustrated in Figure 3.3. The process accepts inputs from other 
processes at states OUTPUTo:!, OUTPUT1:! and OUTPUT2:!. Its buffer then being 
full, the three messages are output in a single turn, the process returning to the state 
OUTPUTo:? Consider now the case where the process is in the state OUTPUTo:!. 
and there are two input messages: 
messagel = (init; (confirm; {dp : lond}); strong: -) 
message2 = (init; (query; {dt : A})) 
The feature strong on a confirmation initiative determines whether or not a response 
is explicitly required (see Section 3.3.8). The state changes of OUTPUT are shown 
in (3.50): 
Events 
(3 50(?(init; (confirm; {dp: lond}); strong: -) 
. o?(initj (query; {dt : A}, {})) 
ac! "from london what time . .. " 
State changes 
OUTPUTo:! --+ OUTPUTl:! 
OUTPUT1 :! --+ OUTPUTo:? 
The first initiative is not marked [strong: +], so the predicate is_init is not 
satisfied, and messagel is retained in an internal buffer. However message2 is all 
(init; query . .. ), which counts as a true initiative, so the composite message: from 
London. what time do you want to leave is generated. 
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\\Then OUTPUT ... :! has spoken, the process becomes OUTPUTo:? In this state, 
further activity is blocked and the interlocutor is free to speak. This may be commu-
nicated to the rest of the system via the global message your _turn. Conversely we 
may define an input process, with the two states: II\lPUT? and LVPUT!. The latter 
state blocks input from the Caller, because the system is presumed to be speak-
ing; on receipt of the global signal your _turn it becomes INPUT? and is capable of 
processing Caller utterances. That is: 
(3 .. 51) 
I do not enter into details of the process state INPUT? Its normal activity is 
to process an acoustic signal from the Caller and return a sign representing the 
linguistic analysis along the channel ind to the discourse interpretation component. 
On receiving the signal ?my_turn, however, or if some period of time elapses during 
which there is no input from the Caller, it reverts to the blocking state INPUT!. 
The message my_turn may be sent by some component which detects a turn-change 
signal, or by the interpretation process after analysing an utterance to be a true-
initiative. 
The message my_turn causes a state change in OUTPUT: 
(3 .. 52) OUTPUTo:? - ?my_turn - OUTPUTo:! 
As for the phased outputting of chunked portions of a single message, some 
difficulty can be avoided by the observation that this case should not overlap with 
that of messages being buffered. I define a process OUTPUT _CHUNKS which 
starts with a sequence of chunks, and whose job is to output these one at a time. 
OUTPUT becomes this new state, if the input message requires chunking; assuming 
a predicate which decides this and returns n, the number of chunks, the following 
can be added to the definition of OUTPUT: 
OUTPUTo:! - o!messagel-
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(3 .. 53) if requires_chunking( messagel, n} then OUTPUT _CHUSI\'sln 
else ... 
OUTPUT _CHUNKS; can be defined thus: 
{3 . .54} OUTPUT _CHUNKS; - ac!generate_chunk{c) 
--+ OUTPUT _CHUNl\'S;~l 
(n < c) 
OUTPUT _CHUN/{S: - ac!generate_chunk( n) 
--+ OUT P UTo:? 
vVhen all the chunks have been generated (using the function generate_chunk), 
OUTPUT takes over again. 
To allow feedback and possible insertion sequences between chunks, the defini-
tion 3.54 must be refined thus: 
(3.55) OUTPUT _CHUNKS; - ac!generate_chunk( c) 
(n < c) 
--+!your _turn --+ TEMP _OUTPUTo:? 
; OUTPUT _CHUNKS~I 
where TEMP _OUTPUT ... behaves like OUTPUT ... , except if it receives a time-
out message, in which case it terminates. The infix operator '; , is used for sequential 
composition of processes; that is, PI ; P2 is that process which behaves like PI until 
that process terminates successfully, whereafter it behaves like P2 • 
Chunking of output is illustrated in Figure 3.4. The process in state OUTPUTo:! 
receives a message o? d1, which requires chunking into three components. The pro-
cess becomes the process OUTPUT _CHUNKSt (o_ch l ), which generates the first 
chunk, sending it on channel ac as ml. After the global message yt (represented 
as a vertical line), 0Pl becomes the process TEMP _OUTPUTo:?, represented as 
too:?' \-Vere there no input from the Caller, this process would simply die. As 
it is, the input ca.s1 is received, and other processes (not represented) decide to 
react to it, producing o.d2. This is the current active output process. and the 
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Figure 3.4: Chunking a message 
ac.m4 
global signal mt (my turn) having been received, it is in a state to speak, produc-
. '2 lllg aC.m . TEMP _OUTPUT now terminates, and the output process becomes 
OUTPUT_CHUNKS!] (O_Ch2)' which generates the next chunk ac!m3. Finally, 
when the last chunk ac!m4 has been generated, OUTPUT _CHUNKS; (O_Ch3) dies, 
and OUTPUTo:? (oo:?) becomes the default output process again. 
The account of buffering and chunking offered here is an abstract one, confined 
to the external behaviour of OUTPUT. At which level of language production might 
buffering or chunking take place? Referring to Levelt's architecture for the speaker 
(see Figure 2.3), this could be at the level of the Conceptualizer, or that of the 
Formulator. The definitions given here are sufficiently abstract to leave the issue 
undecided. In terms of economy of processing, it would seem preferable to make the 
decision to split output at as high a level as possible. 
This section has presented a schematic account of the language production pro-
cess, from the perspective of its dynamic behaviour within the system. In Chapters 5, 
I present a detailed account of the workings of the language production model within 
the Sundial implementation. 
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Figure 3.5: Simplified dialogue act hierarchy, showing correlation with syntactic and 
semantic features 
3.3.4 Pragmatic interpretation 
The component D_INT is responsible for interpretation of surface semantics with 
respect to the discourse model. I do not present a formal definition of this compo-
nent; its functionality is discussed in Section 4.3.1.2. The pragmatic interpretation 
component P _INT assigns a dialogue act label to the result of discourse interpre-
tation. As I have shown (cf. Section 3.2.3) the extent to which dialogue function 
is explicitly marked varies. For responses, it can be marked by yes/no; otherwise 
reliance must be put on matching and adjacency. So far as initiatives are concerned, 
Figure 3.5 shows some of the correlations between features extracted during syn-
tactic or discourse processing, and dialogue act types. Dialogue acts are organised 
in a simple inheritance hierarchy, with root ini t. Below this they are divided into 
queries and confirmations, and these are divided according to whether they are 
open, alternatives, default or values. Syntactic features are prefaced syn. Some 
semantic features (corresponding in the main to propositional attitude operators) 
are treated as non-interpretable during discourse interpretation; these are prefaced 
with semop, their values being schematically represented using small capitals. The 
feature status is a flag reflecting the manner in which the discourse model has been 
advanced: if nothing has been changed, its value is d_rep; non-monotonic change 
91 
would lead to the value d_mod. The feature sel refers to selector component of 
the task constraints derived (cf. Section 3.3.2). Thick arrows denote correlations 1 
unique arrows from a feature node to dialogue act node or vice versa indicating that 
this relation instance is functional. For example1 the arrow from [syn : [inv : +lJ to 
ini t indicates that this syntactic feature necessarily implies an initiative. Similarly, 
the dialogue act Unit; query; open) necessarily implies the feature [sel : open]; the 
reverse however is not true, because that feature assignment could equally well apply 
to (init; confirm; open). 
The mapping shown is complex and far from complete; for example factors like 
adjacency and the re-use of surface forms have not been taken into account. It 
nevertheless shows how, even in the absence of matrix phrases or explicit syntactic 
marking, it is still possible for a hearer to distinguish the dialogue acts at the terminal 
nodes of this hierarchy, just by the features sel and status, each of which is available 
as the result of successful interpretation. 
The mapping is also of use to the Agent qua speaker; were it not conventional 
in this way, it would not be possible to exploit it in conversation. In both cases 1 an 
algorithm is required which selects the appropriate target nodes: for the speaker, 
given dialogue act specifications; for the listener, given whatever features have been 
derived. I therefore assume that the mapping (3.56) is 1-1: 
(3.56) Surface_Init : Cues x Selector x Status +---+ Inits 
Responses must be dealt with differently. To be counted as such, they must 
correspond to earlier initiatives. These may be recorded on the Response Stack, a 
datastructure which keeps track of pending responses in a last-in first-out manner, 
deleting them when they have been found. Items are put on the Response Stack at 
the time when an initiative is sent to OUTPUT. Representing the former by the 
process RS with input channel (from any module) rsin, then whenever a response 
is expected, the corresponding rule must be modified to take this into account: 
(3 .. 57) ... o!(init ... ) -+ Chan?(resp ... ) -+ '" 
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(3.58) '(") . '''Ch?( )l' Ch?( ) ... o. znzt... -+ rszn. . an. resp... -+ an. resp... -+ ... 
That is, if Chan is an arbitrary channel, then the expected response in (:3.Yi) 
must be prefaced in the modified rule (3.58) by a message sending a quoted copy of 
the template for this response to RS. If initiatives are stored in this way, a ftll1C-
tion LookuPRS within P _INT can seek a match between the incoming features and 
the underspecified template on top of the response stack, and return the resulting 
instantiated template; this retains the prefix with the address of the component for 
which it is destined. 
P _INT is defined thus: 
(3.59'f _INT - dp?( Cues, TInJ, Status, Validity) -+ 
if SurJaceJnit( Cues, Selector, Status) = (query; QSelector) 
then pi!(init; query; QSelector; TIn!) -+ P _INT 
else LookuPRS( Cues, Selector, Status, TIn!) -+ P _INT 
endif 
The message from D_INT includes not only a task-oriented interpretation ( TIll!) 
but also surface cues (Cues), status and indication of acoustic validity. The defi-
nition is limited in only considering initiatives destined for the component I,VFO: 
moreover, nothing is said about the possibility of LookuPRS failing to return a result. 
In that case a failure result may be returned, leading to a request for repetition. 
In this section I have attempted to show that the computational task of prag-
matic interpretation may depend on a combination of contextual and linguistic cues. 
This reinforces the suggestion made in Section 3.2.3, that prosodic cues provide 
complementary information, facilitating pragmatic disambiguation. In Section :3.4 
I examine whether good correlations between dialogue acts and prosodic contours 
exist, which could be exploited by the listener to effect such disambiguation. 
3.3.5 The Meta component 
Acts that refer to previous acts, or results of processing previous acts, I call meta-
communicative. In the case of initiatives, these are repetition requests, confirmation 
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requests (including open confirmations) and corrections. They are treated differently 
depending on who the initiating party is. Acts initiated by the Caller require the 
Agent to modify his representations (where necessary), and respond appropriately. 
Acts initiated by the Agent on the other hand come about because of difficulty 
arising from processing an utterance of the Caller's. The difficulty needs to be 
resolved interactively, before processing can continue. I define two processes, AIETAl 
and lvlETA2 to deal with the two cases. 
First, Caller-initiated acts. I assume that the processes D_IlVT and P _INT have 
labelled these successfully. The process "'fETAl then reads in a labelled act on the 
channel pm. The possible labelled dialogue acts are as follows: 
(init; repeat) 
(init; confirm; ... ) 
(init; correct; Mod) 
In the case of corrections, Mod consists of three elements: a context, an old 
value, and a new value. This needs to be confirmed interactively, before a message 
to the discourse model valid_mod ratifies the change. The definition of AfETAl is 
then the following: 
(3.61) 
~ ( 
pm?(init; repeat) -+ o!(last) -+ METAl 
I 
pm?(init; confirm; ... ) -+ o!(resp; confirm; ... ) -+ METAl 
pm?(init; correct (Mod); TC) -+ o!(init; confirm; mod(Mod); TC) -+ 
pm?(resp; confirm; mod(Mod); TC) -+ md!(valid_mod(Mod)) -+ 
-+ METAl 
Here I introduce a further kind of confirmation act, confirmation of a modifica-
tion. It is characterised by emphatic focus (cf. Section 4.4). Added to the alphabet 
for OUTPUT is the message o.(last). This process is required to retain a copy of 
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the last message generation instruction 1 at some level during the production pro-
cess. On receiving (last) it formulates this message again: the addition of the feature 
[repeated: +] however may cause it to be formulated differently. 
The operation of AlETA! may be illustrated by considering the case where the 
Caller has initiated a correction, with the utterance: not London Luton. 
Utterance 
C : not London Luton 
A : from Luton 
C: yes 
(3.62) 
Event 
pm?(init; correct ( {(dp, lond, lutn)} 
o!(init; confirm; mod( {(dp, lond, lutn)} 
pm? (resp; confirm; mod( {( dp, lond, lutn)} 
md! valid_mod( fl,fod) 
State changES 
Here the message (valid_mod( Mod)), where Mod is a modification, needs to be 
added to the alphabet of D_INT. It acts as a control signal confirming a non-
monotonic change. 
The definition of META2 is less straightforward. The process needs to monitor 
for messages where interactive intervention is required, possibly on several chan-
nels. I handle this by letting pX be a variable taking as value anyone of the 
several output channels of the process P _INT, including pm. META2 picks up any 
of these which have been flagged by the earlier interpretation processes as having 
[validity: poor], interactively confirms them, and puts them back with that feature 
replaced by validity: good. For this to happen, none of the 'consuming' processes 
of messages from P _INT, including META itself, must allow structures with the 
feature [validity: poor] in their alphabet. META2 also reads in messages which 
include the component failure, directly on the channel pm; in this case, AGENT's 
most recent utterance is repeated. 
(3.63) 
(3.64) 
NfETA2 - ( 
pX?(Act[validity : poor]) --+ 
o!( init; confirmact; Act) --+ pm?( resp; confirmact; Act) --+ 
pX!(Act[validity : good]) --+ AfETA2 
pm? (Jailure ... ) --+ o!(last) --+ META2 
) 
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Figure 3.6: The process META2 intercepting a message and requiring confirmation 
Here the expression Act[Feat : Val] is the same as Act, except that Feat is 
required to have value Val. 
Figure 3.6 shows the operation of META2, when it interrupts a message intended 
for INFO and requires confirmation. Here and in similar figures arrows are used to 
represent the flow of control: vertical arrows correspond to messages, horizontal 
to state transitions within processes. Horizontal dotted lines are used to identify 
processes. The input message ca?sl is received by P _INT; the latter carries out 
pragmatic interpretation, and decides that the act is a dialogue act dl, intended 
for INFO. But the message pi.dl is intercepted by META2, because it carried 
the feature [validity : poor]. This then sends out a confirmact initiative o. cd to 
OUTPUT, which is in turn generated as ac.rn!. A your_turn signal (not shown) 
follows, followed by the input ca.s2. For the sake of clarity I omit all interpretation 
stages for this, including pragmatic interpretation, and assume it is sent directly to 
lvlETA2 as an affirmative response. META2 then releases the message pi.dl which 
it has held back, allowing it to pass to INFO, this time with its validity endorsed. 
Confirmation of an entire act is the simplest case to handle symbolically; open 
and value confirmations can be handled similarly. Corrections initiated by the Agent 
are not included in the definition of META 2. To the extent that these are motivated 
by an interpretation of an unauthorised modification as being a failed confirmation 
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initiative, this is dealt with in the definition of METAl' Othenvise, where the 
interpretation of some other act is flawed by an unauthorised modification. this may 
be dealt with by the same kind of interaction that was used to put right acts with 
poor validity. 
3.3.6 An example 
The example is taken from the Swedish Airlines corpus. Only processes which change 
state are shown. 
SA4:A1: Swedish Airlines flight information 
The agent begins as a decisive agent, taking the initiative (cf. Section 3.3.1). 
STATE can be defined to make the response to this (init; opening) optional: 
if the Caller wants to respond with a greeting, he may buffer it together with 
his first move, C 1. 
SA4:A1: can I help you 
Events States 
o.(preinit; Task) OUTPUTo:! -+ OUTPUTo:? 
INFO( ):! -+ INFO( ):? 
RS( ) -+ RS«init; Tad:» 
In its initial state, INFO has no current task, so Issues an (preinit; Task) 
message on channel o. This expects for its response an initiative-shown by 
the response stack RS having on it a template corresponding to this. 
SA4:C1: when is the next flight to Rome please 
Events 
pi.(init; (queryl; {dt : A}, {order: next; ap: rome})) 
States 
INFO( }:? -+ 
INFO«query 1 )):1 
The incoming utterance is analysed as an open query initiative. This matches 
the expected template on RS, which gets popped off. 
SA4:A2: are you travelling from Heathrow 
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Events States 
o.(init; (query2; {dp: hrow}, { ... })) INFO«queryl}}:!-+ 
INFO«queryl »:? 
RS(} -+ RS«re!p2; Ren/t» 
OUTPUTo:! -+ OUTPUTo:? 
\Vithin the INFO component, the predicate db_adequate fails; nexLsubquery 
produces the default query. Again a template corresponding to the expected 
reply is saved on the response stack. 
SA4:C2: no Stansted 
Events States 
pi.(resp; (query2; {dp : A}, { .. . })(result; {stsd})) RS«mp2; Ren/t» -+ 
RSO 
The response is authorised, and therefore not a correction. The lack of marked 
emphasis on Stansted would probably also lead to this conclusion. The default 
value in the response template on RS is ignored; the result is put on the channel 
pi. However because the default is overridden, it is flagged [validity: poor], 
and hence unacceptable in the alphabet of INFO. 
SA4:A3: travelling from Stansted 
Events States 
o.(init; (confirm; n, {dp : stsd}); strong) RS(} -+ RS(pm.(mp; confirm ... » 
OUTPUTo:! -+ OUTPUTo:? 
The flagged response being in the alphabet of META2 , this process initiates a 
confirmation. Again, expectation of the result is pushed on the response stack. 
SA4:C3: sorry what was that 
SA4:A4: you're travelling from Stansted 
Events States 
pm.( init; repeat) 
o.(last) OUTPUTo:! -+ OUTPUTo:? 
The act is interpreted as a request for repetition; METAl handles this by 
instructing OUTPUT to repeat the last utterance. The presence of the feature 
[repeated: + 1 forces a reformulation of A3. 
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SA4:C4: that's right 
Events 
pm.( resp; confirm . .. ) 
States 
RS(pm.(mp; ... )) -
RS( ) 
pi.( resp; (query2; {dp : A}, { ... }) (result; {stsd})) 
The response C4 matches the confirmation response template on the stack: 
this is then sent to kfETA 2 , which has delayed sending the response to the 
default query (C2) to INFO. This now goes ahead. 
SA4:A5: hold on please,won't be a moment 
SA4:C5: thank you 
SA4:A6: hello 
SA4:C6: hello 
The hold-resume mechanism was discussed in Section 3.3.1. INFO sends out 
a hold message while a database search is taking place; STATE negotiates this 
with the Caller. Subsequently INFO sends out a resume message, and this is 
negotiated. 
SA4:A 7: there's a flight this evening at nine 
Events 
o.(resPi (queryl), (result; {9}, {at: 11}, {})) 
ac.generate_chunk(l) 
States 
OUTPUTo:! -
OUTPUT _CHUN[(S12 -
TEMP _OUTPUTo:? 
The result of the database search is an overloaded response, which includes 
an arrival time. In OUTPUT, the predicate requires_chunking succeeds, and 
the message is split into two chunks. OUTPUT _CHUN[(S12 delivers the first 
part of the message, then suspends as TEMP _OUTPUT, while a response is 
expected. 
SA4:C7: nine 0 'clock 
This is treated as an implicit confirmation, not requiring a response. 
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SA4:A8: arrive Rome eleven thirty 
Events States 
ac.generate_chunk(2) OUTPUT _CHUNKSl -+ 
TEA!P _OUTPUTo:? 
TEA!P _OUTPUT died because no response was needed to the Caller's confir-
mation. OUTPUT _CHUNKS? continues with the second half of the message; 
again a temporary output process comes into existence. 
SA4:C8: seven thirty 
Events States 
pm.(resp; (confirm; {}, {at: 730}); fail: +) 
C8 is interpreted in the discourse model as an unauthorised modification; the 
act is therefore a confirmation which has failed. 
SA4:A9: no eleven thirty 
Events 
o!( correct; (at, 730, 1130)) 
States 
TEMP _0 UTPUTo:! -+ 
TEMP _OUTPUTo:? 
The failed confirmation is dealt with by META}, which sends out a correction 
initiative. 
SA4:C9: eleven thirty 
This is treated as a confirmation of the correction, not requiring a response. 
SA4:C9: thank you very much 
SA4:AIO: thank you 
SA4:CIO: bye 
SA4:ClO: bye 
C begins a pre-closing sequence (C9), which absolves INFO from having to 
send out another (preinit; ... ). The preclosing and closing sequences are 
handled by STATE. 
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3.3.7 Discussion 
The computational system described allows the modelling of a number of prop-
erties of human conversation. Firstly, the dialogues that it engages in are struc-
tured, with local organisation based on the initiative-response pair, but allowing 
embedding amongst these. At a global level a dialogue is effectively divided into 
non-transactional phases: openings, preclosings, holds; and phases during which in-
formation transactions can take place. Secondly, the Agent interprets the Caller's 
goals in terms of what it is capable of; it will prefer approximate solutions to none at 
all, but will mark these as somewhat dispreferred. Thirdly, because interpretation 
depends on context, and context is extended dynamically, a set of constraints or 
requirements can be communicated incrementally, over a number of turns. Lastly, 
it provides mechanisms for the system to initiate repair in case of failure, and to 
cope with Caller-initiated repair. 
There is in principle no constraint on the degree of embedding of subsequences 
permitted. This may not be desirable. More than one level of embedding seems 
particularly unlikely at the purely informational/task level, and has not been ob-
served in the corpora studied. Although the major task may give rise to dependent 
subtasks, a more complex domain would be required for the dependencies to go 
any deeper. However if repair moves are taken into account, embedding can go 
further: 
(3.65 ) 
4:Cl: when is the next flight to rome please depth: 0 
4:A3: 
4:C3: 
travelling from stansted 
sorry what was that 
depth: 1 
depth: 2 
The system defined opens itself to a number of interesting extensions. Firstly, 
although little explicit attempt has been made to model the Caller, a representation 
is implicitly present, for example in the discourse model, within assumptions about 
shared knowledge. The architecture presented here also affords the opportunity of 
modelling an interlocutor's knowledge of his state within the dialogue. For example, 
a response stack for Caller initiatives can be created as a process that reflects the 
functionality of the Agent's own response stack. Whenever a Caller initiative has 
been assigned an appropriate pragmatic interpretation, a placeholder is pushed onto 
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Figure 3.7: Temporal sequence of Caller's result stack and its model by Agent 
the Caller response stack; this may be removed once an acceptable response has been 
provided. This situation is illustrated in Figure 3.7. The Caller's response stack RS 
and the Agent's model of it RScIJller are shown outside the time frame (delimited by 
rectangles). The figure illustrates the delay inherent in Caller modelling. RScIJller 
only has the message i1 pushed on at the time ~, after the Agent has performed 
pragmatic interpretation of the Caller's message ca.81' However the Caller updated 
his own response stack RS at time t l , when he first formulated the message. Sim-
ilarly, after pragmatic interpretation of the response ac. rl at time t4, the Caller is 
able to pop the record of his initiative off RS. The issue of when the Agent should 
do the same with his copy RScIJl/er is not so straightforward. Doing this prematurely 
(at t3 for example) entails the risk of the Agent having to revise his model of the 
Caller subsequently, should the response for some reason be unacceptable to the 
Caller. A more prudent option would be to delay until after the Caller's next turn, 
by when it should be apparent if the response has caused any difficulties or not. 
The unreliability of conventional phrase-structure representations of dialogue, 
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Figure 3.8: Dialogue histories, for both Agent and Caller 
as well as the difficulties in modelling the interlocutor, both of which this style of 
analysis brings out, are illustrated in Figure 3.8, which again refers to Dialogue 4 
from the Swedish Corpus. C1 is both a response to an initiative and itself an initia-
tive; similarly for A4, the repeated confirmation request. The relative shallowness of 
embedding is based on the assumption that the Agent removes the template for the 
response to A2 from his stack, after receiving C2. If he keeps it there until the re-
sponse has been ratified, the line A2-C2 needs to be extended leftward, and A3-A4, 
C3-A4, etc, embedded below it. Also shown in the figure is the structured record 
that the Caller is able to build up, over the same sequence of turns. It is identical 
in the initial stages, where the Agent and Caller can be said to agree about what 
each other's acts are. It differs after A3; the Caller failed to interpret A3 (shown by 
a dot), and so doesn't need to embed C3-A4 any deeper. 
The foregoing discussion has demonstrated that although simple this model may 
be extended in interesting ways, such as allowing the Agent to maintain a partial 
and asynchronous representation of some of the interlocutor's internal structures. 
Some pragmatic inference and revision could then be performed. 
3.3.8 A taxonomy of dialogue acts 
In terms of the architecture described in this chapter, dialogue acts are best rep-
resented at the level of messages emerging after pragmatic interpretation. This is 
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because pragmatic interpretation is the last link in a chain of refinement which be-
gins with acoustic and linguistic analysis. Similarly on the production side, messages 
are maximally explicit before being encoded by the output component. Dialogue 
acts may be defined in two ways: structurally, as bundles of features, or function-
ally, in terms of the traces they form part of. A trace of a process is a sequence of 
events which the process can participate in (Hoare 1985). I consider first functional 
definitions of dialogue acts based on traces, before developing a taxonomy along 
structural lines. 
Representing the process A GENT as the concurrent combination of its compo-
nents as in (3.66), the set of traces traces(AGENT) has as its members all possible 
sequences of events that AGENT could participate in. 
(3.66) AGENT ~ INPUT II D_INT II P _INT II OUTPUT II AlETA II ... 
An arbitrary trace t from traces(AGENT) contains not only events at the level 
of dialogue acts, but every kind of message that every component could engage in. 
A sub-sequence however will consist of dialogue acts. Now for a given dialogue act 
dj , a functional definition will relate it to its environment in the traces in which 
it could have taken part. This can be done either retrospectively, by considering 
patterns which traces that culminate with dj should conform with, or prospectively, 
in terms of patterns on traces which begin with dj , or in both ways, by considering 
patterns that constrain traces which include dj • An example of a retrospective 
definition would be that a response should culminate a trace which contains in it 
the corresponding initiative. A response to a correction would be defined in terms 
of a more constraining pattern, that included a corrective move earlier; to do this 
the definition of a correction needs to be available. An example of a prospective 
definition would be that of a pre-initiative. The definition would then constrain 
traces beginning with such a move to contain an initiative from the other party. 
Such a definition of course needs refinement, because a speaker cannot guarantee that 
his interlocutor will understand or respond. This may be achieved by partitioning 
traces in to those that contain preferred outcomes, and those containing dis preferred 
outcomes. 
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Corresponding to the functional definition of a dialogue act, a structural defini-
tion should specify on it a set of features that can be used to determine whether or 
not it will meet the prospective or retrospective constraints. It is that combination 
of features which define the event which the processes that produce or consume it 
engage in. I do not attempt such rigorous definitions, but define a possible tax-
onomy of structure-based dialogue act labels. The motivation for this comes from 
the observations of human dialogues in Section 3.2, and the computational model 
presented in this section. The basic features are shown in Table 3.1. 
Label 
owner 
seqlab 
type 
repeated 
Value set 
self, other 
init, resp, preinit, postresp 
query, update, confirm, correct, repeat, opening, 
closing, preclosing, hold, resume 
+/-
Table 3.1: Major dialogue act features 
default 
The owner feature records which party is speaking. This is important, not least 
because as we saw in Section 3.3.7, there is a time-lag and a possible lack of symmetry 
between representations that the two parties may build. The seqlab feature takes 
values corresponding to the sequential position of a move within an exchange: these 
are init (initiative), resp (response), preinit and postrespj the latter representing 
pre-initiatives (ie, initiatives expecting initiatives) and post-responses (ie, responses 
to responses). The type feature serves to group together dialogue acts, according to 
the components of the model responsible for handling them: 
Component 
INFO 
META 
STATE 
Types 
query, update 
confirm, correct, repeat 
opening, closing, preclosing, hold, resume 
~inally, the binary-valued feature repeated indicates whether or not the dialogue 
act is being repeated. Default values are provided for some features. 
More detailed featural distinctions, which concern the relations between dialogue 
acts, are shown in Table 3.2 for initiatives, and Table 3.3 for responses. Initiatives 
that belong to the information component: ie, queries and updates, can be distin-
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Type Label Value set default 
query, update topicini + 
query qtype open, alts, default, polar 
confirm qtype act, open, alts, default, value 
confirm failed +,-
confirm modified +,-
confirm strong +,- + 
correct authorised +,- + 
Table 3.2: Secondary features: initiatives 
Type Label Value set default 
any overloaded +,-
query relaxed +,-
confirm confirmed +,- + 
Table 3.3: Secondary features: responses 
guished by whether or not they initiate a task (topic) or are subsidiary. Queries 
are classed according to what kind of options for response their selector provides; 
confirmation initiatives likewise. The remaining features: failed and modified for 
confirms, and authorised for corrects, indicate properties of these dialogue acts with 
respect to the discourse model. In the case of failed and authorised, the features are 
properties assigned by the hearer after pragmatic interpretation, and not present 
for the speaker. The feature strong for confirms indicates whether or not they are 
marked as requiring a response. As for responses, any of these may be overloaded. 
It is often possible to represent such overloads as separate dialogue acts. Responses 
to queries may be relaxed, which is the case when the strict constraints of the 
query cannot be met, but looser ones succeed. Responses to confirmations may be 
confirmed or disconfirmed. 
Finally, three further features relate to the manner in which dialogue acts are 
buffered or chunked. 
Label 
multiturn 
dfinal 
tfinal 
Value set 
+,-
+,-
+,-
default 
+ 
+ 
The feature multiturn indicates whether or not a dialogue act is spread out over 
a number of turns. If it is, or if the dialogue act is separated into chunks only by 
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selt/ 
owner r------~~s~e~l~ab~ 
--------I 
init/resp [init] 
preinit/postresp 
init/resp [init] 
open/alts/default/value 
+/- [+] 
+/- [+] 
Figure 3.9: Taxonomy of dialogue acts. Defaults in square brackets 
pauses, the feature dfinal (dialogue-act final) is relevant. If a turn is divided into 
dialogue acts, then the feature tfinal is relevant. 
I follow normal practice when defining taxonomies, and make use of inheritance 
principles to avoid redundancy. The organisation of the taxonomy may be sum-
marised as follows: 
1. All acts belong to the inheritance tree. There is one distinguished node, the 
root act, from which all other nodes descend. Otherwise, every node has 
exactly one parent, and except in the case of leaf nodes, has children. 
2. The relation [SA between immediately connected nodes is transitive. 
3. If A inherits from B, then A inherits all of B's properties, with the addition 
and possible exception of those more locally defined. Properties or features 
are atomic-valued. Where possible default values are provided. 
Figure 3.9 shows the taxonomy. Arrows represent ISA links; simple lines repre-
sent featural attachment. 
Dialogue act labels should be thought of as bundles of features. Organising them 
107 
Updates 
Open queries 
Alternatives queries 
Default queries 
Value Confirmations 
Open Confirmations 
Corrections 
Repeats 
Holds and phatics 
Pre-initiatives 
topic major responses 
simple Yes/no responses 
overloaded yes / no responses 
Response to open confirmation 
[seqlab: init, type: update] 
[seqlab : init, type: query, qtype : open] 
[seqlab : init, type: query, qtype : alts] 
[seqlab : init, type: query, qtype : default] 
[seqlab : in it , type: confi1'm, qtype : value] 
[seqlab : init, type: confi1'm, qtype : open] 
[seqlab : in it , type: correct] 
[seqlab : init, type: repeat] 
[seqlab : init, type: phatic] 
[seqlab : preinit] 
[seqlab : resp, topic: +] 
[seqlab : resp, qtype : default] 
[seqlab : resp, qtype : default, overloaded: +] 
[seqlab: resp, type: confirm, qtype : open] 
Table 3.4: Dialogue acts used in the Swedish Corpus 
in a hierarchy according to the features type and seqlab facilitates the representation 
of a number of regularities and constraints, such as the constraint that phatics are 
not specified for qtype, or that only [type: task] have pre and post specified. 
Certain properties of the feat ural system are not so easily represented with an 
inheritance taxonomy. Thus the feature seqlab needs to be specialised for tasks; 
similar specialisation (not shown here) is needed for the feature qtype. Feature 
cooccurrence relations (Gazdar et al. 1985) are also needed, for example to state 
that the features described in Table 3.3 are only defined on responses. 
3.4 Contours and contexts 
This section examines the relationship between the dialogue acts described in the 
previous section, and intonation contours. The analysis is based on the Swedish 
Corpus (see Section 1.4.4), which was transcribed both using dialogue act labels, 
and intonationally. The principle dialogue acts used are summarised in Table 3.4. 
Intonation is transcribed in terms of sequences of tonal events (cf. Section 1.4.2). 
However, at this level contours are not so easily characterised, or compared. For 
a broader-based description, a useful starting point is the pitch movement on the 
'nucleus' or final sentence accent. A basic opposition between rising and falling 
nuclei may be observed. Secondary characteristics-such as the direction of the 
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Downst 
22 
Upst 
25 
HL LH 
22 9 
Mixed 
9 
HH 
3 
Level 
41 
~ther I 
Table 3.5: Open queries 
pre-nuclear 'head', and the extent to which individual pitch accents are raised or 
lowered with respect to one another-may then be compared. 
Appendix B gives transcriptions of utterances from the Swedish Airlines corpus, 
showing variation between speakers. These are grouped broadly according to the 
taxonomy presented in Section 3.3.8. In the following analysis, I consider first the 
different kinds of initiatives, as defined in the model, and examine patterns that 
emerge. Responses are then considered, and compared with initiatives. Finally, 
conclusions are drawn about the applicability of the analysis to a computer imple-
mentation. 
Analyses are generally based on all of the transcribed utterances of the corpus. 
The major exception is that of repeated utterances; these are excluded from other 
analyses, and considered in a category apart. The featural system does not neatly 
partition dialogue acts into disjoint categories, and some of the categories considered 
below overlap. Unless stated, figures given are percentages of all transcribed material 
of the relevant category, over all speakers. 
3.4.1 Task initiatives 
Table 3.5 shows the distribution of heads and nuclei for utterances of type 
(init; query; open). Nuclei are predominantly HLH. This trend is reinforced if we 
disregard speaker JM, who accounts for 71 % of HL nuclei. The LH nuclei all occur 
with the politeness marker please. An alternative analysis for these, with a fall-rise 
nucleus instead of a fall-pIus-rise, would result in an even greater proportion of HLH 
accents. Heads are mainly level; disregarding again speaker JM, who accounts for 
43% of all downsteps, the second most frequent category is that of upsteps. 
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Downst 
10 
Upst 
30 
Mixed Level 
10 50 
Table 3.6: Head contours for default queries 
Downst 
42 
Upst 
42 
Mixed Level 
o 14 
HL 
14 
Table 3.7: Value queries 
Default queries are extremely regular; all speakers use HLH nuclei. Table 3.6 
shows the distribution of head contours. Value queries (Table 3.7) are mainly HLH . 
There is no clear pattern in the head contours. 
Pre-initiatives too have mainly fall-rise nuclei (Table 3.8). There are however 
- -
a large proportion (16%) of the stylised contour L H lH. These occur with the 
utterances: [SA l:Al 'j 3:Al ']: can I help you. A possible explanation is that this 
act, juxtaposed with a stylised greeting, is normally stylised. Bolinger (1989: 76) 
refers to this phenomenon, whereby contour spreads beyond the material to which 
it belongs, as perseverance of intonation. Note however that the alternative: [SA 
8:Al ']: how can I help you is only stylised by two speakers. 
Alternative initiatives all end with falls. The current analysis ignores act-medial 
nuclei. Table 3.9 shows heads. All alternative queries (including pre-initiatives) fol-
low the pattern sometimes known as list intonation: a number of non-final phrases, 
followed by continuation markers, then a final phrase, which is generally accompa-
Downst Upst Mixed Level 
4 37 12 45 
HLH HL LHlH H HH Other 
58 12 16 4 4 4 
Table 3.8: Pre-initiatives 
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Downst 
33 
Upst 
22 
Mixed Level 
44 0 
Table 3.9: Alts initiatives 
nied by a fall: 
(3.67) [SA 6:A8] do you 1 want to travel 2business or 2economy class 
(JM) 2HLH] 3THL!] 
The continuation markers used in the Swedish corpus are fall-rise (HLH ), low-rise 
(LH) and level (H). 
With the exception of alternatives queries then, queries tend to have a rising 
(HLH) nucleus. This can be observed in open queries (3.68), default queries (3.69) 
and value (existential) queries (3.70): 
(3.68) [SA I:C5] 1 what time does the eight 2fifteen arrive 
(JQ) IH 2THLH 
(3.69) [SA 6:A2] from llondon 
(JM) IHLH 
(3.70) [SA 8:Cl] is Ithere a flight on 2sunday 3morning 410ndon to 5stockholm 
(JM) IH 3!HLH] 4H 5HLH 
3.4.2 Repair utterances 
Value confirmation initiatives are divided into strong and weak, depending on whether 
or not a response is expected. Because of the difficulty in establishing a speaker's 
intention here, I adopt an operational definition whereby weak initiatives are those 
which are non-turn-final. Table 3.10 compares confirmation initiatives according 
to this distinction. Apart from the greater tendency to downstep, there seems lit-
tle difference between the two categories. The use of T HL.LH would appear to be 
associated with the violation of a strong default (see Section 4.3.4). In the case 
of the one speaker (MC) who imposes this interpretation (3.71) the corresponding 
linguistic event might better be labelled to reflect this. 
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Downst Upst Mixed Level 
Strong 47 26 0 26 
Weak 60 10 10 20 
HLH HL THL.LH HH 
Strong 21 73 2 2 
Weak 20 80 0 0 
Table 3.10: Strong and weak confirmations 
Downst 
o 
Upst 
57 
Mixed Level 
o 42 
HH 
14 
Table 3.11: Open confirmations 
(3.71) [SA 3:A2] lfive one 2two from 3pans 
(MC) IH 2THL.LH 
Open confirmations request repetition of part of a previous utterance. Syn-
tactically, they can be similar to open queries, in using the wh- question form. 
As Table 3.11 demonstrates, they employ mostly HLH nuclei; these tend to be 
upstepped. The use of high register and upstepping heads means that open con-
firmations have a lot in common with repeat initiatives. Correction initiatives are 
distinguished mainly by the preponderance of raised accents; this is in line with 
the need to make changed material relatively salient, discussed in greater detail in 
Chapter 4. 
3.4.3 Modification utterances 
These are marked [modified : +], indicating that they refer to some change in 
the state of the discourse model. In the case of (init; correct) acts (Table 3.12), 
the feature modified is necessarily present. Table 3.13 shows the distribution of 
heads and nuclei for all such acts, and for the two sub-cases [authorised : +] and 
[authorised: -]. 
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Downst 
o 
Upst 
69 
Mixed 
7 
HL 
53 
Level 
23 
Table 3.12: Correction initiatives 
Downst Upst Mixed 
- authorised 0 69 0 
authorised 11 44 11 
All 4 59 4 
Level 
30 
33 
31 
HLH HL jHL.LH 
- authorised 38 53 7 
authorised 11 88 0 
All 27 68 4 
Table 3.13: Authorised and unauthorised modifications 
It might be expected that unauthorised modifications would be generally marked 
with the 'deferential' fall-rise, as was shown in Example 3.5; this is not the case, 
although a greater percentage of these have HLH nuclei. However, the unit of 
analysis may again be inappropriate. Nuclei for the utterances 
(3.72) [SA 9:A4"] there isn't a flight one five three from geneva 
[SA 9:A4"'] there's a flight one nine three 
are as follows, for the four speakers: 
9A4" 9:A4'" 
JM HLH HL 
JQ HLH HLH 
MC HL HLH 
MG HLH HL 
It can be seen that every speaker uses a HLH nucleus at least once in a pair. On 
the other hand, for [SA 8:A 7]: 
(3.73) well, there's a flight at eight fifteen, 
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Inits 
Resps 
All 
Downst 
18 
Upst 
33 
Mixed Level 
7 40 
HL 
77 
Table 3.14: Heads and nuclei for repeated utterances 
HLH-HL 
10 
o 
9 
HL-HLH 
10 
o 
9 
x-x 11 
70 55 
100 0 
72 50 
-U-
10 
50 
13 
+phrase 
20 
o 
18 
Table 3.15: Repeated utterances compared with antecedents 
nochange 
10 
50 
13 
only one speaker (MC) used an HLH contour. Further evidence concerning the use 
of HLH accents in these dialogues comes from a study by House et. al. (1992). 
In an experiment designed to evaluate the importance of pragmatically appropriate 
intonation in speech synthesis, listeners were presented with short dialogue excerpts 
based on exchanges taken from the Swedish Corpus. In the case of sentences [SA 
9:A4"], [SA 9:A4" '] and [SA 8:A 7], there was a significant preference for material 
synthesized with the HLH accent, over tokens using the default fall. 
3.4.4 Repetitions and reformulations 
Table 3.14 shows the patterns of heads and nuclei for repeated utterances. It may 
be more informative to consider the changes between repeats, and their antecedents. 
Table 3.15 shows contour changes, whether accents have been boosted (11) or de-
pressed (-U-), and whether the number of phrases has increased (+phrase). There is 
also a category for no change. For each category, percentages of the relevant total 
are given. Contour changes seem to be confined to initiatives. Changes such as 
an increase in the number of accents were not taken into account; in the corpus 
these were also associated with a change in the textual form of the utterance. The 
utterances for which no (prosodic) change was noted: [SA 2:A4;7:A3] were in fact 
textually different from their antecedents. Discounting these, it is possible to con-
114 
Downst Upst Mixed Level 
Inits 33 27 8 30 
Resps 29 13 6 50 
HLH HL LH jHL.1.H LHlH H HH Other 
Inits 38 44 7 0 2 1 2 2 
Resps 8 89 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Table 3.16: All initiatives and responses, excluding repeated utterances 
clude that in reformulations and repetitions, prosodic change is a complementary 
cue to textual change. 
The data of Table 3.15 only compares nuclear tones which are either act-final 
or turn-final. Thus alternative questions, which always end with HL, are classed 
as X--+X. Such analysis masks the fact that these tones tend to be boosted in the 
repeat. It also fails to take into account the continuation tones before the final fall, 
for example, 2HLH in (3.67). Of these, 4 out of 6 show a change in contour, the 
most common being H --+ HLH . 
3.4.5 Responses 
Table 3.16 compares heads and nuclei for all initiatives and responses, except re-
peated utterances which were again excluded from the analysis. 
The pattern that emerges is one where responses are predominantly marked with 
falls, while initiatives are fairly evenly divided between HLH and HL. Given the 
lack of structural variation among responses, we may take them to be the unmarked 
form. This is in accordance with the account of the contextual interpretation of 
responses (Section 3.3.4); compared with the interpretation of initiatives, this is 
relatively straightforward. 
Dialogue acts in which a lot of information is communicated may be broken up 
over a number of turns, as we have seen (Section 3.2.4). In the Flight Enquiries 
corpus, [dfinal : -] turns were frequently marked with continuation tones, such as 
HLH. In the Swedish Corpus however, both [dfinal : -] and [dfinal : +J turns end 
in falls. Differences are subtle: the final turn in a chunked sequence is more likely 
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dfinal 
-dfinal 
Downst 
71 
o 
Upst 
14 
37 
Mixed 
14 
12 
Level 
o 
50 
Table 3.17: Distribution of heads according to act-finality 
to have a nucleus that is downstepped or falls to the bottom of the speaker's range. 
For one speaker, the [dfinal : -] falls were less steep than the final ones. Table 3.17 
shows the distribution of heads. Non final turns tend to be upstepped or level, 
whereas final turns tend to be downstepped; in these cases heads may be providing 
the cues not provided by nuclei. 
3.4.6 Discussion 
The above analysis reveals little in the way of reliable correlations between dialogue 
act and contour. There are interesting regularities, but none that could claim an 
explanation within the model. Consider the open query [SA 5:A2'] 
(3.74) lwhat time 2do you want to 3leave 
(JQ) IH 3HLH 
(MC) IH 3HL 
What distinguishes the tokens uttered by JQ and MC can hardly result from any 
distinctions made in the model presented in Section 3.3. An attempt at explanation 
would need to be based on concepts such as attitude, or interpersonal relations; 
these are by definition excluded from the idealised notion of information dialogues. 
The analysis thus vindicates the stance taken by Cutler (1977), Cutler and Isard 
(1980), Couper-Kuhlen (1986) and Bolinger (see for example Bolinger 1989: 2), that 
intonation contours are not amenable to analysis along the lines of intentions, or 
speech acts. Even phenomena which previous research would predict to be present, 
such as dialogue-act-medial signals, and the use of the fall-rise to mark cooperative 
responses, were not found consistently. 
Such equivocal results may nevertheless be of use in an implemented speech 
output system, where contour needs to be assigned, even if heuristically. In the 
Sundial implementation, the contour assignment rules, described in Section 5.6, are 
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based on a single speaker. Averaging over speakers would not achieve any generality. 
and would be likely to blur within-speaker distinctions. Data not considered in detail 
here, including the use of stylised contours to accompany phatic utterances (House 
and Youd 1991, House 1992) have been added. An attempt has been made to 
exploit the opportunities for representational economy offered by the inheritance 
hierarchy. For example, default rules appear for initiatives and responses which 
are not further specified, or whose specification fails to match higher-ordered rules. 
Variability in the rules (reflecting the percentages observed) is modelled by weighted 
random selection. The implementation therefore, whilst lacking explanatory power. 
is nevertheless consistent with observations. 
3.5 Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter first examined dialogue phenomena from a structural and prosodic 
point of view, with reference to the flight enquiries corpus. This led to a specifica-
tion for a computational model of an information-providing Agent in dialogue. The 
model can be viewed as an idealisation of the Sundial manager. In Section 5.1.3 
the two are compared. The model can be applied in the analysis of the constructed 
dialogues of Appendix A; an example is given in Section 3.3.6. As a result of the 
specification, a feat ural notation for dialogue acts was proposed, with certain fea-
tures corresponding to events in the model. Features relating to high-level functions 
(such as the default nature of a query) may be combined, in the description of 
dialogue acts, with features relating to lower level formulation decisions (such as 
non-finality). The Swedish Dialogues were labelled according to this notation, and 
transcribed intonationally, to determine the extent to which regularities between 
dialogue act descriptions and contours existed. Although some regularities were 
found, these were lacking in predictive power. 
It does not therefore seem possible to account for contour choices in any determi-
nate way, in terms of the model. This negative result should however be seen in the 
following light: the analysis has simply shown that the phenomena are more com-
plex than a model such as the current one can handle. If, as a number of researchers 
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have suggested, a speaker's attitude is a central factor, then an exploratory account 
must await the successful modelling of attitude. Such an exploration has, however, 
value in offering rules, albeit probabilistic, that will generate contour choices, given 
an abstract characterisation of dialogue moves (see Section 5.6). This itself is an 
advance on the bland heuristics generally used in text-to-speech prosody generation. 
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Chapter 4 
Focus assignment 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I explore how the decision to make items within an utterance more 
or less prosodically prominent may come about, on the basis of internal contextual 
representations which are independently motivated, to a greater or lesser extent, by 
considerations of the computational task faced by the speaker during the process 
of language production. In the previous chapter although an explicit model of dia-
logue was proposed, the analysis of prosodic contour was inconclusive. By contrast, 
prosodic prominence is better understood (cf. Sections 2.5.1-2.5.3). I therefore elab-
orate a model which is more theoretical, and which attempts to account for prosodic 
prominence as an emergent property of the whole process of utterance production. 
Attempts to provide structural accounts of the incidence of prosodic accent have 
been of limited success. Even semi-structural accounts such as that of Gussenhoven 
(1984) are so hedged with exceptions as to carry little explanatory power. I follow 
Bolinger (eg. 1989) in preferring non-structural accounts of prominence, and relative 
prominence, for structures within which distinctions may be made at at a concep-
tual level, or in terms of 'interest'. This is possible because the representations I 
present cover in some detail the conceptual level, and the level of conceptual-lexical 
correspondence. Because of this, there is no need for structural rules of projection 
or percolation. 
Focus assignment may come about in a number of ways. Firstly, elements may 
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be assigned focus properties according to the re-use of previous linguistic forms in 
their formulation: 
(4.1) When do you want to leave 
vVhen do you want to <<arrive» 
(1.7') ... leaves at seven twenty in the evening our time 
>which is< <<eight»<twenty> >in the evening< <<their»>time< 
The assignment of relative prominence can be seen as a signal to the heaTer 
indicating how the current phrase was built up out of past productions, and so 
assisting him in rebuilding the structure during parsing. Evidence discussed in 
Section 2.3.2 supports the notion that previous surface forms may be temporarily 
retained, and used for this purpose. In Section 4.2 I propose how surface generation 
mechanisms may take advantage of this, and how prosodic focus assignment in turn 
can be based on it. 
Secondly, elements may obtain prosodic marking according to their accessibility 
zn the discourse model (d. discussion in Section 2.3.1). Broadly speaking, this 
means that conceptual entities at the level of the discourse model may be ordered 
for focal prominence: the more accessible, the less prominent. For example, in this 
exchange: 
(4.2) C: i want to book a flight to Heraklion 
S: do you want to fly business or economy class to > Heraklion < 
the discourse entity corresponding to Heraklion has recently been mentioned, IS 
therefore highly accessible and so gets defocussed. That we are dealing here with 
accessibility at a conceptual level as much as at a surface level, may be illustrated if 
we replace the token of Heraklion in C's utterance with Crete. In a discourse con-
text where both speakers have the world knowledge whereby so far as airports are 
concerned, Crete and Heraklion are equivalent, the defocuBsing would still go ahead. 
In Section 4.3 I propose a representation of the discourse model in which discourse 
entities are represented detached from surface linguistic features, and so as to per-
sist throughout the discourse. The relative accessibility of entities in the discourse 
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model, together with conflicts between information states, leads to a definition of a 
prominence ordering over discourse entities. 
Thirdly, the decision to mark certain message elements for focus may form part 
of message genesis-ie, be a direct result of the decision to speak. For example, a 
correction will place contrastive focus on the element requiring modification: 
(4.3) The flight arrives <<at nine» 
(not at five) 
Similarly, for a confirmation request those message elements to be confirmed are 
required to be prominent: 
(4.4) You want to fly <from london> <on sunday> 
Section 4.4 takes into account the prominence needs of discourse elements which are 
central to the speaker's intention. 
These levels appear to correspond to the three levels of discourse structure dis-
cussed by Grosz and Sidner (1986). At the intentional level, an utterance is planned 
as a means towards solving some goal of the system. This goal may require singling 
out certain message elements for special attention; for example, a request for confir-
mation requires that the elements in need of confirmation are marked specially. At 
the attentionallevel, as descriptions of message elements are planned with reference 
to the context represented in the discourse model, concepts are ranked for prosodic 
prominence on the basis of their accessibility in the discourse model. A concept 
which is highly accessible will thus be relatively low in the prominence order. At 
the linguistic, or textual level, generation of the surface structure of an utterance 
may be facilitated by referring to a previous utterance with which it shares structural 
and semantic features. If this is the case, certain constituents of the utterance will 
be assigned prominence according to the manner in which they re-use, or modify, 
the previous material. 
According to most accepted models of production, the intentional, attentional 
and textual/linguistic levels are processed in that order; in this discussion however, 
I shall begin with the textual level, moving on to the attentional and intentiona.l 
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levels. This order of presentation will facilitate the introduction of representations 
and mechanisms. 
This chapter presents a cognitive account of the production of prosodic focus. 
viewed as part of the larger process of language production. Apart from Sec-
tion 4.3.2, where the effects of recency and inferrability in the Swedish Airlines 
corpus are considered, the analysis of data is informal. I assume phenomena of 
focus and accent to be largely independent of those issues of contour choice ex-
amined in Chapter 3. Only cases of local contour choice are considered, where it 
may be used to distinctively mark simple prominence information. No attempt is 
made to account for the variability found in the corpus. In Chapter 5 I describe an 
implementation in which many of the more theoretical points made in this chap-
ter are realised. Specific claims and ideas presented here are, wherever possible, 
accompanied by references to details of that implementation. 
4.2 Focus assignment by reference to surface forms 
4.2.1 Modelling the retention of surface forms 
vVe have seen (Section 2.3.2) that speakers are attuned to surface features of their 
own or their interlocutors' previous productions; but that this retention is short-
lived, unless it serves a purpose. A simple model of recall uses a buffer of previous 
utterances, produced by either party. We can limit accessibility (and possibly the 
length of the buffer) to the few most recent clauses. I shall refer to this datastructure 
as the linguistic history. 
In a model of an Agent who is alternately speaker and hearer, the linguistic 
history can be of benefit in either modality. If a previous encoding of information 
is shared and persists, then there is reduced effort for the speaker in reusing that 
encoding, and correspondingly reduced effort for the hearer. In Section 4.2.4 I shall 
sketch how a speaker and a listener might reuse previous expressions; first of all 
though, it is useful to consider the nature of the dialogue contexts in my material, 
in which examples of reuse have been found. 
122 
A speaker may echo back information just received: 
( 4.5) 
[7] T1:SA:2013 (T) 
A: two eight six will be landing now at thirteen ten 
C: thirteen ten 
A: yes 
In (4.5), the echoing utterance may have been intended as a request for confirmation: 
it was probably taken as such by the Agent. In contrast to face-to-face conversation. 
confirmatory echoing is very common in telephone dialogues. It may also be used 
in a restatement of information after a confirmation request: 
( 4.6) 
[3] T1:SA:632 (T) 
A: yes it'll be landing now ahead of schedule ... 
C: ahead of schedule bee ay two nine six 
A: ahead of schedule yeah 
A related use of echoing, less likely to initiate interaction, is the back-channel signal. 
In the following example, the Agent overlaps the Caller: 
(4.7) 
[2] Tl:SA:349 (T) 89 (M) 
A: in future you need to dial seven five nine one eight one eight 
C: one eight one eight 
A: now let me just look for you 
Such uses of echoing are common in telephone dialogues, where they may indicate 
correct transmission of information. 
The examples of echoing discussed so far occur across speakers. Self-repetition, 
on the other hand, is sometimes necessary when a speaker hasn't succeeded in ob-
taining the intended response or attention from the interlocutor: 
(4.8) 
[2] T1:SA:349 (T) 89 (M) 
C: ... right thanks very much indeed 
A: now when you've got to ring tomorrow you ring 759 18 18 
C: right okay thanks very much indeed 
In (4.8), the Caller appears to have the goal of terminating the conversation. The 
Agent isn't quite ready, which accounts for the Caller's need to repeat the pre-
closing move. Self repetition occasioned by a lack of appropriate response to an 
earlier dialogue act may result in reformulation of intonation, as was discussed in 
Section 3.4. 
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Echoes and self-repetitions explicitly reference earlier utterances. The same may 
be said of substitution utterances; however in these, whereas a portion of the an-
tecedent expression may be retained, one or more subexpressions are changed: 
[31] T2:SA:328 (T) 
(4.9) A: . .. it is scheduled for thirteen thirty 
C: yeah I think it was scheduled to fly at twelve fifty 
Utterance pairs such as this can be distinguished from echoes, not so much because 
the members of a pair do not have identical wording, as because they convey different 
information, and this difference may be marked. The substitution may occur within 
a single turn; especially in cases where parallel structures are being used: 
[2a] T1:SA: (T) 
(4.10) ... either the four seven three which is scheduled for seventeen thirty 
or the four seven five which is scheduled at ten o'clock 
4.2.2 Representing linguistic and propositional informa-
tion 
Before examining in further detail the mechanisms that might be used by speakers 
and hearers in the re-use of previous surface forms, I present a theory of linguistic 
representation capable of expressing the necessary multilevel constraints between 
lexis, syntax, and semantics. 
This notation, based on the principles of unification of partial information, and 
lexicality, has been influential in computational linguistics since the late 1970's (Kay 
1984, Gazdar et al. 1985, Bresnan and Kaplan 1982). The version described here 
owes most to Head Driven Phrase Structure Grammar (HPSG: Pollard and Sag 1989) 
and Unification Categorial Grammar (UCG: Calder et al. 1988b). The basic unit 
of encoding, the sign, is divided into fields representing various levels of linguistic 
knowledge: 
[
phonology 1 
sign = syntax 
semantics 
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2 
Figure 4.1: Reentrancy in a graph: paths (PI, P2, ... Pn) and (ql, q2,'" qm) point to 
the same node 
The syntax component is recursively defined to contain signs, representing con-
straints on the environment of the word or phrase represented by the sign. Con-
straints between components and levels, enforcing agreement, dependencies, C0111-
dexing, etc, are implemented in the representation via the use of re-entmnt feature 
descriptions, whereby distinct feature-labelled paths point to the same value, as 
exemplified in Figure 4.1. 
A sign in general is therefore not a feature tree, but a feature graph (Shieber 
1986); unlike trees, in which nodes can have at most one parent, the more general 
category of graphs allows nodes with several parents. Utterances have syntactic and 
semantic structure by virtue of lexical entries being encoded as signs which may 
be complex. A complex sign, or functor category, both constrains its environment 
by specifying syntactic and semantic patterns that its subcategorisation frame must 
satisfy, as well as describing how its semantic field is built as a function of these 
components. A simple example is the entry for ninety, to be used as functor in 
structures such as ninety seven in which a unit argument follows. 
phon: ninety 
head: noun 1 
syn: args:( [:!:::h;ad:noUn]) 
dir: post 
:~p:/: tens 1 sem: 
value: 9 
next: S 
This states that the functor is followed by a single argument with semantics 
S, and this semantics is copied into the < next> field of the resulting semantics. 
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If required, the argument can be further constrained, say to having semantic type 
units. 
The constraining and structure-building aspects are both described locally, in the 
lexical entry. There is therefore no need for a separate set of phrase structure rules; 
instead these are replaced by highly generic rules of combination for signs, which 
are based on categorial grammar rules of combination: in particular, backward and 
forward functional application: 
(4.11 ) 
( 4.12) 
AlB B -+ A 
BA\B -+ A 
The operator symbols 'I' and '\' indicate order of application; the notation can be 
streamlined somewhat by defining 
A\B 
- AlB 
That is, the directionality of the 'slash' operator is specified by a feature on the 
argument. When the order of an argument B with respect to its functor A is 
unknown or unimportant, the functor argument relationship can be indicated simply 
as AlB. As a further notational device, (( ... (Aol Ad ... )1 An-dl An can be replaced 
with Ao/(An, An-I'" AI), or in a feature structure encoding: 
[
head: A 1 
args: (An, An-I." AI) 
The reverse stacking of the arguments is common in sign-based approaches, and is 
used as the default order of reduction of the sign with respect to its arguments. 
The atomic version of functional application may be extended to complex feature 
structures, as in UCG: 
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4 3 head: H 
[
phon: P 
( .1) syn: [ args : A rgs 1 [
phon: APPLY[P, Arg.Phon1j 
[
head: H 0 0 1 
s n' --y . args: Argj 00 
sern: S 
where 
sern : So 0 
Argi E Args 1\ 
0= UNIFY[Arg, Argd 1\ 
Argi = Args - Argj 
In other words, the functor sign can be reduced with respect to the argument 
Arg by unifying Arg with one of the arguments Args, discarding that argument, and 
applying the resulting substitution () to everything that remains. 
For example, consider the phrase: 
(4.14) Air France operates from Stansted 
For the sake of the present discussion, I treat the phrase "Air France" as having 
a single atomic lexical entry. I use the shorthand in (4.16) to refer to a structure 
schematically given as (4.15), where Args is a list of signs, and Args1 the corre-
sponding shorthand expression. When the phonology is underspecified, the short-
hand form is as given in (4.17); where ARCS is empty it is as given in (4.18)' and 
so forth. 
(4.15) 
( 4.16) 
(4.17) 
( 4.18) 
[
phon: P 1 
s n : [ head: MAJOR: Cat 1 
Y args: Args 
sern: S 
P : Cat/ Args1 : s 
Cat/Args1: s 
P: Cat: s 
The required lexical entries for (4.14) are then the following: 
(4.19) Air France:np:A IR-FRA N CE 
operates:s / [np:cA RRIER, PP:AIRP 0 RT ]:0 PERATION (CA RRIER ,A lRP ORT) 
frorn:pp / [np:S]:S 
Stansted:np:sTAN STED 
The derivation may be described as follows: 
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( 4.20) Air France operates from Stansted: S:OPERATION(AIRJRANCE,STANSTED) 
operates: S / [np:cARRIER, PP:AIRPORT]:OPERATION(CARRIER,AIRPORT) 
A ir France: np:A IRJ RAN C E 
from Stansted: PP:STANSTED 
from: PP / [np:S]:S 
Stansted: np:STANSTED 
A theory of linguistic representation based on the sign is appropriate to describing 
the relations between linguistic and semantic information, for a number of reasons: 
1. it is declarative, and therefore potentially bidirectional. It may therefore be 
used to describe the competence of both a language analyser and a language 
encoder, on the assumption that these ought to be identical; 
2. words and phrases may be simultaneously described at a number of levels. This 
will enable us to relate intonation, which is best described on a phonological 
level, to informational components; 
3. with the version of uca described here, it is not necessary to reduce the 
arguments of a sign in a fixed order; their order with respect to the head 
may be underspecified, as tends to be the case, for example, with postmodifier 
constituents. Such flexibility will allow, for example, a prosodically marked 
constituent to come after a less marked one, if these appear together in a 
lexical environment which permits order variation; 
4. if the semantic component contains indices, these can be bound to persistent 
objects in the discourse model, so that it is possible to retain a record of how 
the latter objects relate to surface expressions used. 
Accounts of semantic interpretation are often expressed in terms of a mapping be-
tween levels. By using the sign as the basic level of representation, we can maintain 
a representation of linguistic information simultaneously on a number of levels, from 
the surface to that of the discourse model. Figure 4.2 illustrates this situation. We 
may use it to distinguish between the surface semantics, or 'propositional form', of 
an utterance, which is built up according to compositional principles during gram-
matical derivation, and those discourse entities that parts of it reference. In general, 
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r-----------------j Ir------------j 
: linguistic sign : 
L _________________ ~I • • discourse model 
L ____________ ...J 
Figure 4.2: Relationship between surface structures, their semantics, and the dis-
course model 
the mapping between the surface semantics and its projection in the discourse model 
need not be one-to-one. 
4.2.3 Representing and updating the linguistic history 
The linguistic history may be modelled by a bounded buffer containing entries which 
combine surface, syntactic, and propositional information, as described above. How-
ever, in order for cross-level correspondences to be made for subexpressions within 
an utterance, it is necessary that not only the sign representing the result of the 
analysis of an utterance, but also the analysis tree itself, be retained for every entry. 
The linguistic history is thus updated, in the case of an interlocutor's utterance, 
by retaining the entire parse tree and adding it as the new entry. In the case of 
an agent's own utterances, an analysis tree is available as the result of the produc-
tion process-see Section 5.4. Because a bidirectional linguistic representation is 
used, the linguistic structure of the agent's utterance may be described in the same 
manner as that of the interlocutor. 
The structure of the analysis tree is described recursively; a non-terminal node 
corresponds to an instance of functional application, which ultimately derives the 
string dominated by that node. The immediate daughters of the non-terminal are 
the head and arguments referenced by that instance of functional application. For 
details of the analysis tree used in the implementation, see Section 5.4.4. The 
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linguistic history C can be described as follows. Given a sequence of utterances, 
( UI ... Uk), the linguistic history after utterance Uk: Ck, is the sequence of analy-
sis trees (AI'" AI), where I cannot exceed the maximum length of surface recall, 
max(C), and C is ordered from most to least recent. Addition to the linguistic 
history is then as follows: given a linguistic history Ck = (AI' .. AI)' and an utter-
ance UHb form CHI = (A~ ... Al), by adding the analysis tree corresponding to 
the new utterance to the front, and dropping the last analysis tree if the resulting 
length exceeds max(C). 
In the discussion that follows, I use the following notational conventions. Given 
an analysis tree A, A. root is the sign corresponding to its root; A.subs are its sub-
trees, which may be enumerated as the sequence (A.sub l •.. A.subn ). The root of 
any subtree is a sign, so we may refer to its phonology, syntax, and semantics compo-
nents; for example, A.root.phon is the phonology of the root sign, A.subI.root.sem is 
the semantics of the root of the first subtree. Since phonology, syntax and semantics 
are specified on nodes and not trees, the component root may in fact be omitted 
without risk of ambiguity. I refer to the phonology component of some node within 
an analysis tree A, as a subphrase of A. So for example, after the first three turns 
of Dialogue 5 from Appendix A, the linguistic history (showing only the root.phon 
components) is as follows: 
(4.21 ) 
Al = [roo., [ phon' London '0 S'o,khohn "" "J] 
subtrees: .0' 
[ 
[
phon: I'd like to reserve a return flight. 0 oj] 
root: 
A2 = 
subtrees: 000 
A3 = [roo., [ phon: Sw,d;,h D;rUn" "" "J] 
subtrees: 000 
Where turns are multi-sentential, as in this dialogue, a more refined representation 
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would divide L on the basis of sentences or phrases, rather than turns. This is in 
fact done in the implementation described in Chapter 5. 
4.2.4 Searching the linguistic history 
For the hearer, the computational task of first detecting a case of reuse and then 
applying the earlier analysis to the present situation may be described as follows. 
At the time of utterance of the string UHl = Ao.phon, Lk consists of a buffer of I 
previous analysis structures: 
indexed by their strings Al.phon ... A/.phon. Starting with A l , and working back-
wards, find an analysis tree Ai which has a subphrase Pi corresponding to some 
subphrase of Ao. If Pi is coextensive with UH1! this is a case of echo; if Pi matches 
a subphrase of Al, I call this embedded echo. Alternatively, there may be a number 
of subphrases of Ai matching subphrases of Ao; assuming these occur in a similar 
order in both, then: 
1. mark the areas which do not correspond, as gaps; 
2. form an abstract of Ai, by replacing those subtrees corresponding to the gaps 
with placeholders indicating global and syntactic constraints on them; 
3. replace each of these placeholders with the result of analysing the correspond-
ing gap in the newest utterance, Ao. 
Since we are dealing with two structures which can be aligned with respect to their 
similarities, I refer to this case as one of substitution. So far as detection of occasions 
of reuse goes, such an algorithm requires only the phonology components of analysis 
structures. 
For an agent in the role of speaker, the task of generating from a previous entry 
is twofold: firstly, an appropriate entry which is sufficiently recent must be chosen; 
secondly, generation should take place in such a way as to maximise use of the 
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Echo Substitution 
Embedded echo Embedded substitution 
Figure 4.3: Echoes, substitutions, and their embedded versions 
previous structure. The ways in which a newly generated sign Ao. root may draw 
on a previous analysis tree Ai are the same as for the agent in the role of hearer, 
namely: 
Echo: The analysis tree Ao corresponds in its entirety to all or part of the previous 
structure. 
Substitution: Ao corresponds closely, but not exactly, to all or part of Ai. 
Embedded echo: some subtree or subtrees of Ao correspond exactly to a subtree 
or subtrees of Ai. structure. 
Embedded substitution: This is similar to the case of embedded echo, except 
that the embedded substructure is not identical to but may be derived via 
substitution from its antecedent. 
Figure 4.3 illustrates the four possibilities. The echoes are a special case of 
substitutions (where there are no differences); the embedded cases may be handled 
by beginning the attempt to reuse previous material at some recursive stage within 
generation. I therefore concentrate on the case where the speaker builds an utterance 
by applying a substitution to some earlier analysis tree, or a subtree thereof. 
Selection of an antecedent structure Aiuh for a target utterance with semantics S 
must be based both on recency and goodness of match. Re-use is of doubtful value 
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to either speaker or listener, if a more distant rather than a more recent antecedent 
is used, because of the additional amount of search that this would require. Given 
a linguistic history (AI' .. AI), this means staTting with i = 1 and searching for an 
Ai such that MATCH(AiUb ,8), where MATCH is a suitably-defined matching relation 
over pairs of semantic structures. 
Having found a candidate for re-use, generation of the target utterance may take 
place. Two algorithms have been explored. The first one consists in locating those 
parts of the antecedent analysis tree Aiub in advance, and copying over a skeleton 
analysis tree with these subtrees intact. The skeleton is then traversed in top-clown 
fashion, calling the default procedure GENERATE at those subnodes which are still 
underspecified. 
This algorithm is successful in many cases, where it is possible to lexically instan-
tiate those nodes marked as not recoverable from the antecedent analysis tree. How-
ever this is not necessarily the case. For example, assuming that numbers are repre-
sented as lists of digits, the algorithm will mark the second parts of I N IN E Is EVE N I 
and lONE I SEVEN I as the same. This marking will turn out to have been redundant, 
because the lexical candidate "seventeen" requires no arguments. 
An alternative algorithm which combines lexical search with comparison of the 
source and target structures, assumes that the relation MAT C H (81,82) holds for one 
of three reasons: 
1. SI and S2 are identical; 
2. 8 1 and 8 2 have the same semantic type, and furthermore, there is a common 
lexical entry lex such that lex :< sem > is unifiable with either of 8} or 8 2 , 
This means that the two structurally parallel analysis trees will share the same 
lexical head; 
3. similar to (2), only instead of potentially sharing the same lexical head, it is 
sufficient that there is a lexl :< sem > unifiable with 8}, and a le;r2 :< sem > 
unifiable with S2, where lexl and 1ex2 are lexical entries which are semantically 
close. I shall consider what constitutes semantic closeless below. 
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Figure 4.4: Generation of surface forms with lexical head reused or modified 
Now given an antecedent analysis (sub)-tree Aiub as candidate, the algorithm 
works by matching Strg, the semantics for the target analysis tree, with Aiub :< 
sem >. If the match yields the result identical, then the entire antecedent analysis 
tree is copied.! If a common lexical entry Lex can be found as the result of the 
match, then a pairwise correspondence exists between the arguments of Lex and 
those of Aiub • A recursive call to the algorithm for each of these pairs results in 
the arguments of Lex, Lex :< args > being instantiated either as copies from the 
arguments of the antecedent, or as modifications of them. The target analysis tree 
A trg is then built by combining the information from Lex with the information about 
its instantiated arguments. The situation for matches with reused lexical entry, and 
for those where a new form must be used is illustrated in Figure 4.4. In the figure 
the lexical head is shown at the root of its subtree; it is also treated as a terminal, 
in forming part of the string generated. The first case shown is where the target 
analysis tree and the antecedent share the same lexical head Lex. In that case, the 
subcategorial arguments correspond, and may have identical values (S1, S2) or differ 
(S3, S~). 
If a lexical entry Lextrg for A trg is not identical but close to that for Aiub, a 
correspondence between some arguments may still be possible, and these are recur-
sively generated, as before. However some arguments of Lextrg may not correspond 
to any from the antecedent; for these it is necessary to apply the default generation 
1 Modulo different morphological instantiation of the head, if this is brought about as a result 
of different morpho-syntactic features being imposed by the environment .. 
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go 
travel 
.... -----1 get to 
_--I fly 
drive 
motor 
Figure 4.5: Portion of a lexical index showing semantic proximity 
algorithm. This second case is also shown in the figure. The new lexical head Le:rtrg 
is sufficiently close to the old Lexold. Some arguments still correspond, and have 
identical values, or differ (S1, S2, S~); some arguments required by Lextro however are 
not present for Lexold (S3). 
To determine matching on the basis of semantic proximity reqUIres that the 
lexicon be accessible accordingly. Figure 4.5 shows a portion of a lexica.l index, 
which includes the lexical items "go", "fly", "travel", and "drive". A lexical entry 
is attached to the node in the semantic type hierarchy which corresponds exactly 
to the type of its < sern > component. Ordering among entries at a node is partial. 
For lexically close entries to match requires additional matching of their arguments. 
This is illustrated by the case of attempting to generate seventeen using the previous 
structure for ninety seven. The roots of the two analysis trees have similar semantics: 
phon : ninety seven 
syn : head: noun 
id : Id97 
type: tens 
value: 9 
next : [ ;~p:e I:d~nits 1 
value: 7 
sem: 
phon: seventeen 
syn : head: noun 
id: Id17 
type: tens 
value: 1 
sem: 
next: [ ~~p/~~nits 1 
value: 7 
However the lexical entries for ninety and seventeen: 
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phon: ninety 
s n . [ head: noun ) ] 
,:m. ['[~::J{'lm : s ] 
next: S 
phon: seventeen 
[
head: noun ] 
syn' 
. args: [1 
sem: 
id:Id17 
type: te1lS 
value: 1 
next: [ ::p:/:d:nits 1 
value: 7 
differ in their arguments, and should therefore not be acceptable as candidates 
for MAT C H. In practice however it is simpler to let lexical matching go ahead, and 
backtrack if subsequently the arguments fail to match. 
The algorithm may be illustrated by considering the generation of the phrase: "I 
drive to Paris", when an analysis tree for "I fly to Paris" is in the linguistic history. 
First, this entry is chosen, because its semantics (4.22) is similar to that of (4.23): 
( 4.22) 
( 4.23) 
id : flight41 
type : flight 
thetheme : [ 
id : speaker 1 
type : individual 
[ 
id : paris 1 
thegoal : 
type: city 
id : drive23 
type: drive 
thetheme : [ 
id : speaker 1 
type : individual 
[ 
id : paris 1 thegoa/ : 
type: city 
However, the lexical head of the former analysis tree, "fly", is incompatible with the 
target semantics, and there is no other suitable candidate at the node indexed by 
F L 10 H T. SO the search continues with candidates nearby in the class hierarchy: first 
at the node T R AV E L, which is successful but not specific enough, then (successfully) 
at its daughter node DRIV E. Next, the <syn args> of the instantiated lexical head 
"drive" 
( [ 
syn : c[at;~ ~~peaker ] 1 [syn: c[a\/Pparis ] 1 ) 
sem : , d' 'd / sem : , type: In IVZ ua type : czty 
are matched off against corresponding subtrees in the former analysis tree, on 
the basis of their semantics. Since an exact match is possible, these subtrees are 
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(a) 
(c) (c) 
'--__ .....Ir ~~-------~------~ 
Figure 4.6: Marking scheme for indicating surface reuse 
completely copied over onto the target analysis tree. 
4.2.5 Prosodic signalling of surface re-use 
Echoing and substitution might be indicated on surface structure as follows: con-
stituents which are exact copies of previous structure are marked s_echoed; a con-
stituent derived from some previous structure by substitution requires a global mark-
ing together with local markings to indicate which parts differ, and which are un-
changed. A possible marking scheme is illustrated in Figure 4.6. For the two cases 
(echo and substitution), structure (a) is the antecedent on which recycling is based; 
structure (b) is the target. The profiles (c) indicate how a 'naive' prosodic encoding 
might work. This would depend however on the speaker using stylised intonation, 
which is not generally the case when information transfer is intended. If instead we 
take sentence accents to be local, marked on syllables, then the listener is at least 
able, after lexical segmentation, to interpret these accents as markings on words. El-
ements marked changed could be distinguished from constituents which are simply 
new, by greater pitch prominence. Echoed constituents however are not inevitably 
'de-accented' in the sense that they lack any accent; as Horne (1991) demonstrates, 
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pre-nuclear constituents in particular tend to have weak accents, even when they 
echo given material. Only when they occur within the nuclear tail are constituents 
necessarily without accent. Some form of relational representation is therefore to be 
preferred to one which is strictly binary, or three-valued. 
Signals based on patterns of prosodic prominence only serve to indicate how the 
current structure compares with previous ones. Such prominence information is no 
longer useful when the utterance in question is no longer the current one. For this 
reason, I assume that prominence information is not retained when an utterance is 
added to the linguistic history. 
4.2.6 Reuse and ellipsis 
The proximity of former analysis structures required for the markings s_modified 
and s_echoed to be generated, raises the possibility of the speaker using ellipsis as 
an alternative. Consider for example, the following: 
(4.24) A: you want to fly to manchester 
B: no. I want to < drive> to manchester 
(4.25) A: you want to fly to manchester 
B: no. drive. 
According to the Gricean maxim of quantity, (4.25) should be preferred, all other 
things being equal. Both speaker's production algorithm and listener's search algo-
rithm can be modified, as follows: speaker-generate as for a substitution utterance, 
but only utter the part(s) marked s_modifiedj listener-assume this is a substitu-
tion utterance (in Example 4.25 the assumption is warranted by the presence of the 
discourse marker "no"), locate a former (sub-) tree in the linguistic history, whose 
semantics is in the proximity of the head semantics of the utterance, and pelform 
the necessary substitution. 2 In the case of echo utterances, the search is even more 
2The apparent anomaly in (4.25), whereby instead of ellipsed you in B's utterance, we are 
supposed to read I, can be resolved by the requirement that common portion match semantically 
as well as syntactically, with semantic matching taking precedence. Semantic matching is discussed 
in the following section. 
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straightforward; a substring (or substrings) from the prevIOUS analysis structure 
should exactly match the current utterance: 
[37] T2:SA:1235 (T) 
(4.26) A: yes that's arrived at eleven oh five 
C: eleven oh five 
In (4.26), A is able to infer that C's utterance matches her own, and therefore 
may be expanded to have the full semantic representation as that. A pragmatic 
interpretation of its dialogue function can then be made. Routinely, this will be 
a confirmation request. In some cases, the intonation may serve as a cue that a 
non-routine interpretation is required: 
[2a] T1:SA: (T) 
(4.27) C: well he's got four forty five leaving malaga 
A: (well it's not our ... ) 
H leaving TTHL malaga 
Elliptical references to the previous utterance are extremely common, especially 
when confirmation is being sought or given. However, there are many cases from 
the Flight Enquiries corpus where ellipsis could have, but has not, been used, for 
example: 
[5] T1:SA:1356 (T) 
(4.28) C: which terminal will I come back to 
A: you'll come back to north terminal 
[7] T1:SA:2013 (T) 
(4.29) A: you say it's arriving on the [@:m] 
C: it's arriving early morning 
[3] T1 :SA:632 (T) 
(4.30) A: yeah it's definitely in the zone though 
CC: it's definitely in the zone at the moment 
This indicates that other factors than Gricean economy may be at stake. In 
each example, information is being added: north terminal, early morning, at the 
moment; providing a frame of reference which the listener can be assumed to still 
have access to may facilitate semantic processing, which will require the location of 
the new information within the frame of reference. 
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4.3 Focus in the discourse model 
Evidence that speakers maintain internal discourse models is necessarily indirect. 
However the asslimption that speakers add to and reference internal models greatly 
facilitates the analysis of a discourse. Consider the following example: 
[38] T2:SA:1516 (T) 
3 C: good afternoon I'd just like 
4 to confirm a flight tonight 
5 ahm (.) supposed to be flying to cyprus 
6 on bee ay six six eight at ten o'clock 
7 (I) 
8 A: right I'll check that for you 
9 C: thank you 
10 (4.3) 
11 A: to larnaca 
(4.31) 12 C: that's right yes 
13 A: yes: that's: er scheduled for take off 
14 at twenty two hundred 
15 C: right and uh what time am I 
16 supposed to be at the airport 
17 to check in 
18 A: yes about two hours before departure 
19 C: two hours 
20 A: yes 
21 C: a:nd (.) which terminal is that 
22 A: it's the north terminal at gatwick 
C's initial utterance introduces a discourse entity corresponding to a flight, which 
is related to the speaker (as passenger), and to a place time, and flight number. A 
is able to infer a default destination airport of Larnaca, although this has not been 
mentioned, because she can assume that she and her interlocutor have a common 
internal representation of the island of Cyprus. Similarly, references to the take-off 
event (by A) and the check-in (by C) indicate that they can be assumed to be in 
the respective interlocutor's model. The dialogue also illustrates how anaphora are 
used to refer to discourse entities which are temporarily in focus: "that" in lines 8 
and 13, refers to the flight; in line 21, it is used to refer to the check-in event. 
Speakers construct mental models of the situation in a cooperative and sympa-
thetic way. They need to be aware of what default knowledge on the part of the 
interlocutor it is safe to assume-that Larnaca is the main airport in Cyprus, for 
example. When these assumptions break down, repair is always possible, as in the 
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continuation of the above dialogue: 
[38] T2:SA:1516 (T) 
24 C: ... does the railway 
25 take me to the north terminal 
26 A: I beg your pardon 
27 C: the railway take me to 
28 the north terminal ( 4.32) 
29 (.3) 
30 y'know the trains at gat wick station 
31 A: (u)hmm ituh 
32 I think it just takes you into gat wick 
A indicates incomprehension, and C makes a double attempt at repaIr: firstly, 
to repeat himself, then to expand the context in which "railway" is to be inter-
preted, incidentally introducing more discourse referents corresponding to "trains" 
and "Gatwick station". 
It is useful therefore to distinguish a number of levels at which an agent may 
maintain an internal model of the discourse. Firstly, the discourse model may con-
tain only those discourse entities which are referred to explicitly by one of the 
participants, or which are deictically present. This is the definition of 'discourse 
model' that a number of authors use, for example Levelt (1989), for whom the dis-
course model consists of the union of the speaker's and interlocutor's contributions. 
Secondly, the discourse model may contain that extension of the world of those el-
ements which have been explicitly introduced, which is necessary for coherence. I 
have illustrated the working of this with respect to the Gatwick-Cyprus example. 
This demonstrates also that an agent does not necessarily extend the model in all its 
full details~ven if he had the mental capacity to represent an entire world inter-
nally, this would run the risk of departing from the interlocutor on too many details. 
Instead the situation which the agent represents to himself is a partial model of the 
actual situation, with many details left unspecified. The agent, for example, does 
not initially include the train station in her representation of Gatwick airport, and 
in fact has some difficulty at first in doing so. Finally, an agent may represent to 
herself facts and assumptions about the interpersonal situation which only ever get 
referred to indirectly, if at all. 
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I shall adopt the second definition of a discourse model, namely, the plausible 
extension of the situation represented in the discourse so far, which an agent adopts 
and refers to in his utterances. 
This section IS organised as follows: in (4.3.1) I outline a knowledge representa-
tion formalism for representing structures within the discourse model, and semantic 
information generally. In (4.3.2) a number of mechanisms are proposed according 
to which discourse entities in particular and semantic entities in general may be 
ordered for prominence. Section 4.3.4 discusses the particular case of contrastive 
focus, especially that which comes about when repair utterances are employed to 
convey and acknowledge modified information states. To handle these cases a new 
representational device, of accessing layered information states within the discourse 
model via world-indices, is introduced; this is then applied to the case of alternative 
solutions. 
4.3.1 Representing information in the discourse model 
4.3.1.1 Knowledge representation 
Representing discourse entities and their interrelationships can be done in a rela-
tively straightforward manner using a semantic network (eg Brachman and Schmolze 
1989). Unlike representations based on predicate calculus, networks have the ad-
vantage of encoding straightforwardly the persistence of objects. They are also 
amenable to graphical representation. Monotonic addition of information can be 
effected by simply growing the relevant portion of the network to include the new 
entities and relations (see Figures 4.7 and 4.8 for examples). 
The choice of semantic primitives for the knowledge representation language is 
to some extent arbitrary. The representation used here is based on typed discourse 
entities, related to one another via semantic roles. The discourse model at anyone 
time consists of whatever such instances currently exist, together with the relations 
between them. Discourse entities (or objects) correspond not only to the kind of 
thing referred to by nominal expressions in English. I follow usual semantic network 
practice, and recent literature on linguistic semantics (eg Calder et al. 1988a, Hobbs 
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Gol 
theinstrLlt the 7-th-efource 
PLANEl LOCATIONl 
theCfY 
LONDON 
LOCATION2 
the1itY 
PARIS 
Figure 4.7: Discourse model after utterance: "fly from London to Paris" 
1985) and reify verbs-ie, represent the relevant events, states, and relations as 
tokens denoting discourse entities. This greatly facilitates representation, and may 
be partially argued for on grounds of anaphoric usage; consider, for example the 
following: 
( 4.33) A i want to travel to Perros B sorry. where is (the journey/that) to? 
To the extent that nouns and verbs reference the same event, they may be repre-
sented as the same discourse entity. In (4.33), "travel" and "journey" might both 
refer to the same discourse entity, SIN G L E--l 0 URN E Y 1 . 
Using a semantic network representation, I illustrate how the discourse model is 
extended over two successive inputs: 
( 4.34) fly from London to Paris 
(4.35) travelling from Heathrow at 17:15 
As a result of utterance (4.34), with semantic representation: 
( 4.36) 
theinstrument : [ type: plane ) 
[
type: go 1 
thesource : [ thecity: london ) 
thegoal : [ thecity: paris ) 
the discourse model contains the information shown in Figure 4.7. The semantic 
representation of the utterance in (4.35) is: 
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GO~ 
ureetime thei~ntr, m~nt theg 1 TIME~ . i 
the ouree ~' tn~es 
theh ur 15 
PLANE1 LOCATION! LOCATJON2 
thec!ty the1ity 17 
LONDON 
theai 
PARIS 
HEATHROW 
Figure 4.8: Discourse model after the utterance: "travelling from Heathrow at 17:15" 
( 4.37) 
[
type: go 1 
thesource : [ theairport: heathrow ] 
. [ thehour: 17 ] 
thesourcet,me: th . t 30 emmu es : 
As a result, the discourse model gets extended as shown in Figure 4.8. This extension 
assumes that we can infer that "fly" and "travelling" refer to the same event. 
The power of representation may be further extended by the addition of rules of 
inference, or constraints. For example, world knowledge tells us that flying entails 
a journey, and that the latter has arrival and departure events associated with it. 
It would then be possible to extend the utterances in (4.34-4.35) by the inputs: 
(4.38) leaving from terminal 4 
(4.39) arriving at Charles de Gaulle airport at 1730 
Figure 4.9 shows the results of operating an inference rule that adds the dis-
course events corresponding to JOURNEY, ARRIVAL and DEPARTURE. If all applica-
hIe constraints have been imposed, I call the resulting state of the discourse model 
inferentially complete. Explicitly mentioned entities may need to be distinguished 
from inferred ones, in case referring to the latter is done in a different way-for 
example they may be presented as being less accessible. 
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thejourney 
--..:::.------'''-~. S IN G L E-I 0 URN E Y 1 
thedepa/ure ~al 
D PARTl ARRIVEl ~
LTAT'ON2 
Figure 4.9: Discourse model extended by inferred entities and roles 
4.3.1.2 Representing semantic input and output 
It is useful to distinguish on the one hand the informational content of an utterance 
viewed as a set of constraints encoded in a subgraph of the discourse model; and 
on the other the semantic representation which is compositionally derived from a 
natural language expression, with the aid of the lexicon. Assuming that interpreta-
tion is modular, this representation is not initially anchored in context; the semantic 
representation is ambiguous as to what discourse entities are being referred to. Ex-
pressions of the semantic representation language, however, make use of the same 
primitives as those used in describing tre contents of the discourse model. However 
the representation is closer to predicate logic, allowing in particular the possibility of 
quantifiers, determiners, disjunction and negation. Using the binary-valued feature 
DEF to denote definiteness, for example, we can represent: "the flight from paris is 
delayed" as follows: 
[
type: dela
y
[ type: single_journey II 
thetheme : de! : + 
thedeparture : [ theplace: [ thecity : paris ] ] 
In interpreting this input as an assertion, it would be necessary to find out to 
what extent it asserted new information, and to what extent it simply referenced 
existing information. In this example, SINGLE-IOURNEY and PARIS are existing 
information, and need to be linked to existing discourse entities. DEL A Y is new 
information, requiring the addition of a new discourse entity, with the appropriate 
links. In many European languages, where a common noun is used to describe a 
discourse entity, whether or not it is assumed to be already present in the discourse 
model is signalled by the use of a definite or indefinite determiner, respectively. 
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\Vhen interpreting input, definiteness markers and other accessibility markers such 
as pronouns are used to guide the search for an anchoring to some existing discourse 
entity. Once found, however, they are not retained as part of the discourse model's 
information. 
Input is therefore interpreted as being about the discourse model. If an interlocu-
tor's utterance is pragmatically interpreted as an assertion, information is added. 
In the cases of queries about the content of the discourse model information may 
not be added, although it can be, as in the following example: 
C i want to fly from London to Paris 
A what time do you want to leave Heathrow (4.40 ) 
-where A has made the default inference that the departure airport is heathrow. 
Because the same linguistic knowledge base is being used for generation as for 
parsing of input, descriptions to be generated by the Agent also have to be planned 
in terms of the semantic representation language. To do this requires both ordering 
(since representations in the discourse model are on the face of it unordered), and 
the ability to draw on context and make anaphoric references where possible. 
I shall commonly use the name of a semantic type in small capitals to refer to a 
semantic structure of that type. Thus for example 
[ 
id : gol ] 
type: go 
~~~source : [ ... ] 
may be referred to simply as GO, or GO 1 if it makes a difference which semantic 
structure of type go is being referred to. Where it is clear that I am talking about 
discourse entities viewed as nodes in the semantic network rather than about entire 
structures, I shall use the same shorthand to denote the nodes. An extension of 
this shorthand is to use strings indicating values to stand for structures containing 
information which may be complex. Thus for example, 930 stands for: 
id : L 
type: time 
th h . [ type: hour ] 
e our. value: 9 
th . t [type: minutes] 
emmu es : value: 30 
In a similar fashion, I use expressions like SA 790 to refer to flight numbers, and 
LUTON to refer to cities. 
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4.3.2 Accessibility and prosodic focus 
The notion of accessibility (d. Section 2.3.1) is one that has emerged largely out of 
consideration of discourse coherence mechanisms. Using the plausible metaphor of 
levels of activation over a memory network, the accessibility principle treats 1110re 
active discourse entities as more accessible to an interlocutor. Relative accessibility 
is then encoded linguistically using a number of devices, including: word order. 
pronominalisation, prosodic (de- )focussing. This thesis is largely concerned with the 
last of these; however a theory of the effects of accessibility on prosodic focus ought 
to be compatible with accounts of its influence on the pronominalisation decision, 
and should explain clashes where they occur (see Section 4.3.3.3 for examples). 
Aspects of the speaker's message which appear to exhibit given-new information 
structure are often predominantly studied with reference to the temporal organi-
sation of discourse. However, as Bolinger (1989) points out, a speaker may also 
take into account his own momentary assessment of the relative interest value of 
discourse entities. 
In an attempt to review the evidence concerning accessibility and prosodic fo-
cus, I first present an analysis of the Swedish Airlines corpus. This material was 
designed for the purpose of investigating prosodic behaviour from an interactional 
point of view, rather than specifically to look at discourse referents. Nevertheless 
the dialogues exhibit a number of the qualities of authentic spontaneous material 
which render a study of accessibility possible, including a considerable amount of 
redundancy and repetition. 
For each dialogue, a number of nominal and verbal groups were singled out, on 
the basis that they were deemed to refer to existing material--either mentioned or 
inferrable. An example dialogue is given in (4.41): 
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(4.41 ) 
Word Accent Score/4 Distance Verbal Intentional 
SA8:Cl: flight 0 - - -
SA8:A2: london 4 1 - TP 
SA8:A2: stockholm 4 1 - TP 
SA8:A3: flight 1 3 - RF 
SA8:A3: london 4 3 - RF 
SA8:A3: stockholm 4 3 - RF 
SA8:A3: sunday 1 3 - RF 
SA8:A3: mornmg 4 3 - RF 
SA8:C3: flight 0 2 - -
SA8:C3: morning 3 2 - -
SA8:A7: flight 2 7 - -
SA8:C7: that 1.5 1 - -
SA8:C7: mornmg 0 8 - -
SA8:A9: reserve 1.5 - + -
SA8:A9: seat 4 - - -
Table 4.1: Results for SA dialogue 8, showing deaccenting scores 
SA8:C1: 
SA8:A2: 
SA8:C2: 
SA8:A3: 
SA8:C3: 
SA8:C3: 
SA8:A7: 
SA8:C7: 
SA8:A8: 
SA8:C8: 
SA8:A9: 
is there a flight on sunday morning, london to stockholm 
london to stockholm 
sorry I didn't get that 
you want a flight from london to stockholm on sunday morning 
that's right 
is there a flight around mid morning 
well,there's a flight at eight fifteen 
is that the only one in the morning 
yes 
okay then 
do you want to reserve a seat 
For each of the four speakers, the selected phrases were given scores of 0 or 1 
according to whether or not they were defocussed. In case of an uncertain judgement, 
a fractional score (typically 0.5) was given. The results for the four speakers were 
pooled, so that each target phrase received a score out of four, and tabulated as in 
Table 4.1. The distance from the antecedent is a measure (in turns) of the distance 
between the token, and some earlier expression assumed to be co-referential with it. 
Where no distance is given, the entity is assumed to be potentially inferrable from 
context. For example, reserve or seat might be taken to be inferrable, if the service 
is known to be concerned with flight bookings. The label Intentional is discussed 
below. Results discussed below use the combined data of all nine dialogues; tables 
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Near 
No Filter 2.71 
Filter 1.07 
Mid 
2.58 
2.29 
Far 
3.11 
2.39 
Inf 
1.81 
1.25 
Table 4.2: Distance and focussing score: all dialogues 
for these are given in Appendix C. 
The first question concerns the relationship between distance and de-focussing. 
Marked tokens were divided into four groups, NEAR, AflD, FAR and I.\'F. as 
follows: NEAR was the group with Distance ~ 1, AflD had 2 ~ Distance ~ .5. 
FAR had Distance ~ 6, and INF was the group of inferrables. Table 4.2 shows 
the average scores for these groups. In the condition No Filt e 7', all results were 
considered together. Assuming a score of 2 below which a word can be considered 
defocussed, all mentioned tokens are relatively focussed; only inferrables may be 
said to be defocussed. However, as I propose in Section 4.4, some discourse entities, 
notably those intentionally mentioned as task parameters, need to be absolved from 
rules about accessibility and deaccenting. I therefore marked such words TP. In 
addition, task responses (( respj task)) and reformulations (( ... repeated : + ... )) 
were marked RQ and RF respectively; utterances of both kinds could be considered 
to involve accents of power. The result, shown as Filter in Table 4.2 indicates a 
progression of increasing focus from Near to Mid to Far, with Near defocussed. 
These results suggest a falling off of accessibility with time; however, this need 
not be so. In Table 4.1 for example, [SA 8:C3]:morning was deaccented by only 
one speaker, whereas [SA 8:C7]:morning, at a comparably greater distance from its 
most recent antecedent, was deaccented by all speakers. 
The tables were examined for evidence of defocussing of verbal expressions. The 
results are shown in Table 4.3. Verbs with score less than 2 were classed as defo-
cussed; otherwise they were focussed. When RF and RQ are not filtered out, there 
is no clear preference for defocussing verbs. When they were, there was a tendancy 
for verbs not previously mentioned to be defocussed. An explanation for this could 
be that verbs which are classed as inferrable are relatively uninteresting. or less 
informative compared to other material in the same phrase. 
Consideration of those tokens treated by all speakers as defocussecl reveals a 
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All utterances 
Focussed Defocussed 
Mentioned 6 3 
Not mentioned 8 7 
Filtered 
Focussed Defocussed 
Mentioned 4 1 
Not mentioned 3 7 
Table 4.3: Defocussing among verbs: all dialogues 
number of scenario-dependent tokens: flight, travel, arrive. These when they occur 
are relatively uninteresting; in Bolinger's words (1986), accent gets "sacrificed to 
nearby focal meaning". How is it then that the token three in [SA 9:A4'], which is 
undeniably part of a task parameter, and new information, also gets deaccented? 
The most likely reason is the occurrence of three in a structurally similar position in 
the previous phrase. Structural parallelism has already been discussed in Section 4.2; 
many of the arguments concerning the processing advantages of exploiting it can 
equally be applied at the discourse level. 
This study of the Swedish Airlines corpus has been of some exploratory value, 
suggesting that there is a relation between defocUfsing and recency, and pointing 
out the importance of inferrability, and its dual relative informativeness. In many 
cases, the default focus pattern due to accessibility may be overruled by the speaker's 
intention. In Section 4.3.3 I present a computational account of prosodic focus in 
discourse which extends these results. In it I attempt to disentangle such factors 
as recency, mention, deixis, inferrability and relative informativeness. The theory 
of relative focus that I present derives in part from Bolinger's notion of interest 
(Bolinger 1986, Bolinger 1989). Excluding for the present intentional focussing 
(Section 4.4), the following factors are proposed: 
1. mention, either exactly or in modified form, in previous discourse; 
2. inferrability-specifically that of scenario-dependent entities; 
3. deixis-in particular the accessibility of certain privileged entities that form 
part of the current discourse situation; 
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4. relative informativeness within the current structure. 
Unlike factors 1) and 2), 3) and 4) have not been explicitly investigated in this 
section. Nevertheless, previous studies point to their importance (see Sections 2.5.1-
2 .. 5.2). 
4.3.3 Modelling accessibility for prosodic focus 
4.3.3.1 A relational representation of prosodic focus 
Labelling word tokens according to a binary valued feature focus may be overly 
restrictive. Take the utterance: 
(4.42) SA 7:A4: travelling from Stansted 
Both travelling and Stansted are accented by all speakers; however, the labelling 
scheme fails to account for the considerably greater prominence of Stansted. Pre-
nuclear sentence accents often count for little, their presence being attributable 
to the relative stability of the 'hat pattern' (Bolinger 1986), rather than to any 
necessary focus on the accented material. The power of accents generally increases 
from left to right, culminating in the nucleus, with any material following it usually 
deaccented. To account for this I propose a relational representation that divides 
the discourse entities in an utterance into more or less prominent. 
I define a partial ordering of prominence over discourse entities. The ordering 
is partial because the relative prominence of an arbitrary pair of discourse entities 
may be indeterminate. I represent the ordering relation with the operator '-<'. So 
for the utterance 
(4.43) >you're< <travelling> from <Paris> 
the ordering on discourse entities can be represented: 
(4.44) CALLER -< {GO, PARIS} 
Note that the delimiters < ... > and> ... < marking textual examples are not 
capable of making all the distinctions implicit in the ordering of semantic enti-
ties. To do this properly requires that an ordering be established over non-terminal 
constituents-see below. 
151 
\Vhen it comes to representing abrupt discontinuities in prommence, such as 
are present in emphatic stretches of text, the ordering relation '-<' is insufficient. 
I therefore define also the ordering relation '-<-<'. A variant of Example 4.43 with 
emphatic focus on Paris is the following: 
(4.4.5) >you're< <travelling> from <<Paris» 
with the corresponding ordering over semantic indices: 
(4.46) CALLER -< GO -<-< PARIS 
Relations (4.44) and (4.46) are compatible, the latter refining the former. 
A proper derivation of metrical prominence takes as its input a partial ordering 
over semantic entities, and produces a metrically-labelled binary tree, of the kind 
discussed in Giegerich (1985): that is, all nonterminal nodes are binary-branching, 
with their sub-branches labelled strong (s) and weak (w). Because lexical entries 
contain a semantic component, once the surface structure has been generated, every 
semantic element in the ordering can be associated with a surface constituent. This 
is normally situated where the lexical entry was put into the tree. A prominence 
order over surface constituents may be converted into a prosodic representation, for 
example a metrical tree. An algorithm for doing this would iterate over the seman-
tic entities specified for prominence, in descending order, at each stage if necessary 
manipulating the relative strength marked of subtrees so that the designated ter-
minal element (DTE) of those portions of the tree as yet unassigned is associated 
with the currently most prominent semantic entity. In the case of underspecifica-
tion of semantic prominence, or no specification, metrical ordering defaults to that 
required lexically (eg by entries for 'frozen' noun compounds), or to the even more 
basic default of prominence to the right. 
4.3.3.2 Historically derived focus 
I consider the possible relations between the current semantic form and members of 
an accessibility history of past semantic forms. This idea is similar to that inves-
tigated in Section 4.2.3, but whereas there complete records of linguistic structure 
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were being compared, and primarily from a lexical point of view, in this section only 
the semantic components of utterances are under investigation. Again, the length 
of history available at any given time is trimmed to a fixed upper limit, so that a 
weak notion of recency is operative. vVhen they reach a certain age (determined by 
this limit), items are discarded. 
At first, it might seem appropriate to keep only a record of discourse entities. 
The accessibility history however contains entire structures corresponding to past 
utterances. The pattern of prominences derived may thus reflect modifications be-
tween structures; subsequently the listener will be able to use this information to 
build a representation of the current structure on the basis of the previous one. 
Turns Al and A3 of the dialogue in (4.47) illustrate how this can happen: 
Cl I want to go from London to Paris 
Al what time do you want to arrive in >Paris< 
C2 two thirty 
A2 two thirty 
(4.47) C3 that's right 
A3 (and) >what time< do you want to <leave> <London> 
C4 >leave< >London< <about noon> 
A4 sa 123 > leaves < >London< at twelve thirty 
A4' and <arrives> in <Paris> at <two thirty> 
An acceptable pattern of prominences for Al is: 
(4.48) <what time> do you want to <arrive> in >Paris< 
ie, the arrival event and the unspecified time are given increased prominence. In 
uttering A3, however, the Agent may organise the prominences to the effect that 
the parallel with Al is brought out: 
(4.49) >what time< do you want to <leave> <London> 
Here it would appear that the two utterances are matched at the outermost (struc-
tural) level. Retaining entire structures also means that when a (sub )expression 
S corresponds exactly to a previous structure or to some subexpressioll of it, it is 
sufficient to mark this sharing at the root node of S, rather than marking all its 
nodes. 
Let us now consider the dialogue (4.47) in more detail. A reduced form of the 
semantic structures kept in the accessibility buffer is shown in Figure 4.10. The 
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r--------. r--------, 
1 go I 5 deJ'art I 
I / '--....... I I / "'.. I 
~london paris~/~ l_O~~O~J _ ~?_ ~ 
r de art , 
r--------'6 1,/ I 
I arrive I I ~ I 2: / "" : ~l~~d~~ ~b~~t_ ~o~~ 
'paris ?? I r---aeJar""t----' 
L: - - - - - - - - ~ 7: ~r:" : 
r - - - - - - - - , bal~ london 123() 
3 I 5 : 30 I L - - - - - [ - - - - - ~ 
L ________ ~ r----ur~e---' 
r ________ ,8: / ~ ~ : 
4- 5: 30 I ba123 paris 230 I L ________ ~ L ___________ ~ 
Figure 4.10: Buffer for accessibility history dialogue 
evolution of the accessibility buffer over time is straightforward. At the time of 
C1 it is empty; at the time of Al the contents are [1]; at the time of utterance 
C2 the contents are [1,2]; and so on, until by the time of A4' the contents are 
[8 - n, ... , 7] for a maximum buffer size of n (n ~ 7). No representation is shown 
for C3, which lacks a referential component. Nor is WANT represented, because in 
the simple account of semantic interpretation presented here, propositional attitude 
operators are not represented within the discourse model. I return to their treatment 
in Section 4.3.3.5. 
An algorithm concerned with deriving patterns of focus VIa the accessibility 
history must account for two phases: matching the current structure or some of 
its substructures with previous structures or substructures, and as a result of these 
matches, deriving the ordering relation over the current structure. I first assume 
a matching algorithm, and consider how the results can be arrived at. I use the 
notation [n +- mJ (n > m) to refer to the situation where structure n in Figure 4.10 
or a substructure thereof is matched against structure m or a substructure of it. 
[2 +- 1] no acceptable modification at top level will derive 2 from 1. PA RIS IS 
common, so it has reduced prominence. 
[3,4 +- ... J nothing interesting happens here; items C2-C3 only appear in the 
dialogue to demonstrate that Al and A3 are not required to be adjacent. 
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[5 ~ 2] DEPART and ARRIVE are closely semantically related-they have a common 
supertype (cf. Figure 5.4). They also have matching roles: theme. thetime, theploa. 
TIM E is common3 • the other elements correspond to modifications~ giving T "I E 
-< LONDON, DEPART. 
[6 ~ 5] The structures match at root level, and have theplace:Lo N DON Jl1 common: 
LEAVE, LONDON -< ABOUT NOON. 
[7 ~ 6] Similarly: L E AV E, LON DON -< SA 123 -<-< 1230. 1230 differs from ABO U T 
NOON, so has heightened prominence. 
[8 ~ 7] Finally, we obtain for [8]: SA 123 -< ARRIVE, PARIS, 230. In the string ut-
tered, the second occurrence of SA 123 is ellipsed by the rule for vp-conjunction. 
which is implicit in the lexical entry for and. 
An algorithm capable of accounting for these patterns of prominences can be 
summarised as follows: 
1. Given a current structure with semantic representation So, and an accessibil-
ity buffer (SI ... Sn), where n ~ max, the maximum buffer size, a structure 
to match So is found by searching backwards for a structure Sj, or some sub-
structure Srh which matches So entirely. If none is found, start again with 
some substructure of So, Souh, searching backwards for some structure which 
matches that in its entirety. So for example, with [2 ~ 1], So is [2], Sj is [1]. 
and matching doesn't succeed until the level PARIS is reached-ie, we have 
a match between Soub and S:ub. With [5 ~ 2] on the other hand, with [.5] 
corresponding to So, and [2] to Si, matching happens at top level. The order 
of search is important; searching isn't allowed on behalf of substructures of 
So, until it has been tried at root level, for the whole buffer. Otherwise, there 
would be nothing to prevent the structure TIME matching with '230' from [4]. 
2. Having located a matching pair (Soub, Srb), the resulting prominence pattern 
is determined thus: 
3In fact identifiers representing unknown discourse entities of the same type need to be kept 
distinct, as they will probably be different once instantiated. The algorithm therefore allows 
unspecified discourse entities of the same type to match. 
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If S~ub ;! Srb, ie, S~ub is an extension of Stub, as for example: [type :OEPART, 
thedest: PARIS] is an extension of [type :OEPART], then Stub marks the 
echo part, giving 
( 4.50) 
* where '-' denotes set difference, and '~' is the relational operator '~' 
extended for sets, ie 
(4.51 ) 
I use S.ids to represent the discourse entities contained in the structure 
S. Henceforth I drop the ids component, where context makes it clear 
that we are referring to a set of discourse entities, and not a structure. 
Otherwise, defining Common, Changed, New as in (4.52-4.54), the case where 
neither of the parallel substructures subsumes the other is given in (4.55). 
( 4.52) Common - S~ub n Srb 
( 4.53) Changed 
-
S~u6 - Common 
( 4.54) New 
-
S, SIUO SIUO 0- 0 - i 
• * ( 4.55) Common ~ New ~ Changed 
That is, correspon ding elements which are different are most proml-
nent; common elements are least prominent, with the remainder in be-
tween. This is illustrated in [5 +- 2], with Common = TIM E and S~uo 
= {ARRIV E ,PA RIS}. These two sets together partition the semantics of 
the utterance, so that the middle term is absent. The effect of the rule 
is to raise in prominence changed elements and lower elements which are 
shared by the two structures. 
I use the notation ~h to represent ordering of discourse entities derived with 
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respect to the accessibility history. I drop the distinction between --< and ~; which 
of these is intended can usually be made out from the context. In expressions of the 
type A --< REST or REST --< A, REST should be taken to denote the complement 
of A with respect to the total set of entities under consideration. Thus (·1.50. 4: .. ).5) 
may be rewritten: 
( 4.56) 
( 4.57) 
S:ub--<h REST 
Common --<h REST --<hS~ub 
An example of rule (4.56) is found in the Cyprus dialogue discussed III Sec-
tion 4.3: 
[38] T2:SA:1516 (T) 
22 A: it's the north terminal at gat wick 
(4.58) 23 (.) 
... does the railway 24 C: 
25 take me to the north terminal 
Not only is the unfocussed reading> north terminal < preferred; to focus this 
phrase would create the unwanted presupposition that C had not heard the earlier 
mention, or wished it to be assigned special prominence. Rule (4.57) is illustrated 
in (4.59): 
(4.59) my uncle inherited a fortune, 
but my aunt quickly spent the money. 
Here aunt, spent belong to SJub, the money belongs to Common, and quickly to 
REST. In the following sections, I consider ordering principles which are not strictly 
dependent on the accessibility history. 
4.3.3.3 Deictic expressions and pronouns 
Discourse entities may be a mutually accepted part of the current discourse situation 
and serve to frame it for both speakers, for example, those corresponding to I, you. 
here, now. They are, in Prince's terms, 'situationally evoked' (Prince 1980), and 
assumed by both speakers to be highly accessible. They are therefore inclined to be 
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less prominent than other elements of the utterance: 
(4.60 ) 
for S~ub E Deictics. 
However, when there is a clash with the historical rules, the latter win, othenvise 
we would rule out: 
(4.61) John asked for chocolate 
but <you> asked for <chips> 
In (4.61), assigning reduced prominence to you is blocked by Rule 4.55, since a 
structural comparison begins at the level of the semantic equivalent of ask for, and 
assigns increased prominence to those parts which do not correspond exactly.4 
Algorithms to determine when a discourse entity may be appropriately referred 
to using a pronoun have been considered extensively in the past (eg. Dale 1988) 
and are not strictly within the scope of this work. As regards accent, pronouns 
are not only reduced semantically, but it would appear that lack of metrical promi-
nence, combined often with phonological reduction, may positively aid the listener 
to identify the referents of these highly accessible discourse entities (eg. Fowler and 
Housum 1987). 
The prominence rule for '-<1" may therefore be stated in a similar form as that 
for deictic expressions: 
( 4.62) snb-< REST o l' 
for Souh C Pronouns. An illustration of this rule is the following: 
[7] T1:SA:2013 (T) 
(4.63) A: you say it's arriving on the [@:m] 
C: it's arriving early morning 
Both tokens of it must be deaccented. As argued in Section 4.3.3.2, to do otherwise 
would evoke unwanted presuppositions. 
4The possibility of using local contour to mark the theme-rheme distinction in examples such 
as (4.61) is further considered in Section 4.3.4. 
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4.3.3.4 Inferrables 
One criterion for discourse entities to belong to Prince's class of inferrables. is the 
possibility of referring to them using a definite description, notwithstanding the 
absence of any previous mention, for example: 
(4.64) the bus was late 
the driver blamed the fog 
It has been noted (eg. Sanford and Garrod 1981) that inferrables are unlikely 
candidates for pronominalisation. I follow Sanford and Garrod in distinguishing 
a subset of inferrables, the scenario-dependent entities, which, once a scenario has 
become established, may be assumed to be particularly accessible. In Sanford and 
Garrod's account, these are represented as unfilled slots which come into being with 
the scenario. 
The results reported in Brown (1983) would suggest that inferrables are less 
likely to be defocussed than recent explicitly mentioned discourse entities. However 
consider the following extract: 
( 4.65) 
[4a] T1:SB 
C: so if I (.) you know (. )the plane is full 
when I get there 
they're not going to put another one on 
This is the first mention in the dialogue of the new scenario (arrival for checkin); 
nevertheless the location: there, and the airline personnel: they, are both defo-
cussed. This would suggest that scenario-dependent entities may well be relati"ely 
less prominent. My main concern here is with inferrable discourse entities which are 
not pronouns. Try replacing the pronouns in (4.65): 
C: so if I (.) you know (. )the plane is full 
( 4.66) w hen I get to the airport 
the airline's not going to put another one on 
Now although possible, it is much less likely that the expressions corresponding to 
inferrable discourse entities: the airport and the airline will be deaccented. 
The discourse model semantics presented in Section 4.3.1 lacks an explicit for-
mulation of scenario. However, in the human-machine dialogue situation it is rea-
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sonable to equate scenario with a database task. We might during a conversation, 
for example, have a succession of task-scenarios such as the following: 
flight enquiry: journey A 
fares enquiry 
flight enquiry: journey B 
connection enquiry 
reservation 
where journeys A and B are different. Different possibilities for a given journey are 
assumed to belong to the same scenario. It is then possible to define the inferrable 
entities for a given task, Tasklnfermbles, to be those discourse entities which are 
known to exist and which are unique for their types, given the task. For example, 
if the task specifies a journey with a particular departure place and destination, 
then the discourse entities corresponding to the flight, the arrival event, and the 
departure event are scenario dependent. Flight numbers, on the other hand, are 
not, since there may be many which correspond to the same journey definition. 
The rule for (scenario-dependent) inferrables: 
( 4.67) 1DSinJ-<iJ REST 
for IDSinf E TaskInferrables, affords inferrables low precedence. However to account 
for examples such as (4.66), this rule must be given relatively low priority, and may 
even be optional. 
4.3.3.5 Informativeness 
There remains the case of discourse entities which are inherently more or less inter-
esting than others within a given structure, being more or less informative. To some 
extent, relative informativeness is an emergent property of the factors considered 
above, such as inferrability. Here I concentrate on the static, context-independent 
aspects of this relation, whereby semantic entities within an expression are consid-
ered relative to one another. As is the case with other prominence relations so far 
discussed, we are dealing with a partial ordering, which mayor may not apply to 
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an arbitrary pair of discourse entities within an expression. 
Rather than attempting to define a mechanism which may be supposed to ap-
ply in the case of both speaker and hearer, I offer three heuristics which appear 
appropriate to the data and domain covered in this work. 
1. Semantic information which gets incorporated in the discourse model is rel-
atively more informative than information that doesn't. In particular, those 
parts of a semantic expression which contribute towards the interpretation of 
its dynamic significance within the dialogue, such as propositional attitude 
operators, are relatively less informative than those which refer to discourse 
entities. Thus in the structure: 
id : want! 
type: want 
thetheme : speaker 
[ 
id : gol 1 
thegoal : type : go 
thedest : london 
-corresponding to the utterance: I want to go to London, WANT 1 is relatively 
uninformative. Similar cases would be entities of type REPEAT in Could you 
repeat the departure time, and SAY in Did you say after seven thirty. However 
this heuristic must be refined to deal with cases where the description of the 
dialogue act includes the feature repeated : +, and where this repetition is 
possibly the effect of the interlocutor's failure to comprehend the dialogue 
significance of the act the first time round, for example: 
A did you say at <five> 
(4.68) C sorry 
A did you <say> at <five> 
The issue of repeated utterances has already been discussed in Section 3.4. 
2. Structures within the discourse model that contribute to task-domain informa-
tion are more informative than ones that don't. Thus ARRIVE -<iv TIME:330. 
Discourse entities such as ARRIVE, which do not directly contribute task infor-
mation, may be regarded in this respect as placeholders, with a similar effect 
to function words or case labels. 
3. Given two structures A and B, if the information content of A IS inferrable 
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from that of B, then B is more informative than A. Consider for example the 
phrase London Heathrow. Mention of the discourse entity H EA TH RO W is more 
informative than that of LON DON; it is common knowledge that Heathrow is 
an airport in London. Determining informativeness on such grounds relies on 
assumptions about mutual knowledge; an individual who had not visited Lon-
don might not know this fact, for example; another might not know that the 
less well-known Stansted was an airport in London, in which case an ordering 
which refused to assign relative priority to LONDON or STANSTED would be ap-
propriate. Nevertheless a speaker guilty of 'egocentrism' (Chafe 1974) because 
of an unwarranted assumption is unlikely to mislead the hearer on grounds 
of prosodic prominence alone. If the hearer perceives the relative prominence 
(which is not guaranteed when surface ordering follows focus ordering), he 
may simply draw the conclusion that this was a case of world knowledge that 
he should have been aware of, but wasn't. 
The rules for relative informativeness are summarised in (4.69) and (4.70): 
( 4.69) 
where IDSdm and IDSdm are those semantic ids explicitly represented in the discourse 
model, and their complement; and IDSta6k are those discourse model entities which 
are explicitly tied to the task. 
(4.70) 
Rule (4.69) can be illustrated by the sentence: You want to fly to Manchester, 
where WANT~ivFLY~ivMANCHESTER. Rule (4.70) is illustrated in the Cyprus dia-
logue: 
(4.71) [38] T2:SA:1516 (T) 30 C y'know the trains at gatwick station 
Here the reading> gatwick < station is preferred; in other contexts (eg, discussing 
London stations) the reverse might be the case. 
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4.3.3.6 Prioritising the prominence rules 
Having partitioned issues of relative prominence according to the fiw relations 
-(ix, -(h, -(if, -(P' -(iv, it remains to determine how these principles combine. Since 
all the relations are partial orderings, and what is required is a partial ordering, the 
simplest approach would be to merge the relations into one, by renaming each as the 
simple prominence order -(. However difficulties arise in cases where a giyen pair 
of discourse entities are assigned conflicting orderings according to different promi-
nence principles. For example, if LON DON has been recently mentioned, but DE PA RT 
hasn't, then LON DON -( h DE PART. However this conflicts with the informa ti yeness 
princi pIe, according to which DE PAR T -( iv LON DON. 
The non-historical ordering relations largely complement one another. Rela-
tive informativeness for example is related to assumptions about inferrability. By 
contrast, -(h may overrule prominence ordering derived from these. Consider for 
example the sentence: 
(4.72) ba843 leaves before ba125 
and it leaves before ba220 
If it co refers with ba843, then -(It. and -(p make the same predictions. Assuming the 
simplified semantics: 
[
type: leaves_befor'e ] 
earlier: X 
later: Y 
the parallel structures are identical except for the fillers of the later slot, which is 
therefore marked as more prominent by -(It.. But this is compatible with -(p, which 
marks it as less prominent (by -(p). The result, 
BA843 -( LEAVES-BEFORE -( BA220 
is a simple combination of -(It. and -(p. 
On the other hand, if it corefers with B Al 25, comparison of the two structures 
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results in disparity for the fillers of both earlier and later slots, giving: 
REST-<d BA125, BA220 } 
Although this violates -<p, -<h must be allowed to take priority, or there would be 
no way of distinguishing between coreference in parallel structures which observes 
the parallelism, and coreference which doesn't. A similar general argument may be 
made, that where there is conflict between -<h and other ordering principles, -<h 
wins. An independent reason for giving -<h priority is that to a certain extent this 
relation indicates how the current semantic structure can be built, re-using where 
possible previous structures from within the accessibility history. 
A prominence ordering incorporating -<ir, -<p, -<if, -<ill and -<h is therefore a par-
tial ordering incorporating all their ordering relations. 
I represent a partial ordering in normal form as a set of ordered pairs, with 
those removed that can be derived by transitivity. The left-associative operator 'ffi' 
is defined to be set union over such partial ordering, with precedence to the left: 
-<1 ffi -<2 consists of those pairs in -<t, with the addition of any pairs in -<2 which 
do not contradict relations in -<lor its transitive closure. The overall prominence 
ordering, -< is therefore: 
(4.73) 
The implementation of prominence ordering is discussed in Section 5.5.2. 
The combination rules can be applied to the Agent's utterances, in the dialogue 
of Figure 4.47. 
Firstly, for A1:what time do you want to arrive in Paris: 
{PARIS, CALLER }-<hREST 
WANT-<iIlREST 
{CALLER, PARIS} -< WANT -< {TIME, ARRIVE} 
In the case of A3:what time do you want to leave London, we have: 
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{TIM E, CA LLER }-<h REST -<h {DEPA RT, LON DON} 
WAN T -<ivD EPA RT -<ivL 0 N DON 
{CALLER, TIME} -< DEPART -< LONDON 
For A4:sa123 leaves London at twelve thirty: 
{DEPART,LONDON}-<h{SA123,1230} 
DEPART -<iv{LO N DO N ,SA 123,1230} 
{DEPART} -< {LONDON} -< {sAI23, 1230} 
Finally, for A4':and arrives in Paris at two thirty: 
{SA123}-<hREST-<dARRIVE, PARIS, 230} 
ARRIVE -<iv{LO N DO N ,SA 123,1230} 
{SA123}-<dARRIVE,PARIS, 230} 
4.3.4 Contrastive focus 
In the analysis so far, prominence patterns indicating accessibility have been re-
stricted to those where comparisons are between structures in a single, consistent 
information state. In this section I extend the model to cases of disparate informa-
tion states, such as might arise in a repair situation or when alternative solutions 
are proposed. On the prosodic side, I assume that relative prominence may be 
supplemented by emphasis, and that additionally local contour accompanying a 
prominence marking give further indication about how the content relates to the 
discourse model. 
4.3.4.1 Conflicting information states and repair 
In this section I pursue the idea that contrastive focus comes about because of the 
need to highlight the difference between mutually incompatible information states. 
Consider the case where the Caller corrects an earlier statement: 
(4.74) 
[SA 3:C1] 
[SA 3:A2] 
[SA 3:C2] 
[SA 3:A3] 
I was ringing to enquire about the flight SA 512 from 
paris. Is it on schedule 
512 from paris 
sorry, 513 
513 from paris 
One reading of [SA 3:A3]' in which the Agent takes note of the changed flight 
number, uses contrastive prominence to bring out the difference between the two 
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values: 
(4.7.5) [SA 3:A3] 51«3» from paris 
This emphasis was indeed observed in all readings. The algorithm for deriving focus 
from the accessibility history would in fact give this pattern for [SA 3:C2j, but 
not necessarily [SA 3:A3]. Moreover, being concerned with comparisons of a local, 
structural nature, it would fail to account for the observation that we are dealing 
with a repair, that conflicting values are at stake, and that the emphases, when 
made, are probably part of the speakers' intentions. 
In [SA 3:C2] the speaker explicitly corrected himself-the discourse marker sorry 
explicitly drawing attention to the repair. Alternatively, the correction may be 
initiated by the other party: 
(4.76) 
[SA 4:A8] 
[SA 4:C8] 
[SA 4:A9] 
arrive rome eleven thirty 
seven thirty 
no eleven thirty 
The cases 4.74 and 4.76 correspond to Caller-initiated and Agent-initiated repair, 
respectively. In both cases, we may say that the speaker is authorised to make the 
repair, as the original owner of the information-ie, the first to introduce it into the 
discourse. On the other hand, [SA 4:C8j might be viewed as an unauthorised Caller-
initiated repair; though it seems more likely that it is a case of simple mishearing. 
Consider also: 
[SA 8:C3j is there a flight around mid morning 
(4.77) 
[SA 8:A6] well, there's a flight at eight fifteen 
-where, it seems, A needs to stretch what counts as 'mid morning' to be able to 
retrieve a solution. This is a case of cooperative answering: where a solution that 
corresponds exactly to the Caller's requirements is lacking, a way out is to relax one 
or more of the initial constraints of the problem (eg. Kaplan 1983, Guyomard and 
Siroux 1989). Such a modification may be required by considerations of cooperative-
ness; it is nevertheless unauthorised, and its dispreferred nature may be expressed 
using a deferential tone, such as HLH , on eight fifteen. Further consideration of [SA 
4:C8] yields another case of unauthorised repair, this time Caller-initiated. Suppose 
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that C did hear the time correctly, but the time seven thirty seemed unreasonable 
because it conflicted with his expectations about how long the journey should take. 
C's repair is not a correction, but calls a value into question, possibly with an 
emphatic contour conveying incredulity: 
(4.78) i HLl.H seven thirty 
There seems to be a difference between this fall-rise and the deferential contour that 
accompanies a cooperative response: here the overall range is wider, and the lo\\' 
point is more likely to reach the bottom of the speaker's range. 
Another case of modification, which hardly counts as repair, is denial of a default 
value: 
( 4.79) 
[SA 4:A2] 
[SA 4:C2] 
[SA 4:A3] 
are you travelling from Heathrow 
no Stansted 
travelling from Stansted 
[SA 4:C2] is authorised, the Caller being the 'expert' about where he wants to travel 
from. But it would be unusual for Stansted in [SA 4:A3] to receive any contrastive 
prominence, because default values are readily overturned. On the other hand, an 
agent may resist the overturning of strong default assumptions, as in Example 4.78, 
or in the following: 
( 4.80) A there's a flight from Clapham C from i HLl. H Clapham 
the incredulity stemming from the strong default assumption that Clapham-a rela-
tively built-up area of south London-has no airport. A similar case is Example 4.27, 
reprinted here 
( 4.27) 
[2a] Tl :SA: (T) 
C: well he's got four forty five leaving malaga 
A: (well it's not our ... ) 
H leaving T THL malaga 
where the Agent is unable to find a flight corresponding to the Caller's specification, 
and so suggests the Caller may be mistaken. 
To summarise, where there are inconsistencies between the information states of 
agents, utterances which initiate or confirm repairs serve to bring out the differences. 
167 
by highlighting them. This is a cornmon factor behind the cases considered, whether 
or not the speaker has authority to make the repair; and whether a weak or a strong 
default has been overturned. 
4.3.4.2 Representing conflicting information states 
The cases of conflicting information states discussed above have been ones in which 
the conflict is local and temporary. Representing each information state by its own 
knowledge base of propositions is wasteful, and fails to bring out the locality of the 
discrepancy. Instead, the observation that speakers may introduce and refer to dis-
crepancies via intonational emphasis suggests a representation based on differences. 
This is achieved using a layered representation of information states: each informa-
tion state, or world, may inherit information from other worlds, so that only local 
additions and differences need to be represented. In particular, if information in a 
world Wi conflicts with that in a previous world W;-l, the changed information is 
represented at Wi and nothing else. 
Formally, let Wo ... Wn be a finite set of world indices: unique identifiers of 
information states. Define an inheritance relation /rom_w as a partial ordering over 
worlds, with Wo distinguished as the initial world or root; every world index inherits 
at least from Woo The local relation parenLw relating a world index and its parent 
is such that /rom_w can be derived as its transitive closure. I distinguish between 
local inheritance of two sorts: transparent and opaque. Transparent inheritance is 
monotonic-information can only be added at the daughter world, not taken away 
or modified. Opaque inheritance is non-monotonic. The relation /rom_w can thus 
be partitioned into /rom_wt for transparent inheritance, and /rom_wo for opaque 
inheritance. The knowledge local to a world index Wi is the set of propositions 
in/ _loealwi which Wi references. Then the total knowledge at a world index, in/Wi 
can be defined recursively as follows: 
(4.81 ) 
(4.82) 
in/wo - inf _loealwo 
in/WI - in/ _Ioealwi l±J U infwj 
wJ 
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where parenLw( Wi, Wj). The definition states that the information at Wi con-
sists of that defined locally, combined with that defined at ancestor worlds. The 
operator l:!J is union, with overriding where the relation between the disparate worlds 
IS an opaque one. 
Semantic expressions which bring about a world with conflicting information, 
or refer to one, are conveniently represented as sets of substitutions, where each 
old element is replaced by some (different) new element. For utterances where the 
modification is fully explicit, both new and old parts are referred to, as in not londoll, 
luton. Alternatively it may be sufficient to refer just to the new part, relying on 
emphatic accent to identify it from within a larger matrix structure-[SA 3:C2. 
3:A3]. 
I shall pursue the more general case of explicit modifications. These may be 
expressed semantically as instructions to replace the filler of a certain slot with a 
new value, for example, replace LONDON in < deparlureplace > with LUTON. A 
modification is defined to be a triple 
(elx, Old, New) 
where Old is the value at etx in one world, and New is a different value at a different 
world. I define the modifications of a world Wi, Mods( Wi)' as follows: 
( 4.83) Mods( Wi) - { 
(Ctx, Old, New) I 
Old,# New A 
Wi 1= value( elx, New) A 
:3 Wj(Jrom_w"( Wi, Wj) A 
~ 1= value( etx, Old)) 
} 
That is, Mods( Wd enumerates the changes between lVi and some parent(s} H'j. 
The possibility that Wi may have more than one parent world is left open; however 
in most cases that I have examined, single inheritance of worlds seems adequate. In 
order to be efficient, a modification should be minimal. I shall take this to mean 
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that nowhere are any substructures of Mods( Wd.old and Afods( }Vd. new identical, 
where 
Afods(Wd.old == {Old I (etx, Old, New) E Afods(lVd} 
and Afods( Wi). new is defined similarly. The requirement that two structures be 
recursively different is expressed by the relational operator 'f.'. This fits the cases 
described here, and is also in line with the computational treatment of modifications 
described in Section 5.2. It arguably lacks efficiency, since there will be cases where 
a number of modifications could be replaced by just one which breaks the recursively 
different constraint. 
Having defined Mods( Wi)' the patterns of contrastive prominence for the cases: 
• explicit modification: not five thirty, nine thirty; 
• semi-explicit modification: no, nine thirty; 
• implicit modification: nine thirty; 
• denial: not five thirty 
can be defined as follows: 
( 4.84) EMod.1 REST -+< Mods( Wi).old 
( 4.85) EMod.2 REST -+< Mods( Wd.new 
( 4.86) [Mod REST -+< Mods( Wd. new 
( 4.87) DEN REST -+< Mods( Wd.old 
where EMod.1, EMod.2 correspond to the first and second parts of an explicit 
modification expression, [Mod to an implicit or semi-explicit one, and DEN to a 
denial. Not surprisingly, EMod.2 and [Mod have the same prominence conditions, 
as do EMod.1 and DEN. 
As an example, consider the case where the speaker wishes to modify the arrival 
time 530 to 930. Underlying this modification are two worlds with indices W}, W2: 
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Wl F= value( < departuretime >, 
W2 F= value( < departuretime >, 
id : time_point! 
type : time[_~~i7~ourl 1 
thehour : type: hour 
value: 5 
[ 
id : minutes I 1 
theminutes: type: min utes 
value: 30 
id : time_pointl 
type : time[_~~i~l~our2 1 
thehour : type: hour 
value: 9 
[ 
id : minutesl 1 
theminutes: type: minutes 
value: 30 
The structures are shown in detail to demonstrate that they only disagree at the 
level of < departuretime thehour >; ie, the minimum modification is given by: 
[ 
id: hourI 1 [id: hour2 1 
M ods( W2 ) = {( < departuretime thehour >, type: hour , type: hour )} 
value : 5 value : 9 
An explicit repair can be formed on the pattern: not EAfod.l, E.i\fod.2, where 
WI F EAfod.l, W2 1= EMod.2. EMod.l minimally will be Mods( W2 ).old, and 
Elvlod.2 Mods( W2 ).new, ie 5 and 9. They could however contain common material 
from WI or preceding worlds, as in not leaving at 530, leaving at 930. At least 
the minutes information is needed, to block the default 'oclock' interpretation. The 
pattern of prominences for EMod.l is: 
REST ~ mods( W2).old 
ie,MINUTESl -+< HOURI 
and for EMod.2: 
REST ~ mods( W2).new 
ie,MINUTES2 -+< HOUR2 
Note that the identifier TIME-POINTI may be dropped from the ordering, since it 
doesn't explicitly introduce a lexical entry. 
A similar technique may be used to account for contrastive prominence ,,,,here 
the roles differ. In the utterance: 
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(4.88) not from Heathrow, to Heathrow 
This time the underlying worlds WI and W2 give: 
.. [ LOCATIONl ] 
WI F value( < departureplace >, theairport: HEATHROW ) 
. [ LOCATIONl ] 
W2 1= value( < arrzvalplace >, theairport: HEATHROW ) 
In the grammar used here, the words from and to are treated as semantically 
void; they serve as placeholders, indicating in the lexical entry for travel, for example, 
which subcategorial arguments fill which roles. The elliptical case (4.88) is difficult, 
because to associate the semantic roles with the prepositional placeholders, it is 
necessary to assume a matrix verb such as travel-corresponding to discourse entity 
GO l, then drop it. I assume that the word travelling is added, giving 
( 4.89) EMod.l = 
[ 
id : gol 1 
type: go 
[ 
LOCATIONl ] departureplace : . 
theazrport : HEATHROW 
[ 
::p/o:o 1 
. I I [ LOCATIONl ] 
arrzva pace: th . rt 
eazrpo : HEATHROW 
( 4.90) EMod.2 = 
The modification giving rise to the appropriate prominence pattern is: 
Mods( W2) = {« >, [ departureplace: HEATHROW] ,[ arrivalplace : HEATHROW]))} 
Then for the lexical entry travelling, the subcategorial argument corresponding 
to the departureplace role in (4.89)-ie, from Heathrow-is raised to contrastive 
prominence; inside this Heathrow can be demoted, giving: 
( 4.91) not tra veIling <<:from» > Heathrow < 
EAfod.2 can be dealt with similarly. 
In Section 5.2.1, I give details of how world indices are incorporated in the 
discourse model implementation. Section 5.3.3 explains how choices regarding con-
trastive prominence are made. Dialogues nfenq311, nfenq511, nfenq611 and nfenq811 
in Appendix D illustrate the working of the Sundial message output sub-system, in 
various cases involving altered belief states. 
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4.3.4.3 Alternative solutions 
The use of worlds to represent potentially disparate information states may be ex-
tended to representing multiple database solutions within the discourse model. A 
solution which satisfies a set of constraints supplied by the Caller may be represented 
within the discourse model as an instantiation of those constraints. For example. 
times which were loosely specified can be made precise with respect to a timetable. 
But simply adding the information of the solution has drawbacks: 
1. The distinction between the original constraints and their satisfaction becomes 
blurred; 
2. most important, there is no way of representing multiple solutions, each of 
which forms an alternative instantiation of the original constraints. 
If the representation of the discourse model makes use of world-indices, a straight-
forward solution is possible. Given a set of constraints at world index We. together 
with n database solutions SOlI' .. Soln' create n worlds l¥c+l'" Wc+n, obeying: 
( 4.92) 'v'i:l:5i:5n 
That is, a world is created for each distinct solution, inheriting transparently 
from the world where the original constraints were specified. As a result, the ini-
tial constraints are kept distinct from each solution, and any number of mutually 
incompatible solutions may be asserted, at different world indices. 
For example, if the Caller gives the constraints 
[
type: single_journey 
th d rt . [ th~place : london 1 e epa ure. ' . t etame : mornmg 
thedate : monday 
asserted at world index Wo, the alternative solutions: 
< thedeparture thetime > 0840 
< thedeparlure thetime> 0950 
< thedepU1'ture thetime> 1020 
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may be respectively asserted at WI, W2 , W3 • A sentence derivable from this 
information is given in (4.93): 
(4.93) 6: A7there are flights at 840, 950 and 1020 
Consider now the more informative utterance in Example 4.94. 
HLH <BA123> leaves at <840> 
(4.94) HLH <BA226> leaves at <950> 
and HLH <BA358> leaves at <1020> 
Note that the prominences are only grossly specified; it is likely that bee ay will 
be defocussed in the latter two phrases. Utterances like (4.94) are best analysed in 
terms of theme-rheme organisation (eg. Bolinger 1989: 389-391), where the theme, 
or sentential topic, is intonationally marked in each case with a fall-rise. 
Theme-rheme organisation as a unifying device has been explored by de Fries 
(1983), where it is applied to the method of development of a span of text, reflecting 
some principle of organisation such as spatial, temporal, or list organisation. In this 
study I concentrate on theme-rheme organisation as applied to parallel utterances, 
deriving from a set of database solutions. Here each solution is presented from the 
point of view of a local topic, or theme; in (4.94) this is the flight number. Theme-
rheme organisation in an utterance may be based on the Caller's requirements, for 
example, when asked: 
(4.95) when are there flights from london airports leaving in the morning 
an appropriate reply might be 
from HLH Stansted at 840 
(4.96) from HLH Gatwick at 950 
and from HLH Heathrow at 1020 
Or the organisation may not explicitly reflect anything in the preceding discourse, 
but be based on a default model representing how information can be most conve-
niently packaged. This might be the case in (4.94); theme-rheme ordering might 
even reflect known characteristics of a database model, such as the physical layout 
of columns in a printed timetable. 
Theme-rheme organisation may be represented by assuming that the hearer is 
being presented with information in the form of a functional relation over every 
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solution instance, with the themes corresponding to the domain of the function. 
Thus for (4.94), the function (4.97) can be defined, with an instance given by (4.98). 
This replaces the (less directed) relational pairs (4.99). 
( 4.97) 
( 4.98) 
(4.99) 
times_for _fids : FID --+ TIME 
{stansted ~ 840, gatwick ~ 950, heathrow ~ 1020} 
{(stansted, 840), (gatwick, 950), (heathrow, 1020)} 
I do not pursue how such a function is derived, but assume it can be dynamically 
defined for a set of solutions, either by virtue of the Caller's orientation. as in (4.9.5). 
or because of a default pattern of organisation, as in (4.94). 
To display such organisation, an utterance must have a number of properties: 
1. its components need to be structurally parallel; 
2. theme-rheme organisation must be present across the components, so that 
in every component the theme and rheme are identifiable, and structurally 
parallel to corresponding themes and rhemes in other components; 
3. if possible, theme and rheme are focally prominent, and identified apart into-
nationally. 
The requirement that theme and rheme be focally prominent might be satisfied by 
founding this prominence on the difference between solution world indices and their 
parent, as was done for contrastive repair utterances in Section 4.3.4.1. However 
consideration of the following example suggests that prominences for theme and 
rheme may alternatively be derived via the accessibility history: 
from HLH Stansted at 840 
(4.100) from HLH Gatwick at 950 
and from Gatwick at 1120 
If the theme-rheme organisation is most important, then the second mention of 
Gatwick will have a HLH accent. But a better reading would probably make use of 
the accessibility history and defocus the second Gatwick. 
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Put formally, the function Tn is defined over SoLIds, where 
SoLIds = U win! _local( Wd. ids 
I 
(c+1~i~c+n) 
is the set of all solution entities; it partitions SoLIds exhaustively. Every solution 
is a relational instance of TR: 
I shall refer to the instance of Tn particular to Wi as TRw;. A further possible con-
straint is that all the themes belong to the same context, theme(TR), and similarly, 
all rhemes belong to rheme(Tn): 
'v' Wi ( 
Wi F value( theme{TR), dom TR.w;} 1\ 
Wi F value{rheme{TR),ran Tnw;) 
) 
where dom and ran are operators on a function which return its domain and range 
respecti vely. 
This function does not directly affect prominence ordering for each component of 
the utterance. Under normal conditions, where solutions are all distinct, the histor-
ical accessibility prominence ordering -<h (cf. Section 4.3.3.2) will give prominence 
to all themes and rhemes. Thus for Example 4.100, Tn consists of the relation 
instances: 
(STANSTED,840) 
(G ATW ICK, 950) 
(HEATHROW,1120) 
If two successive rhemes are the same, the second will be given reduced prominence 
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from HLH Stansted at 840 
(4.101) from HLH Gatwick at >840< 
Two themes may also be the same, violating the constraint that Tn be a func-
tion: 
from HLH Stansted at 840 
(4.102) from HLH Stansted at 920 
Example 4.102 suggests that we relax the functional constraint, which isn't really 
necessary, and require only that Tn be a many-to-many mapping, for which the 
themes and the rhemes are contextually aligned. But the equally plausible read-
ing: 
from HLH Stansted at 840 
(4.103) from >Stansted< at 920 
in which Stansted is demoted because of -<h, could be allowed by permitting the 
pair (STANSTED, 920) to be excluded from Tn, or even allowing all the entries 
corresponding to STANSTED to be grorped together, so that the relational instance 
becomes: 
(stansted, (840,920, ... )) 
I take the second solution, of dropping from Tn relation instances that would violate 
functionality. 
The function does however impose a linearisation constraint whereby if possible 
the parts of a phrase corresponding to the theme precede those corresponding to the 
rheme. Surface order constraints in the lexicon mayor may not allow theme-rheme 
ordering to go ahead; if necessary, where lexical choice exists, entries which allow 
this ordering should be preferred. If the ordering is lexically blocked, it may still be 
imposed via some stylistic ordering device such as topicalisation, or passivisation. 
On the other hand, intonational marking of Tn instances is sufficiently strong for 
the linearisation constraint to be overruled. Consider Example 2.43 (reprinted here): 
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(2.43) a) London's the capital of Scotland isn't it? 
b) No HL Edinburgh's the capital of HLH Scotland] 
HLH London's the capital of HL England. 
The functional mapping which would naturally emerge from a knowledge repre-
sentation (say a geographical database) would be that of (4.104), with the instance 
( 4.105): 
( 4.104) 
( 4.105) 
country_capital: COUNTRY ~ CITY 
{england 1--+ london, scotland 1--+ edinburgh} 
In place of this straightforward mapping, (2.43b) presents a 'skewed' one 
( 4.106) {scotland 1--+ edinburgh, london 1--+ england}. 
Here the domain and range are of heterogeneous types; this arises out of the need 
to repair a previous misconception. 
In Section 5.3.3 I give details of the implementation of the theme-rheme relation. 
4.3.5 Discourse-model-related focus: a summary 
If we assume that the relative prominence in surface trees, as manifest for example 
in prosodic accent, derives in part from relative prominence at a conceptual level, 
this semantic prominence may come about in a number of ways. Prominence is in-
versely related to accessibility. Semantic structures may be accessible because they 
are the same, or modified versions, of recent structures. Deictic expressions such 
as I, you, here, now are also taken to be particularly accessible. Discourse entities 
which for particular reasons not considered in this thesis are represented as pronouns, 
are treated as highly accessible and hence of low prominence. Discourse entities not 
explicitly introduced, but inferrable, are potentially higher in the prominence hierar-
chy than highly accessible entities. Within a semantic structure, components which 
are more interesting on context-independent grounds (such as those which reference 
task information) will by default be more prominent. All of these orderings may be 
overruled by prominence derived from modification with respect to the accessibility 
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history. Even more prominent (generally raised to emphatic prominence) are dis-
course entities correspondil1g to modifications with respect to a former information 
state. 
Discourse entities in parallel structures resulting from describing alternative solu-
tions to a query are ordered for prominence according to the historical/modification 
principles. However the information may be further organised by giving it the direc-
tion of functionality, manifest both textually and prosodically in the theme-rheme 
structure of the utterance. 
4.4 Focus assignment and speaker's intention 
I have shown (Section 4.3.4) that when a repair utterance needs to address the 
fact that an information state has become modified, the focus properties of the 
message that convey the modification are integral to the speaker's intention. This 
may be contrasted with the situation where focal properties merely serve to aid the 
listener by conveying accessibility information (Section 4.3.3.2). In the latter case, 
utterances with inappropriate focus patterns will, ceteribus paribus, still succeed in 
their intentions. This is not the case for repair utterances. Consider the utterance 
[SA 4:A9] uttered in the following manner 
(4.107) <eleven><thirty> 
If this is preceded with no, the hearer may infer (incorrectly) that minutes, or indeed 
the whole time expression, are in need of modification; without any such discourse 
marker, there is no indication that this is a repair utterance. 
The observation that repair utterances are necessarily specified for certain pat-
terns of focus, may be generalised to dialogue acts in general: 
(4.108) A dialogue act which is referential (ie, not a phatic utterance) may require 
for its successful performance that certain focal elements be made prominent. 
the nature of the prominence depending on the dialogue act. 
I shall refer to this as the principle of intended focus. Thus confirmation utterances 
require that the material needing confirmation be prominent; similarly utterances 
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conveying new information require it to be prominent. The intented focus principle 
is important for a number of reasons. It represents another ordering principle, which 
generally takes priority over those based on accessibility. Often the two mechanisms 
will make similar predictions. Where the intention is to present new information, for 
example, the accessibility mechanisms will result in that information being raised 
in prominence, because accessible information is generally lowered. However the 
accessibility mechanism will not always deliver appropriate results: take the case 
of a confirmation request, consisting of a repetition. The accessibility mechanisms 
are incapable of singling out the element(s) requiring confirmation. The intentional 
focus of the utterance must include discourse entities about which doubt exists. If 
it is Stansted that requires confirmation in from Stansted on monday, for example, 
raising the discourse entity s TAN S TED in prominence will result in an appropriate 
ranking: 
(4.109) from <<Stansted»on monday 
-where monday is assumed not to require explicit confirmation.5 
As in Section 4.3.4, I shall assume that local contours may be exploited to more 
precisely indicate the nature of the focus. 
4.4.1 Intended focus in the case of repair utterances 
In order to characterise intended focus more exactly, I return to the case of repair 
utterances which make use of contrastive focus. A repair act incorporating a mod-
ification requires that attention be drawn to the modification. This means that in 
the case of an implicit repair with contrastive focus on M ods( Wd. new (cf. Sec-
tion 4.3.4.2), making these items prominent is part of the intention of the utterance. 
Consider now the various situations in which modification utterances can be 
made: 
Confirnling an authorised modification: Consider again Example 4.74: 
5 By virtue of its nuclear position, with other informational elements in the tail, it is not necessary 
in this case for the accent on Stansted to be emphatic. 
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(4.74) 
[SA 3:C1] 
[SA 3:A2] 
[SA 3:C2] 
[SA 3:A3] 
I was ringing to enquire about the flight SA 512 from 
Paris. Is it on schedule 
512 from Paris 
sorry, 513 
513 from Paris 
In [SA 3:A3], A is confirming an authorised repair. Two contours seem possi-
ble: 
(4.110) five oneTHLH three from Paris 
(4.111) five oneTHLthree from Paris !] 
The emphatic prominence on 'three' is shown as a boosted pitch accent; how-
ever emphasis could equally well be conveyed by amplitude or phrasing. Apart 
from the emphasis, the major difference is the nuclear tone. In (4.110) there 
is a clearer indication that the speaker expects the confirmation utterance to 
be taken as strong. Example 4.111 may still elicit a response; however unlike 
(4.110) a yes answer is probably expected. This makes it, in the terminology 
of Brown et al. (1980), a conducive question. In the Swedish Corpus, all 
speakers in fact used a falling nucleus. 
Confirming doubtful information: Take again (4.110), uttered this time in a 
context not where a modification is being made, but where A has failed to hear 
clearly one of the digits of e's preceding utterance. In this case it is possible 
to use a discourse representation based on the disparity between two worlds, 
WI and W2 , where 
WI 1= value ( < flightn umber>, B A 51 ? ) 
W2 1= value( <flightnumber >, B A 513) 
parenLw( W2 , WI) 
and W2 is marked to indicate that information local to it is of doubtful validity. 
Once again, the modified element is emphasised; however on this occasion, the 
HLH contour is more appropriate: a HL contour would misleadingly sugg<'st 
confidence in the value. 
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Authorised correction: The Caller has uttered a value incompatible with that 
previously provided by the Agent, and which the Agent is expert about, as in 
(4.76 )-reproduced here: 
( 4.76) 
[SA 4:A8] 
[SA 4:C8] 
[SA 4:A9] 
arrive Rome eleven thirty 
seven thirty 
no eleven thirty 
In 4:A9, A is authorised to make the change, since C's supposed confirma-
tion initiative involves an unauthorised modification. The most likely reading 
(observed in the recordings) is 
(4.112) no eTHL leven thirty 
An HLH contour would be possible here, but tends to sound deferential or pa-
tronising (compare unauthorised modification below). In the Swedish Airlines 
corpus, speakers used the HL contour. 
Unauthorised modification: The Agent may wish to modify the constraints 
set by the Caller, in order to avoid the even more dispreferred situation of not 
responding at all (eg. Kaplan 1983, Guyomard and Siroux 1989). Thus in 
Example 4.77 (reproduced here) 
[SA 8:C3] is there a flight around mid morning 
(4.77) 
[SA 8:A6] well, there's a flight at eight fifteen 
eight fifteen is probably a weakening of the constraint mid morning. 
There seems to be a strong association in English between such constraint-
relaxation utterances, and the use of the fall-rise. For example, [SA 8:A6] may 
be uttered 
there's a flight at Height fifHLH teen 
Ladd (1980) and Ward and Hirschberg (1985) attempt to give truth-conditional 
accounts, in their treatment of similar utterances (d. Section 2.5.4). Instead 
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I treat this as a distinct component of a suggestive act intended to convey a 
placatory attitude on the part of the speaker. Evidence for this is the use of 
this contour when an agent is pleading, cajoling, or in some way attempting 
to persuade. It then seems more reasonable to invoke pragmatic principles, to 
the effect that when an agent is unable to fulfil some assumed requirement of 
the interlocutor, (s)he is socially required to be deferential. That set-theoretic 
accounts of the use of the fall-rise accent are misleading may be demonstrated 
by the following example: 
(4.113) 
10 am: Nick: There are ten sweets in this bag 
Don't eat all of them 
10.30 am: Nick: Well, I bet you did eat all the sweets 
Ben: I ate one 
In (4.113), Ben would be unlikely to feel the need to be deferential, since he 
was not violating any of Nick's expectations. However, an emphatic fall on 
one, conveying indignation, would be appropriate. 
Note furthermore, that (4.77) still works when the fall-rise on eight fifteen is 
replaced with a fall; however, the dispreferred nature of the act is no longer 
softened. 
Confirmation of a modification overturning defaults: We have seen (Sec-
tion 4.3.4.1) that the nature of prominence on the modified item depends 
on the strength of the default that was overturned: 
(4.79) 
(4.80) 
[SA 4:A2] 
[SA 4:C2] 
[SA 4:A3] 
are you travelling from heathrow 
no stansted 
travelling from stansted 
A there's a flight from Clapham 
C from i HL.LH Clapham 
whereas III (4.79 )-reproduced here-contrastive prominence on stansted is 
not appropriate, in (4.80) contrastive prominence on Clapham, together with 
a tone conveying incredulity, is acceptable. 
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4.4.2 Intended focus in non-repair utterances 
A repair utterance which refers to a modification of information requires that some 
form of prominence be given to items which refer to that modification. In the case 
of non-repair ~tterances with informative content, it may still be necessary to give 
this content prominence. I consider the two cases of (non-repair) confirmations, and 
informative utterances. 
Confirmations: I suggest above that confirmation requests where some modifi-
cation has taken place, or where there is serious doubt about some value, be 
treated together with repair utterances, as cases requiring contrastive promi-
nence. However, it may be argued that we have a continuum, whereby promi-
nence is given to elements to the extent that they are in need of confirmation. 
If for example fl' f2, f3 are the elements requiring confirmation (in increasing 
order of need), the prominence requirements may be stated: 
If there is confidence about a value, it may be relatively or absolutely defo-
cussed. This makes it considerably more difficult for the interlocutor to effect 
a repair if the value is wrong: 
(4.114) ~:~ travelling to HL Paris from >London< from i HLl.H Luton 
Informative utterances: The rules for prioritising accessibility-related promI-
nence (d. Section 4.3.3.6) already rank informative entities concerning details 
such as times and flight numbers over mere placeholders such as TRAVEL, AR-
RIVE. The relation '-<iv' carries with it no guarantee of special prominence; 
however an utterance intended to impart information must do so by ensuring 
that the information is maximally intelligible. Giving prosodic prominence to 
the new information achieves this. Thus in 
(4.115) A.S: there are flights at HLH seven, eight fiilILH teen, 
and H ten ! HL thirty 
184 
from Dialogue 1 of the Swedish Corpus, prominence is required on seven, eight 
fifteen and ten thirty. A distinction can be made between the prominence re-
quirements here, and those for repair utterances, which I have shown to mostly 
require emphatic prominence. The use of emphasis in (4.115) is pragmati-
cally ruled out, since it would presuppose a modification-unless, that is, the 
new information does violate some existing constraint. As far as contours are 
concerned, Example 4.115 clearly demonstrates that these are derived at the 
phrase level, not at the level of sentence accents. 
In both cases of non-repair utterances discussed, the intentional component of focus 
is relatively weak; emphasis and contours with local scope are not required. 
4.4.3 Representing intended focus 
Intended focus means that certain discourse entities referred to in an utterance be 
given special prominence, as part of the speaker's intention. I shall call the set of 
such entities the information profile of the message underlying the utterance. Under 
normal conditions, if an utterance has a non-empty information profile, this acts as 
a lower limit on possible ellipsis; ie, elliptical utterances must at least reference all 
elements of the information profile. I have shown that elements of the information 
profile are typically more prominent than others in the utterance, the nature of the 
prominence depending on the intention of the utterance. In addition, in certain 
cases a local contour (or tonal accent) which tends to accompany utterances of that 
intention will be associated with accents corresponding to information profile ele-
ments. In Table 4.4, I summarise the kinds of prominence. Typical tonal accents are 
given, where these are specific to a particular intention, together with references to 
the SA corpus. The degenerate case where no special prominence is associated with 
an element requiring confirmation is also dealt with, by associating no prominence 
type. 
Association of intended focus with a message M can then be described as follows: 
If M is to be described using an ordered set of discourse entities (ids-1vt, -<M)' where 
idsM are the discourse entities and -<M the instance of the prominence relation that 
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orders them, then the required focus specification focus(M) is the structure 
where ipM(~ ids-AA) is the information profile corresponding to M; -<VI is derived 
from -<M by applying the associated prominence type to members of iPM, overriding 
where necessary; and toneM is the tonal accent associated with M, where specified. 
In the intonational contour that results, constituents corresponding to members of 
iPM will receive the appropriate degree of prominence, as well as being associated 
with toneM. Details of contour derivation in the implemented system are presented 
in Chapter 5. 
4.5 Towards a unified account of utterance pro-
duct ion 
4.5.1 Focus assignment as a part of utterance production 
In the analysis of focus-assignment mechanisms up till now, computational princi-
pIes underlying the production of utterances have been largely assumed. However an 
account of focus assignment which shares mechanisms with those required indepen-
dently for the production of utterances, if it can be achieved, is to be preferred. In 
this section I give an overview of the computational mechanisms that are assumed to 
be required for language production, indicating how the focus assignment principles 
proposed fit in with these mechanisms. 
intention prominence type tonal accent corpus 
confirm authorised modification -<-< THL [SA 3:A3] 
confirm doubtful information -<-< HLH 
authorised modification -<-< (t)HL [SA 4:A9] 
unauthorised modification -<-< HLH [SA 9:A4] 
weak default overturned 
-< HL [SA 4:C2] 
strong default overturned -<-< THL.L H Ex. 4.80 
confirmation -< or none 
informative 
-< 
Table 4.4: Association between intention and effects on prominence 
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Production starts with an intention to speak. In the model of dialogue proposed 
in Section 3.3, this intention takes the form of a dialogue act label combined with a 
reference to the informational elements that must be included in the message. The 
latter are equivalent to the information profile of the message, already discussed in 
Section 4.4.3. Starting with this input, production down to the level of a prosodically 
structured text string, takes place in three major phases. Firstly, a directed acyclic 
graph (DAG) which spans and may extend the information profile, is derived as a 
subgraph of the discourse model. Secondly, this graph may be extended by semantic 
entities which lie outside the domain of the discourse model, as defined here: namely, 
those indicating propositional attitude components or serving as discourse markers 
and connectives. This is done on the basis of the dialogue act label, which may 
contain information about the role of the act in the greater conversational context. 
Additionally syntactic features indicating properties of the utterance such as mood, 
and other stylistic preferences, are added. Finally, an analysis tree is built, using 
knowledge from the lexicon to derive grammatical and lexical constraints which are 
added to the existing semantic ones. Interleaved with this last process, or as a post 
process, assignment of prosodic prominence and contours takes place. In Chapter 5 
I discuss in more detail the design and implementation of the first stage (description 
building: Section 5.3) and the third stage (linguistic generation: Section 5.4). 
4.5.2 A unified account of focus assignment 
There appears to be a certain amount of redundancy between the mechanisms for 
assignment of focal prominence operating at the linguistic, attentional and inten-
tional levels. Take for example, the case of contrastive focus in a repair utterance. 
The fact that the utterance will encode a modification is already present at the 
intentional level, where it may even be indicated what the modification is to be. 
At the attentionallevel, the modification is apparent from the discrepancy between 
information states; again at the linguistic level, providing the replaced structure has 
appeared in a recent utterance, the modification can be constructed using the lin-
guistic history. Consider again the case of defocussing relatively accessible material. 
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At the attentionallevel, the recent occurrence of the relevant discourse entities will 
be apparent from the accessibility history; but this information is also present, in 
the form of reusable linguistic structures, in the linguistic history. This suggests 
that, while the analysis at the individual levels has appeared reasonable, something 
must be done at a global architectural level both to eliminate this redundancy from 
the account of processing, and to ensure that the different levels do not throw up 
contradictory results. As I argue below, there are a number of reasons why this 
apparent superfluity should be tolerated: 
1. Some phenomena can only be explained at a certain level. If we reconsider 
the example discussed on Page 135, an attempt to draw structural parallels 
between the conceptual representations NINE SEVEN and ONE SEVEN will be 
ignored at the lexical level, since seventeen doesn't decompose, and will there-
fore fail to be capable of being marked as parallel to the surface structure 
ninety seven. On the other hand, it might seem reasonable to argue that num-
bers are not decomposed into their digits at a conceptual level, this happening 
only in the lexicon. In this case, the account of focus with respect to the 
linguistic history is required, to make sense of parallel structures which can 
be prosodically marked, such as thirty seven and forty seven. Similar issues 
are raised by considerations of phrases incorporating the word double, such as 
occur in some utterances of telephone numbers. Apart from this, prominence 
of affixes, as in not deduce, J:§.duce can only be accounted for at a coarse level 
by the conceptual accessibility mechanisms, and needs in addition comparison 
of syllables at a surface level. 
It must be also admitted that a mechanisms proposed at some level may be 
more ungainly than one achieving the same thing at a different level. Take 
contrastively stressed prepositions, as in not from luton, 1JJ. /uton Because of 
cases where from luton was never explicitly said, as in the following: 
c: 
(4.116) A: 
c: 
I want to travel to luton. I need to leave at five 
leaving luton at five 
not from luton, to luton 
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I proposed in Section 4.3.4 an approach at a conceptual level to modifica-
tions which involve changed roles rather than changed values. But a surface 
structural approach is much more straightforward. 
2. The different levels may complement each other, each contributing to the re-
sult. Compare the cases of responses to violation of weak and strong defaults. 
Both involve at the attentional level discrepancies between the information 
states. But the prosodic marking of the two cases tends to be quite differ-
ent, the changed items being played down in the weak case, and exaggerated, 
maybe with a tone conveying incredulity, in the strong case. The incredulous 
response is clearly inviting a reaction from the interlocutor; the toned-down 
response can be relatively indifferent. Such a decision is best taken at the 
intentional level. 
3. a 'levels' approach is still valuable even if all the decisions on the speakers 
part are taken at a single level, because in using the prosodic signals, the 
hearer may be in an asymmetrical position vis-a.-vis the speaker. The decision 
taken by the speaker at the conceptual level to indicate reuse with respect to 
the accessibility history may be used most efficiently during parsing by the 
listener. 
4. independently of considerations of focus assignment, the temporary configu-
rations at one level of production may help at a later level, if they can be fed 
forward. For example, even admitting that a linguistic history mechanism is 
useful for dealing with structural phenomena not accountable for at a con-
ceptual level, most instances of reuse which are detected in the accessibility 
history could go forward to the linguistic history and eliminate the search that 
would otherwise be necessary to retrieve the relevant surface forms. 
The implementation described in Chapter 5 takes this last point into account, 
by allowing accessibility signals produced at the description stage to feed forward 
to the linguistic generation stage, where they guide the surface reuse algorithm. 
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4.6 Summary 
In this chapter I have considered mechanisms at different levels which may be said to 
govern the assignment of prominence during production. The levels may be termed 
linguistic, attentional and intentional. At the linguistic level the possibility of ac-
cessing previous surface structures, as stored in the linguistic history, was discussed. 
At the same time, a representation was introduced capable of describing both lexical 
entries, and, by extension, analysis trees. At the attentionallevel, I introduced the 
concept of the discourse model, and defined a representation for it. Various criteria, 
according to which a discourse model may be considered to be more or less acces-
sible, were presented. In particular, an accessibility history which records previous 
conceptual structures forming part of the discourse was proposed. I introduced the 
notion of information states indexed by worlds in order to handle cases of discrepan-
cies, and alternative solutions. At the same time, it was possible to relate these to 
the repair utterances which often come with such discrepancies. At the intentional 
level, I introduced the information profile, which the message can be thought to be 
about. This necessitates special prominence for discourse entities which are part of 
it. 
Finally, I indicated how the mechanisms for prominence assignment proposed 
in this chapter may be combined within a full account of utterance production by 
the speaker. The mechanisms may be mutually redundant, or they may conflict. 
I therefore presented a framework within which the mechanisms can be seen to 
support one another, and make the correct decisions at the appropriate levels. 
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